ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE OF COMMISSIONED ATTORNEYS: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES IN LIGHT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND MUNICIPAL AUTONOMY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATE OF TOCANTINS

Abstract

This article analyzes the possibility of commissioned prosecutors acting judicially in defense of public entities, a topic that raises controversy due to the restrictive interpretation of Article 37, items II and V, of the Federal Constitution and the thesis established by the Supreme Federal Court in Theme 1010 of General Repercussion. The starting point is the following: does the absolute prohibition on commissioned prosecutors' performance of procedural acts compromise administrative efficiency and municipal autonomy? The study aims to demonstrate that, as long as constitutional and legal limits are observed, the action of these agents is legitimate and necessary to ensure public governance. Methodologically, a qualitative approach is adopted, with normative, doctrinal, and jurisprudential analysis. A comparative study of the legislation of Gurupi, Palmas, and Araguaína is also conducted, highlighting different organizational models of municipal prosecutors' offices. The results indicate that legislation that clearly describes responsibilities and respects proportionality between tenured and appointed positions is compatible with the Constitution, while omitted or generic rules lead to judicialization and inefficiency. The conclusion is that the rigid interpretation of Theme 1010 should be mitigated in favor of the principles of administrative efficiency (Art. 37, caput) and municipal autonomy (Arts. 18 and 30, Federal Constitution), allowing appointed prosecutors to perform technical tasks complementary to advisory and leadership roles, without usurping the responsibilities of tenured positions.