


DIALOGICITY IN FOCUS

DIALOGICIDADE EM PAUTA

DIALOGICIDAD EN FOCO

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to discuss, theoretically, Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Yakubinsky's ideas, emphasizing their contributions in the field of Development and Cognitive Psychology, specifically for studies about the acquisition of language. Entering in a dialogical perspective, the three authors conceive that the subject, while a social-historical being, is formed in and through language, from the dialogue or from the dialogical tensions established with the Other. The way they face language allows encompassing verbal and non-verbal aspects of communication, as well as the flexibility of context. By understanding the human being, so integrated with the social, help to undo some impasses, generated by the traditional models of language, which allowed the gap between language/ thinking, individual/social, monologism/dialogism, etc.

Keywords: Dialogism. Vygotsky. Bakhtin. Yakubinsky.

RESUMO

Pretende-se, neste artigo, discutir teoricamente as idéias de Vygotsky, Bakhtin e Yakubinsky em relação à temática da aquisição da linguagem, tomando por referência os cenários da Psicologia Cognitiva e do Desenvolvimento. Inserindo-se em uma perspectiva dialógica, os três autores concebem que o sujeito, enquanto ser sócio-histórico é constituído na e através da linguagem, a partir do diálogo ou das tensões dialógicas estabelecidas com o Outro. Nesta direção, a linguagem é abarcada nos seus aspectos verbais e não verbais e vista em constante flexibilidade com o contexto. Ao compreender o ser humano, de maneira integrada com o social, permite ultrapassar os impasses gerados pelos modelos tradicionais de linguagem (linguagem/ pensamento, o ser individual/social, e o monologismo/dialogismo).

Palavras-chave: Dialogismo. Vygotsky. Bakhtin. Yakubinsky.

RESUMEN

Se pretende en este artículo, teóricamente discutir las ideas de Vygotsky, Bajtín y Yakubinsky en relación con la cuestión de la adquisición del lenguaje de escenarios de referencia de la Psicología Cognitiva y el Desarrollo. Entrar en una perspectiva dialógica, los tres autores conciben al sujeto como ser histórico-social, se constituye en ya través del lenguaje, del diálogo o dialógica tensiones hasta el Otro. En este sentido, el lenguaje es que aparecen en sus aspectos verbales y no verbales y puntos de vista sobre la flexibilidad en curso con el contexto. Al entender al ser humano en una forma integrada las cuestiones sociales, permite

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superar las barreras causadas por los modelos tradicionales de la lengua (lengua / pensamiento, ser individuales, sociales, y el monólogo y diálogo.).

Palabras clave: Dialogismo. Vygotsky. Bajtín. Yakubinsky.

1 INTRODUCTION

*"Language is no longer linked to the knowing of thing,
but the men's freedom" (Michel Foucault)*

The objective of this article is to expose the contribution of the thought of Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Yakubinsky on the theme of **dialogism** and its implications for researchers in the areas of developmental and cognitive psychology.

We are aware that analyzing the contributions of these theoretical contributions is an arduous task, but at the same time, exciting and challenging. Arduous, because it is a complex line of thought and still insufficiently known among us, since we have only recently had access to the main works of the respective authors (Vygotsky, Bakhtin, 1997, 2000; Yakubinsky, 1997). However, it is exciting and challenging, because this current of thought represents a way to overcome some classic epistemological impasses placed on Psychology, referring to the relationship between thought and language; to the individual *versus* the collective; to monologism *versus* dialogism, among others.

2 SCENARIO: THE CLASSIC DILEMMAS OF PSYCHOLOGY

Historically, we can postulate that Psychology has suffered, since its origin (which is traditionally located in the works of W. Wundt and F. Bretano), from a kind of "lack of epistemological identity", due to a great difficulty in identifying and defining the contours of its own object of knowledge. However, this did not prevent it from making relevant progress both in the theoretical-practical fields and, above all, in its appearance in various sectors of social activity (Sirgado, 1990).

In this context, it advances rapidly in its trajectory as a science, without having sufficient clarity about its object of study. For this reason, Psychology, even today, presents itself as a mosaic of "heterogeneous theories, methods and practices, offering the spectacle of a fragmented universe..." (Moreau & Richelle, 1981, p.2).

In fact, historically, the main element that seems to divide the psychological field is the mechanistic/humanist dual view. Such a cleavage seems to translate into the theoretical-practical fields, the old problem called *the mind-body-problem by the English*. Thus, this consists of an old discussion, insofar as the human being is not restricted merely to the biological or psychological plane (in the sense of *Aristotelian psykè*), being characterized by a synthesis, a great articulation between the socio-psychological dimensions, being, essentially, a symbolic being, socio-historically constructed.

