THE MIRAGE OF AUTONOMY IN BRAZILIAN FEDERAL FEDERALISM: FISCAL ASYMMETRY, TRANSFER DEPENDENCY, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN BRAZIL

Abstract

This research proposes a critical analysis of Contemporary Brazilian Federalism, examining the Mirage of Municipal Autonomy in the face of chronic fiscal asymmetry and high dependency on constitutional transfers, such as the Municipal Participation Fund (FPM). The general objective is to diagnose the ineffectiveness of the current pact and prescribe governance models that ensure the full self-management capacity of local governments. Employing specialized bibliographic review in Public Finance and Constitutional Law and the hypothetical-deductive method, the work confirms that the concentration of revenue at the Federal level, coupled with the unconditionality of transfers, nullifies incentives for own-source revenue efforts, thus perpetuating the financial unsustainability of thousands of municipalities. The central conclusion is that this subordination not only weakens local management and makes it vulnerable to political bargaining, but also directly compromises the realization of fundamental rights, given the inefficiency in allocating essential resources (health and education). The research advocates, as a path to overcome this challenge, the urgency of Tax Reform and the transition to a Results-Oriented Federalism, where equalization mechanisms are conditional on administrative performance and the achievement of social goals, transforming the current subsistence system into an authentic system of sustainable and accountable development.