THREE PERSPECTIVES FOR THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN DIGNITY

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the principle of human dignity from three fundamental perspectives: historical, philosophical, and legal. Historically, the concept of dignity evolved from a restricted notion linked to status, hierarchy, and prestige to a universal understanding, as a result of social struggles, revolutions, and international agreements, especially after the atrocities of World War II. In the philosophical field, the main contribution lies in Kant, who, by recognizing man as an end in himself, endowed with freedom and rationality, grounds dignity as an intrinsic, absolute, and inalienable value. Legally, dignity has been enshrined in constitutions and international treaties, assuming a normative and axiological character, guiding the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, as well as serving as a parameter to limit state power and private relations. Despite the proposed didactic division, the three dimensions are interwoven and complement each other in consolidating dignity as a structuring principle of contemporary constitutionalism. Based on a bibliographical review, the study highlights the centrality of human dignity as an ethical, political, and legal benchmark, indispensable for guaranteeing human rights and preserving the very condition of being human.