From this perspective, we can argue that, just as the human being is inserted in the order of the symbolic, the human environment is in the order of culture, language, the arts, and life in its multiple manifestations.

Thinking about the human being based on these premises requires understanding him, according to Castoriadis (1975),

as a result of two inseparable histories: a history of psyche (*psychogenesis*), in the course of which it changes and opens up to the social-historical world, and a social history, in which society imposes on it a 'way of being' (*sociogenesis*) that it could never bring to its own and which manufactures the 'social individual' that emerges as the coexistence of a private world and a common or public world. (p. 405)

3 ORIGINS OF THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CURRENT

The origins of the socio-historical current are centered on the theoretical-conceptual framework of authors such as Vygotsky; Luria and Leontiev, who integrate vast works and interests in areas such as Linguistics, Psychology, Pedagogy and Neurology. At the time, his ideas were in opposition to: (1) The first works of Scientific Psychology, marked by Wundt's experimentalism and introspectionism, whose belief rested on the description of the constituent elements of consciousness; (2) the elementarism of the S-R model, advocated by Watson and his followers. The situation of Russian psychology was not very different from this scenario, presenting, however, peculiar cultural characteristics due to its history and the fermentation of ideas concerning the end of the Tsarist era.

According to Valsiner (1988), evolutionist postulations were very widespread in pre-revolutionary Russia, emphasizing that two traditions had a great influence on Soviet Psychology: one linked to the field of evolutionary biology, with names such as Vagner (1849-1934), and the other; in the field of Neurophysiology, where I.M. Sechenov (1829/1905), initiator of the reflexological current, stands out.

Post-Soviet Russia also made possible the emergence of the propositions of Luria, Leontiev and Vygotsky, which had their theoretical roots in this double tradition (the line of natural development and that of socio-cultural development). From this new harvest of authors and themes such as: (a) the functions-, elementary and higher; (b) the concept of internalization of psychic functions; (c) the importance of the activity in the transformation of external and internal reality; and (d) the function attributed to **language**. The influence of this

tradition and of other Russian authors, such as Yakubinsky (1923/1997) and Bakhtin (1981, 1987, 1997, 2000, 2001) are of particular interest to us.

Both Yakubinsky's and Bakhtin's thought received the marks of this ambience of socio-historical Soviet psychology, as well as of the presuppositions of Marx and Engels. In fact, as Valsiner (1988, p.77) discusses, "the history of Psychology in Soviet Russia in the 1920s is an interesting case of the science-society relationship. On the one hand, because the official ideology progressively assumes a role of controller of scientific activity, therefore of Psychology. On the other hand, because a large part of the young generation of psychologists, linguists and other thinkers are enthusiastically dedicated to building new theoretical systems in psychology and linguistics, based on dialectical materialism." Such ideas are meaningful because they emerge as an alternative to overcome the impasses and paradoxes (cf. mentioned at the beginning of this article) with which Psychology was debating.

In this direction, the 1920s and 1930s were marked by intense work of demolishing the subjectivist-empiricist tradition, which dominated Russia before the Revolution, in an attempt to build a psychology in line with the principles of Marxism. This will also be a major dilemma for linguists such as Bakhtin. That is, how to overcome the extremisms of the subjectivist relationship, on the one hand; and, empiricist, on the other? This is a concern that is sustained from the epistemological point of view for Soviet psychologists and linguists, such as Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Yakubinsky. The objectifying tendency of some has led them to ignore the problem of consciousness; while the Marxist ideas of others placed it as a real problem of Psychology, scientifically analyzable, but in terms that were still reductionist.

After outlining the socio-historical environment that enabled the proliferation of the ideas of psychologists and linguists, post-Revolution, we will make an excerpt and analyze the contributions of the propositions of Bakhtin (1981, 1987, 1997, 2000, 2001) and Yakubinsky (1923/1997), which emerge in this scientific context.

