

EDUCATION AND FREEDOM: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION



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Thelma Maria de Moura Bergamo¹, Sangelita Miranda Franco Mariano², Laís Alice Oliveira Santos³, Marcus Vinícius Costa da Conceição⁴.

ABSTRACT

The present study aims to investigate, based on the fundamental concepts of the works of Husserl and Sartre, such as consciousness, freedom and intentionality, which require a rigorous and deep reflection on education. The problem of research is developed during the possibilities of education as historical and critical rationality, capable of promoting, to some extent, the openness to being, whether this openness is of an ethical, social or epistemological order. The research raises a reflection on the phenomenological conception of education that must initially reflect on the essence of education itself and its meaning. The analyses of the study lead us to understand that it is necessary to tirelessly seek to rethink the meaning of educational action, to rescue the concept of education as a project that must be built towards a specific end and, therefore, constitutes a free and responsible action. The phenomenological understanding of education implies knowing human reality as a project freely set by historically and culturally situated individuals. In this way, each student is a pole of intentionality, a consciousness from which the world is placed.

Keywords: Consciousness, Education, Phenomenology, Intentionality.

¹ Doctor in Education/UFG
IF Goiano – campus Morrinhos
Email: thelma.moura@ifgoiano.edu.br
Lattes: <http://lattes.cnpq.br/0108721244666715>

² Doctor in Education/UFU
IF Goiano – campus Morrinhos
Email: sangelita.mariano@ifgoiano.edu.br
Lattes: <http://lattes.cnpq.br/1240496516313247>

³ Doctor in Education/UFU
IF Goiano – campus Morrinhos
Email: lais.santos@ifgoiano.edu.br
Lattes: <http://lattes.cnpq.br/5021603348570433>

⁴ Doctor in Sociology/UFG
IF Goiano – campus Morrinhos
E-mail: marcus.conceicao@ifgoiano.edu.br
Lattes: <http://lattes.cnpq.br/5367034769218991>

INTRODUCTION

It is not in any refuge that we will discover ourselves: it is in the street, in the city, in the midst of the crowd, something among things, man among men" (Sartre, 1968, p.31).

In discourses on education, it is very common to find references to the conception of the nature of knowledge as a "content of consciousness". The act of knowing is compared to the act of eating, taking possession, introducing certain information into human consciousness.

This concept of knowledge stems from the fact that nowadays, very little or nothing is asked about the nature, the essence of things and the reality that surrounds man.

Increasingly, people are content to know the apparent, the accidental, to the detriment of the essential. As a consequence of this alienation of knowledge, common sense and fashions have advanced over education, making man forget his true nature and that knowledge must seek the essence of the world around him.

By establishing a fundamental difference between "rigor" and "exactness", between empirical sciences and pure sciences, Husserl draws attention to the fact that phenomenology as an eidetic science, which describes the acts of consciousness, can and should be a form of rigorous knowledge.

Husserl initially expresses his concern with the issue of rigor in the construction of knowledge in his studies on the foundations of mathematics, which will later guide him to philosophy and psychology. From then on, he began the construction of a system of thought characterized by harsh criticism of empiricism and psychologism (Husserl, 1969). In this sense, he established a strict distinction between fact and essence, empirical intuition and eidetic intuition, act of consciousness and content of the act; always attributing primacy to the reality of essences, intelligible, over the other forms of knowledge of the world. In this search for the essential, he established the nature of consciousness as a pure intentional act (Coêlho, 1999).

Husserl criticizes the inability of psychology, as well as the other empirical sciences, to institute a science that is a theory of knowledge. Based on the conception that true scientific knowledge only refers to the universal, he states that science needs to be built within a consistent theoretical framework. The empirical, as a science of fact, is incapable of substantiating scientific knowledge in this way. Characterized as a form of knowledge of concrete reality, of the accidental, Husserl affirms the inability of the empirical to found any form of knowledge, because he is incapable of founding even himself.

The so-called eidetic sciences, on the contrary, are those that reveal to man the essence of things, noemas⁵, and therefore constitute the form of knowledge par excellence. Eidos, as an essence or idea - in the Greek sense of the term - is the principle on which all scientific knowledge must be founded. According to Husserl himself (2006, p. 36) "what is given in the intuition of essence (eidos) is also a pure essence".

In his reflections, he returns to Descartes as he seeks to establish, in a radical way, phenomenology as a science of *the a priori*, the foundation of authentic empirical sciences, in the Cartesian sense of the term. In this sense, all rationality of the fact rests on the *a priori*. For Husserl (1969), a *a priori* science is a science of principles to which the empirical sciences must resort to find their definitive foundation.

