ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REBALANCING OF PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTS AND THE THEORY OF UNPREDICTABILITY AS THE LEGAL GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR REBALANCING REQUESTS

Abstract

The economic and financial rebalancing of public works administrative contracts is a subject of high constitutional, academic, and practical relevance, as it ensures the continuity of contractual performance in the face of unforeseeable events that disrupt the initial balance between burdens and benefits, safeguarding both public and private interests. The general objective of this study is to analyze the legal foundations of rebalancing, with emphasis on the theory of unpredictability as the legitimate guiding principle for contractual revision requests. The methodology adopted was qualitative, based on bibliographic and documentary research, including critical analysis of legislation, legal doctrine, and consolidated case law, particularly from the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU). The main findings show that rebalancing is not a discretionary prerogative of the Administration but a constitutional legal duty, whose application requires a strict distinction between ordinary risk (borne by the contractor) and extraordinary risk (an unforeseeable event or one with incalculable consequences). TCU’s jurisprudence acts as a technical filter, demanding robust proof of causal nexus and rejecting generic claims or those based on foreseeable risks, such as exchange rate fluctuations or poor initial pricing. It is concluded that the theory of unpredictability constitutes the legitimate legal foundation for contractual revision, ensuring material justice, continuity of public works, and protection of public funds, provided it is applied with rigorous evidentiary standards and appropriate legal technique, thus preventing abuses and preserving the stability of contractual relations.