4 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF YAKUBINSKY AND BAKHTIN

Up to the present day, Bakhtinian studies have been taken as a reference in several areas of knowledge, such as: literature, applied linguistics and psychology. Therefore, discussing the studies developed by Bakhtin and his Circle is relevant for two aspects. On the one hand, as we have already mentioned, due to the crossing in several areas of knowledge, which makes it necessary both to review it and to reread it theoretically-

methodologically. On the other hand, socio-historical dynamism is permeated by incessant transformations, which influence man and the context in which he is circumscribed. Therefore, to (re)visit Bakhtinian theory is also to look at it in a particular way, because the reader is human and influenced by the changes that have occurred in the social environment in which he lives. In this way, we will revisit a part of the complex studies of the Bakhtin Circle, in order to look at a specific issue: dialogism.

In a historical retrospective on Bakhtin's conceptual framework, we can observe that it goes against the grain of the studies developed so far: it does not perceive language as an object, nor will it seek to discriminate it in minimal units until the meaning contained in the sentence is established.

For him, as Faraco (2003) points out, the object of the human sciences is centered on the text, perceived as a *coherent* but heterogeneous set of signs ranging from musicology to the history of the visual arts; from society to ideology. Ultimately, Bakhtin's concern lies in the **text-producing man** of a given culture. In other words, man represents this particular culture, through the texts he produces and, at the same time, in which he is represented by it.

Language is no longer the object of analysis of the Human Sciences, but the interrelations of this man and the context that surrounds him. Even with the language he appropriates, Bakhtin develops two major critical orientations to the philosophical-linguistic thought then in force. On the one hand, the so-called thesis of *individualistic subjectivism*, and, on the other, the so-called orientation of *Abstract Objectivism*, in which the followers of Saussurean linguistics are found. We will focus on analyzing, at greater length, some aspects of this second orientation.

In general terms, the orientation of the so-called *Abstract Objectivism*, of Saussuren tendency, perceives language as a system of fixed and immutable rules; as an "object", centered solely on its individual form, completely external to the individual consciousness of the speakers. Bakhtin (1997), on the contrary, sees language (system) in permanent evolution, undergoing profound modifications, originating from the collective, no longer being perceived as a solely individual and immanent manifestation, to become an event of a social nature: "speech is inextricably linked to the conditions of communication, which, in turn, are always linked to social structures" (Yaguello, 1997, p. 14). From this, it proposes a *linguistics of speech*, where language, as it is *shared* by a collective of individuals, is transformed into a *social common good*, whose transformations are inherent to it, reflecting the social variations that, fundamentally, are governed by laws *external* to the *system itself*.

As linguistic forms are presented to the speakers, in the context of precise enunciations, this context, for Bakhtin (1981, 1997), will always be *ideological*. According to him, what we pronounce or hear are not words, but truths or lies, good or bad, important or trivial, pleasant or unpleasant, etc. The word is always loaded with an ideological or experiential content or meaning. This is how we understand words and only react to those that awaken in us ideological resonances concerning life (Bakhtin & Voloshinov, 1997, p: 95).

Unlike the position adopted by abstract objectivists, language is inseparable from its ideological content or content concerning life. Above all, Bakhtin (1997) reaffirms that language is related to the motivations of the *speaker's consciousness*, and cannot receive a *particular status*, in which the linguistic form empty of ideology (sign) is separated from its ideological and experiential factors (signs of language).

To treat language as a "system" is to perceive it only through an abstract gaze, far removed from the consciousness of the individuals who *use* it. The practice of social communication is dynamic and alive, and it is impossible to decompose its elements by artificially isolating them from the real units of the verbal chain; of the infinite spiral of his enunciations. In these terms, in linguistic visions and revisions, under Bakhtin's gaze, the study of enunciation itself expands: it is no longer focused on an isolated monological enunciation, but starts to have "a" "other" "meaning", which takes place in another place, which is not restricted to the immanent study, within the enunciation. Its "limits" become diffuse, slide, complexify, dialogue...

By contrasting the univocity of the word, as highlighted by abstract objectivism, to the plurality of its meanings, he states that the meaning of the word is totally determined by its context. There are as many possible meanings as there are possible contexts. However, the word does not cease to be one. It does not break down into as many words as there are contexts in which it can be inserted (Bakhtin & Voloshinov, 1997, p. 106).

This contextuality, for Bakhtin (1997), is not in one and the same plane, but in an alternation of contextual planes. The same word, taken in relation to the *meaning* and *signification* that one wants to establish, can appear in two mutually conflicting and excluding dialogical contexts. In this way, "the contexts are not simply juxtaposed, as if they were indifferent to each other; they are in a situation of tense and uninterrupted interaction and conflict" (Bakhtin & Voloshinov, 1997, p 107).