In this way, phenomenology supposes a break with the naïve, jettisoned view of reality and education. In Husserl's conception, what really matters is not the existence of the external object, but its appearance to consciousness, the phenomenon in its purity (Husserl, 2006).

The phenomenological method is a constant search for overcoming the natural attitude and its thesis, through phenomenological reduction. This reduction puts the thesis of the existence of the world "in parentheses" and suspends judgments about reality. In this way, it places man before "what is given-in-person in an adequate way".

If I do so, as is my full freedom, then I do not deny this "world", as if I were a sophist, I do not doubt its existence, as if I were a skeptic, but I perform the "phenomenological" εποψη, which totally prevents me from making any judgment about spatio-temporal existence (Husserl, 2006, § 32, p.81).

By "phenomenological reduction", Husserl consolidates a type of knowledge that he calls apodictic evidence, free of prejudices, of the objectivisms of modern science and of reasoning based on empiricism.

This process of knowledge of eidetic reality, in which there is a search for the apprehension of the essence, of the totality, in order to perceive the invariable core of the object, is carried out, among other ways, by abstraction and imaginary variation. By means of these methods, it is possible to reach a limit in which any variation makes the thing cease to be what it is. It is through eidetic reduction that Husserl arrives at his concept of consciousness.

⁵ In phenomenological reduction, *Noesis* is the act of perceiving. That which is perceived, the object of perception, is the *noema*. The thing as a phenomenon of consciousness (*noema*) is what matters, and it refers to the call "to things in themselves" that Husserl had made

According to what has already been said, phenomenology as a scientific study of consciousness, adopts as an essential procedure the (eidetic) intuition which, according to Husserl, places us in the presence of the thing itself. But this consciousness is not a set of logical conditions, it is an absolute fact. It is itself as real and accessible to all that performs the phenomenological reduction (Sartre, 1994).

This consciousness is defined by intentionality, by the movement made by consciousness itself to transcend itself, to unify itself by escaping from itself. "It is consciousness that unifies itself and, concretely, through a game of 'transversal' intentionalities, which are concrete and real retentions of past consciousnesses" (Sartre, 1994, p.47).

According to Coêlho (1999, p. 65) "the term *intentio* was used by medieval scholasticism to designate the fact that the will and the intellect always tend towards an end: the desired object". In other words, intentionality is fundamentally the "movement of passage from potency to act". Consciousness is pure intentionality, it is pure act, since it has the ontological need to transcend itself.

THE INTENTIONAL NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

From this phenomenological conception of intentionality, it is possible to affirm that knowledge is also pure intentionality, a relation, a tendency towards the object. Since consciousness is pure exteriority, there are no contents of consciousness, knowledge is not a possession, a property that man appropriates through education.

Through a critique against the socially established concept that "to know is to eat", Sartre (1968, p. 29) begins one of his texts, stating that "against the digestive philosophy of empiriocriticism, of neo-Kantianism, against all 'psychologism', Husserl never tires of affirming that one cannot dissolve things in consciousness". The criticism, common to the theories of Husserl and Sartre, is based on this phenomenological conception that: no data of reality can enter consciousness, because it is not in the nature of it to have an interiority. Both consciousness and knowledge are pure intentionality.

Coêlho (1999) reaffirms, based on Husserl's theories, the concept of intentionality as the capacity that consciousness has to always be consciousness of something. Since consciousness is always consciousness of something, every object is an object for consciousness. The comprehension of the object in its essence can only be attained by the "phenomenological reduction" in which, as has already been said, the object is placed in

parentheses, reduced to the condition of a pure phenomenon. The world is reduced to what is intended.

As for Husserl, the concept of intentionality occupies a central role in Sartre's thought. Its importance is so striking that it is considered the starting point on which Sartrean thought is built. It is through the movement of perpetually referring to itself, of its intentionality, that consciousness constitutes itself as such and, in doing so, constitutes its individuality. It can only be limited by itself. It is a synthetic, individual totality entirely isolated from the other totalities.

According to Sartre (1997, p. 34), as intentionality, consciousness is always the position of a transcendent object. "Consciousness is consciousness of something: this means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, consciousness is born having as its object a being that is not itself".

The emergence of consciousness and the world are simultaneous. At the same time that everything is outside of it, because it is pure exteriority, it constitutes itself as consciousness of all the realities that it intends and apprehends. For this very reason, this world which is external by essence is also relative to it. In this regard, Sartre (1968, p.29) bases his foundation on Husserl, who "considers consciousness an irreducible fact that no physical image can represent. Except, perhaps, the quick and obscure image of the explosion. To know is to 'burst for'".