5 DIALOGICAL RELATIONS IN BAKHTIN: (RE)SIGNIFICATIONS

The term *dialogism* emerges, in the context of *Bakhtin's Circle*, around 1928 and 1929, to express the permanent interaction and collision between significant structures, inserted in a certain historical and social field. This inexhaustible *dialogue* between signs and, especially, between "system of signs", whether literary, oral, gestural or unconscious, is seen as originating from the drives and tensions provoked by the social. From this point of view, *Dialogia* was the term he used the most to describe the life of the world of production and symbolic exchanges, composed not of a universe divided between good and bad, young and old, living and dead, right and wrong, true and liar, etc., but as a universe composed of signs.

Linked to this assumption, as every sign is ideological, every ideological creation is always a reflection of social and historical structures, and can never be the product of an isolated individual consciousness. Any change in ideology triggers a change in language. In these terms, the notion of dialogism ends up referring to the continuously mutable and renewable character of the sign itself, whose *full meaning* emerges from the complex game of social exchanges (dialogues).

Concerned with avoiding misunderstandings, Faraco (2003), Clark and Holquist (1998) seek to clarify the meaning that the word *ideology* acquires in the texts produced by the Bakhtin Circle.

The word ideology is used, in general, to designate the universe of the products of the human "spirit", what is sometimes called by other authors immaterial culture or *spiritual production* (perhaps as an inheritance of an idealist thought); and, equally, forms of social consciousness (in a vocabulary with a more materialistic flavor). *Ideology* is the name that the Circle usually gives, then, to the universe that encompasses art, science, philosophy, law, religion, politics, that is, all superstructural manifestations (to use a certain Marxist terminology) (Faraco, 2003, p. 46)

In this way, as can be seen, the term *ideology* should not be taken in its restricted, linear, negative or simply closed sense in the *Marxist theoretical environment*, but rather as an *area of expansion* of human intellectual/cultural creativity. The products and artifacts elaborated by such areas of human knowledge, and, mainly, by the *unpredictability* that artistic creation entails, cannot be studied disconnecting them from *the concrete reality* that shelters them. This is the meaning that Bakhtini's conception gives to the term. Thus, signs are *intrinsically* ideological, that is, created and interpreted within complex and varied processes that characterize social exchange. Each and every sign and each and every

statement, in this conception, are located in the deep essence of a certain *ideological dimension* (art, politics, law, etc.), and always contain a certain *evaluative position*: "there is no neutral statement; the very rhetoric of neutrality is also an axiological position." (Faraco, 2003, p. 47).

In the midst of these assumptions, we can affirm that the notion of *dialogism* refers, then, to the *dynamics* of the semiotic process of *interaction of social voices*, which interpenetrate, collide, meet, disconnect, disperse and group around the *social whole*, in which they subsist and from which they compose new dialogical multiplicities. Signs emerge and signify within social relations, they are *among* socially organized beings; they cannot therefore be conceived as resulting from merely physiological and psychological processes of an isolated individual; or determined only by an abstract formal system. In order to study them, it is essential to situate them in the global social processes that give them meaning (Faraco, 2003, p. 48).

Like the notion of ideology, the very metaphor of permanent *dialogue*, a word in itself complex and ambiguous, must also be reviewed, since there are multiple dialogues within the very *notion of dialogue*. According to Faraco (2003), the members of the Bakhtin Circle were not interested in the study of the dialogue-form, commonly associated with the conversations of the characters in written narratives, dramatic texts or face-to-face interaction.

In these terms, Bakhtinian dialogism should not be *taken* and *measured* as just another *concept* among many other concepts with which we are accustomed to working theoretically. This is not some *instrument* that Bakhtin himself uses to address certain aspects of reality. The notion of dialogism should be understood as a kind of *philosophical system*, sufficiently capable of encompassing, with a comprehensive/responsive look, the *Being of Man* and his unusual and unpredictable forms of *cultural making*. There would be no other way for Bakhtin to make this infinite and permanent interaction explicit than with the metaphor of the *eternal dialogue* that permeates the entire *semiotic universe* that assists us and of which we are a constitutive part.

Any ideological process (creative in Bakhtin) will always be involved with a certain axiological position, which will always be in *correlation* with other creative points of view of other interlocutors. The universe of ideological creation is the universe of meanings (Peirce, 2000). In these circumstances, the monological character of the utterances becomes incomprehensible, since the whole universe conspires to the contrary. For these reasons, *the*

metaphor of permanent dialogue has been generated, *as if from itself*, where all these social voices intersect, in a multiform way, at the same time that new social voices are also formed. Eternal movement; encounters and mismatches of meanings to be remade.

In line with these postulates, we can highlight the notion of subject in Bakhtin, as it is involved with the very constitutively dialogical nature of language, referring to the permanent interaction between the discursive *self* and the *other*. In this argumentative direction, the Bakhtinian subject is displaced from his center and starts to live in a certain collective "periphery", where *he dialogues* with the different social voices of his peers. It is, in fact, a concrete and real subject that, contextualized in its social-historical and ideological space-time, is located *in the world*.

As can be seen, the fundamental notion that emerges from Bakhtinian subjectivity is the *interactional space* between the *I* and the *thou*; or between the *I* and the *other*, within the text, which will require an *active responsive attitude* between the partners of verbal communication.

In these terms, Bakhtin's discourse will be oriented towards a *third person*; towards another who, inserted in a particular context, reinforces the *influence of organized social forces* on the very *way of apprehending* discourse. It is a comprehensive, responsive, *active, circular* process that refers, fundamentally, to the *dynamics* of the *interrelation* of the individuals involved with some current of verbal communication. This Bakhtinian "I" is then constituted by the *words of the other*; it is seen through the *eyes of the other*; it is realized *in the other*; within *that other* itself.

It is a question of the permanent dialogue between an "I" that, in turn, is not *solitary* but *in solidarity* with all the "others" that interact with it; and with all the others who are yet to come...

Thus, thinking of the formation of consciousness as a movement between people, the sign is understood in its social nature, and the human being as a meeting of voices. Signs, human creation, only emerge from social interaction; and this, for Bakhtin and Voloshinov (1997), is linked to social structures and immersed in class struggle. And since there is no classless "I," the "I" is stronger in the "we." We are made up of multiple voices with their ideological marks, whether in the sense of concealment, as Marx suggests, or in the sense of worldview, as Bakhtin proposes, for whom ideology reflects and refracts reality – "Being, reflected in the sign, is not only reflected in it, but also refracted". (p.46).

The concept of **refraction** is extremely relevant in the so-called Bakhtin Circle, as it defends the premise that meanings are not given in the sign itself, nor are they guaranteed by an abstract, unique and timeless semantic system, nor by reference to a world given uniformly and transparently, but are constructed in the dynamics of history and are marked by the diversity of experiences of human groups. with its innumerable contradictions and confrontations of valuations and social interests. Thus, in other words, refraction is the way in which the diversity and contradictions of the historical experiences of human groups are inscribed in signs.

From a perspective of greater verticalization, we can postulate that this Bakhtinian other, understood and signified in a given concrete situation, and which, far from being individual, dialogues with a plurality of other subjects and factors/values, refers to a "we", which is the very constituent sphere of this social-collective-ideological, located in a certain community or group, in which this whole process occurs. This other, as Brait (1995) analyzes, also dialogues with the "we" (the collective, since language is not spoken in a vacuum).

For these reasons, Bakhtin insists on the *role of the other* in establishing the meaning of a given utterance, for which there will always be the perspective of *another voice* that dialogues with ours, when dialoguing with the world. The Bakhtinian subject is *relational*, and appears precisely *in/of the mediation* between the *dialogical self-other*.

For Marková (2006), the subject is constituted from the alter-ego tension, emphasizing that the term *tension* does not refer to conflict, but to complementary opposites (convergence X divergence, acceptance X refusal, etc.). He points out that, according to Bakhtin, "a person does not have internal territorial sovereignty and that he is always and completely on the border with the other. When she looks at herself, she 'looks into the eyes of the other or into the eyes of the other.'" (p. 126).

Bakhtin proposes that the subject then experiences a radical incompleteness, leading him, in order to overcome it, to need the Alter, which functions as a **surplus of vision**, in the sense that he can see what the Self cannot see (Faraco, 2003). This notion of **responsiveness** or "*answerability*", developed by the Bakhtin Circle, is central to dialogism (Marková, 2006). This dialogical peculiarity of language is due to the fact that any speech act is always a response, and is thus influenced by what it responds to, that is, the discourse is configured by what the speaker expects from his interlocutor and the person's contribution to the dialogue presents specific characteristics, which only exist or make sense because of the dialogue (Faraco, 2003).

Thus, dialogism, a constitutive condition of meaning in discourse, will always be a function of the active responsive attitude of this *other*. In these terms, the "I" (enunciator) is realized in the Bakhtinian (collective) "we", understood as the space where *communication is negotiated* in a multiplicity of significant interactions, which confer concrete and living fullness to the language. The "we" only gains strength, truth, legitimacy through dialogue with this *real*, social, ideological, contextual, collective space that represents/re-presents different meanings as it is (re)enunciated. The dialogical nature of language, a central concept in Bakhtin's thought, because it is alive, *is still open!*

6 YAKUBINSKY, VYGOTSKY, BAKHTIN AND DIALOGISM

Inserting himself in the dialogical model, Yakubinsky (1923/1997), as well as Bakhtin Voloshinov (1997), opposes the Russian formalist school and Saussure's structuralism. The focus of interest of the formalists, according to Eskin (1997), was directed to poetics and literary texts, leaving aside the social aspects related to these writings, thus contributing to Yakubinsky, whose interest was focused on the social dimensions of language, to end up distancing himself from the presuppositions of this School, of which he became a part.

From a collateral perspective, we can rescue the ideas of Saussure (1916/1966), who, in turn, proposes *that linguistic signs are arbitrary, making a distinction between language (langue) and speech (parole)*. The first refers to a code that has its own existence, not depending on the will of the speaker, and the second - **speech (parole)** - refers to the uses that the individual makes of the language, based on the selection of elements of a system of linguistic signs. In this way, linguistic meaning belongs to a structure of the social system, which imposes itself on the subject

Analyzing Saussurian Structuralism, Cornejo (2004) observes a dichotomy (individual/social), considering that language, as a social structure, is formed independently of the subject. Chomsky's perspective, on the other hand, although it emerged as an alternative to structuralism, cannot overcome the dichotomy left by it, since it also assumes a structuralist view of the sign, when it suggests that there is a "mental lexicon" or a set of syntactic rules, semantically manipulated, blindly, pointing to a structure dissociated from the context. When the speaker makes use of language in communicative situations, he is simply demonstrating a *performance*, originating from a competence, genetically programmed (Cornejo, 2004). Thus, a gap between the subject and the social is verified, since the linguistic meaning is generated "within the head" of the subject (Generative Grammar).

Still within the scope of Cornejo's (2004) analysis, while in Structuralism, the emphasis to explain the origin of linguistic meaning falls on the social, for Chomskyians, it is centered solely on the individual. Both perspectives do not encompass the variability of meaning and the flexibility of context. In turn, pragmatics fills the gaps in these paradigms, emphasizing that it is only possible to understand the human phenomenon when language is conceived in action. It is only in use, in production situations, that language gains meaning.

Sharing the ideas of pragmatics, Yakubinsky believes that there is not a single linguistic system, but each form of language has its own structure, and there are as many *langues* as there are forms of language, which only acquire meaning in use (Friedrich, 2005). This way of conceiving language is shared by Bakhtin, in the set of his works, and discussed by Vygotsky, especially in "Thought and Language" (1998).

It is noteworthy that this view of language involves some of the central characteristics of dialogism, pointed out by Broeckelman (2004), namely: 1) Dialogue and not monologue is the most natural form of human discourse; 2) Meaning is co-constructed in the relationship between the interlocutors; and finally, 3) The context or social situation determines the meaning. Thus, the signs do not have their own meaning, but change or acquire identity in the concrete situations of production.

In relation to the first characteristic of dialogism, Yakubinsky conceives that the subject is generated in dialogue, and the meaning is shared or negotiated by speakers through it, thus not agreeing with the meaning of passive subject, present in structuralism, believing, instead, that it is capable of modifying or revolutionizing language (Eskin, 1997).

By emphasizing the role of dialogue (of *responsiveness*) in the formation of the person, Yakubinsky goes beyond the traditional view of Pragmatics, articulating, in fact, language, subject and subjectivity, which were disconnected in structuralism (Eskin, 1997).

Yakubinsky (1923/1997), in fact, was one of the first theorists to postulate the idea that **dialogue**, and not **monologue**, is the most natural form of human discourse, even anticipating the writings of Bakhtin and his Circle (Broeckelman, 2004 & Eskin, 1997). According to Silvestri and Blank (1993), the notion of dialogue proposed by Yakubinsky exerted an influence on the theoretical elaborations of both Vygotsky and Bakhtin, bringing fruitful results for both.

According to Yakubinsky (1923/1997), while the monologue is a more authoritarian, unilateral form, encompassing a more rational form of communication, dialogue is something natural "*naturalness*", spontaneous, automatic. This is due to the fact that, according to

Friedrich (2005), people's daily lives facilitate the establishment of certain communication patterns "... firmly established sentences, ways of using sentences, sentence pattern 'fossilized' words". (p. 12), to the point that they respond to the other, automatically, or reflexively, in the biological sense of the term, bringing man closer to the animal. Unlike the monologue, the dialogue occurs so quickly that it does not allow a reflection on the action, considering that it is seen as a succession of actions (action-reaction).

This meaning diverges from the traditional model of language, in which biological aspects are rejected, and rationality, an eminently human characteristic, distances man from the animal, rejecting non-rational aspects, such as emotions, feelings, etc. (Friedrich, 2005). He also points out that, for Yakubinsky, dialogue occurs via perception. Thus, aspects such as tone, timbre, intonation, gestures, mimics play a crucial role in communication; As a result, it is possible to communicate only through gestures and mimics. He stresses, for example, that intonation can completely modify what has been said; This implies that the word has no meaning of its own, thus reducing the role of the semantic factor in language.

On the other hand, in Yakubinsky's conceptual framework (1923/1997), dialogue is open, constantly exposed to interruptions. Participation in dialogue is determined by the expectation of the other's response. Even monologue situations, such as academic presentations, for example, can turn into dialogue, every time the audience interferes with the lecture; and, even when people do not get to express their points of view, verbally, they signal their desire to speak through looks, gestures, etc.

Bertau (2005) points out that the emphasis given by Yakubinsky to the ability of language to completely fade away in communication or to transcend speech is one of his main contributions to the study of language acquisition. The author also points out that this characteristic of language presents a complex parallel with the metaphor of evaporation for the transformation of language into thought proposed by Vygotsky, in which he points out that, after this evaporation occurs, language does not disappear in its internal form, since thought is strictly linked to speech.

Based on Darwin's evolutionism, Vygotsky (1998) agrees with Yakubinsky, when he proposes that the development of man has primitive (biological) components, which resemble that of animals. However, under the influence of Marx and Engels, Vygotsky will expand this idea, by suggesting that, with the course of development, from the interaction with the culture (historical process) in which he lives, human development transcends that of animals in qualitative terms. Ontogenetic development does not move in a straight line, demarcating a quantitative accumulation, but presents a series of qualitative and dialectical transformations.

There is probably a parallel between Yakubinsky (1923/1997) and Vygotsky (perhaps even under the influence of the former), when the latter advocates that the action of the subject implies an action between people, presenting a shared meaning. This idea of co-construction of meanings, in the use of language or in communication, consists of the second essential characteristic of dialogism, previously pointed out by Broecklman (2004).

From the moment the subject enters the world, he is faced with a semiotized environment, where the adult (mediator of knowledge - representative of socio-historical and cultural values) will interpret or attribute meaning to his actions (even when they are not yet linguistic, but expressive resources of certain basic needs - comfort, discomfort, hunger, thirst, etc.), introducing him, in this way, to the elements of culture.

According to Silvestri and Blank (2004), based on the Marxist perspective, Bakhtin and Vygotsky share the idea that semiotic mediation is the foundation of the human psyche, or a *sine qua non* condition for there to be consciousness. From this perspective, it is not man's consciousness that determines his being, as postulated by subjectivist idealism, but, on the contrary, it is the social being that determines his consciousness (which is a product of society). In this sense, the matter of the psyche is semiotic and, as a result, its reality is that of the sign.

It should be noted that the clear similarities between Bakhtin and Vygotsky are due to the fact that both share the same historical and ideological context (Silvestri & Blank, 2004).

By conceiving that meaning is co-constructed in dialogical exchanges, Yakubinsky (1923/1997) emphasizes that language is an essentially communicative, dialogical activity, pointing to the construction of an **apperceptive mass** as a facilitator or fundamental condition of communication. The understanding of the other's discourse is apperceptive, that is, it depends not only on the current moment, but on the internal and external experiences as well as on the total psychic content of the interlocutors. The apperceptive mass involves thoughts, emotions, desires (conscious or not) and once established, the dialogue becomes simpler,

more creative, and shorter, since the interlocutors build a story together, thus sharing ideas, emotions, attitudes, etc.

For Yakubinsky (1923/1997) and Vygotsky (1987) cited by Lyra and Bertau (2008), abbreviation results from shared experiences, in the course of the repetition of interactions, which are built in the history of communication between partners. Since the apperceptive mass favors abbreviation, it allows us to explore and understand the complexity of the human phenomenon, in terms of the *self*, the symbol and the subject. This emphasis on the non-verbal aspects of communication (the interest in the notion of apperceptive mass) is what basically distances Yakubinsky from Vygotsky and Bakhtin.

7 APPROXIMATIONS AND DISTANCING BETWEEN THE IDEAS OF VYGOTSKY, BAKHTIN AND YAKUBINSKY

In general terms, the three authors present more theoretical approximations than distancing. The difference is only in the focus of interest that is given by each one, in their theoretical path. Vygotsky emphasizes the interaction and the role of semiotic mediation in the communicative process. Bakhtin develops the conception of dialogism and the role played by dialogue in communication, focusing mainly on its verbal or conscious aspects. Yakubinsky, in turn, although elaborating the idea of dialogue, directs his focus of attention to the apperceptive mass, specifically, to exchanges or to the non-verbal factors of communication. It is precisely because he focuses on the non-verbal specificities of communication, or the establishment of the apperceptive mass, in face-to-face interaction, that Yakubinsky becomes a relevant author for the understanding of language acquisition, especially at the beginning of communication, when it is inherently marked by dialogical exchanges of looks, gestures, mimics, etc.

Like Yakubinsky (1997), Bakhtin addresses the issue of monologue, calling it **authoritarian discourse** and dialogue, approaching what he classifies as **internally persuasive discourse**. Bakhtin (1981, cited by Lightfoot, 2005) in order to differentiate these two forms of discourse, refers to two pedagogical modes, commonly used by students, when preparing for school exams. The authoritarian discourse would correspond to the method of memorizing, while the internally persuasive would correspond to that of answering questions with one's own words.

While the first discourse is closed, imposed by society, coming from the outside in, without being completely integrated into the self, the second is dynamic, creative, arising from the person's dialogue with that discourse, and therefore susceptible to change.

Although the notion of internally persuasive discourse has similarities with Yakubinsky's vision of dialogue, it seems to have a slightly different connotation from the latter, considering that, in the same way as authoritarian discourse, internally persuasive discourse also encompasses a certain reflection or intention, not being carried out in such an automatic or reflexive way, as proposed by Yakubinsky.

According to Broeckelman (2004), Bakhtin, like Yakubinsky, also contemplates the non-verbal aspects of communication, when he suggests that dialogue, as a natural phenomenon, can be compared to a carnival event, in which the participants launch themselves or participate, simply trying to respond to each other, infringing all socially established moral and aesthetic rules or principles, instead of trying to mold their speech to social norms.

However, considering that Yakubinsky's interest seems to be directed particularly to the non-linguistic aspects of communication, he emphasizes dialogue, in a restricted way, as being more linked to face-to-face interaction; thus differing from Bakhtin's Circle, in which the latter is conceived in a more comprehensive way, as explained above.

Both Vygotsky and Bakhtin start from criticisms of the current models of science (functionalist or idealist and objectivist psychology), to develop their model of language, which is conceived not as a mere reflection of reality, but as constitutive of the human psyche. Bakhtin and Voloshinov (1997) suggest that the psyche cannot be explained from physiological or biological principles, or only at the individual level, in which the subject is seen, in a static way, as ahistorical and immutable. To account for the human mind, he resorts to sociology (the notions of sign and ideology), considering consciousness as a socio-ideological fact, which is based on or co-constructed in concrete situations of production.

This notion of consciousness, pointed out by Bakhtin as the need to understand the human mind, as highlighted by Silvestri and Blank (1993), is precisely the one developed by Vygotsky. They call attention to the coincidence between the thoughts of the two authors. According to Freitas (2006) and Silvestri and Blank (1993), although they did not know each other personally, the works of Vygotsky and Bakhtin demonstrate a mutual knowledge. In the work "Bajtín y Vigotski: La organización semiótica de la consciência (Bajtín y Vigotski: La organización semiótica de la consciência), Silvestri and Blank (1993) emphasize that the

similarity between them is certainly due to the fact that they share the same socio-ideological context, and are therefore influenced by socio-historical Soviet psychology and Yakubinsky's idea of dialogue.

Finally, it is perceived that the way in which the three authors conceive language, as a constituent of the subject, which, as a socio-historical being, is formed in dialogue, in dialogical exchanges with the Other, overcome the antagonisms present in the traditional paradigms of language, which, by allowing the separation between thought and language; the individual *versus* the social; monologism *versus* dialogism, etc., cannot account for the variability of meaning and the flexibility of context.

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