Consciousness is presented in three levels. As an unreflective consciousness, it posits something as an object of desire. It is positional or thetical, it puts something that is outside of it. At this moment, it is positional of the object and not positional of itself.

On another level is self-consciousness, which perceives itself as the agent of the act, but does not place itself as the author of this act. He does not ask about the nature of the act, he does not transform it into the object of his interrogation. It is not fully reflective, since it is non-positional of the nature of what it does.

On a third level is reflective consciousness, which is characterized as a positional awareness of itself, which asks itself about the nature of what it does, which places itself as an object. It is characterized as positional awareness of the nature of itself and non-thetical of the world, it swims this world while transforming itself into the object of its own reflection.

Within this understanding, the Self is an existent that gives itself to an intuition that apprehends it "behind the reflected consciousness" (Sartre, 1994, p. 54). It only appears on the occasion of a reflective act. But Sartre insists on the exteriority of the Self when he

states that it – as a transcendental Self – must be within the reach of phenomenological reduction, since "the certain content of the pseudo-Cogito is not 'I am conscious of this chair', but 'there is awareness of this chair' (Sartre, 1994, p.55)".

Consciousness is this act of launching oneself into the world. It is always consciousness of something, impersonal. Since there is nothing within it, because it is pure exteriority, pure positional act, it is possible to affirm that there is no kind of Self within consciousness. It is its own nothingness, pure intentionality.

It is worth noting that, based on this conception of consciousness, Sartre states that our action in the world always occurs on the plane of the unreflected. When consciousness acts on the world, it is non-thetical to itself, it does not place its action as an object of reflection. In this way, there is a primacy of the unreflective over reflection. However, rescuing the Cartesian and Husserlian tradition, "he states that only reflection is capable of placing us in the realms of certainty" (Coêlho, 1999, p. 76).

It is through the understanding of the phenomenon as something transcendental in its pure sense that phenomenology constitutes itself as an ontological science. Sartre (1997, p.16) reiterates the Husserlian concept of phenomenon: something absolute that, when it appears, reveals itself as it is, as something "absolutely indicative of itself". In this way, the dualism between being and appearing cannot find legitimacy in philosophy, since appearing reveals being.

Husserl understands as transcendent everything that exists outside consciousness. In this way, the phenomenological reduction proposed by him places us before what "is given-in-person in an adequate way" (Coêlho, 1999, p. 64). Through reduction, the gaze starts to be directed to the acts of consciousness, seeking to understand the way in which it places these objects, seeking to reach the apodictic evidences. It is in this process that intentional consciousness arises as a "phenomenological residue".

In Husserl's (2006) understanding, intentionality is characterized as the need that consciousness has to exist as an awareness of something other than itself. Regardless of the level at which this consciousness acts, it is always entire object consciousness. It does not present an unconscious part, nor is it reduced or included in its content. It is entirely consciousness, from end to end. It is pure intentionality (intentio = tend towards, to throw oneself outwards).

HUMAN ACTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS (OF) FREEDOM

For Sartre (1997, p. 587), "to be is to do, to act". There is no opposition between potency and act: everything is act. "To act is to modify the figure of the world" (Sartre, 1997, p. 536). For the act to take place, it must necessarily be free, intentional. The existence of the act implies its autonomy.

Every action is in principle intentional, as it implies the adequacy of a result to the intention. It necessarily originates in an objective lack, a negativity. Every act has an intentionality that is characterized as a desirable and unfulfilled possibility. "From the conception of the act, consciousness can withdraw from the full world of which it is consciousness and abandon the terrain of being to frankly approach that of non-being" (Sartre, 1997, p. 537).

The act presupposes a negation, a swimming of reality as such. Only a free consciousness, capable of conceiving another state of affairs, can act. In this way, it is necessary for it to be able to position a state of affairs as pure present nothingness and at the same time position the current situation as nothing in relation to this state of affairs.

Every action, by its intentionality, has an end in function of which consciousness attributes value to the motive or motive. Therefore, the motive can only be understood in terms of a non-existent; he himself is a negativity. "It is only because I escape the In-itself by swimming towards my possibilities that this In-itself can acquire the value of motive or motive" (Sartre, 1997, p. 541).

In a single origin are found the motive, the act and the end. The relationship between these three structures is essential, insofar as each of them claims the other so that each and all of them has a meaning. The motive is in itself a negativity insofar as it can only be understood in terms of an end, that is, a non-existent. He teaches what is through beings that "are not", through becoming.

It is the set of projects put forward by consciousness that recede to give the mobile its mobile structure. It is only within a projected set that motives or motives acquire their value, that is, in the face of a set of non-existents. The relationship between act, project and motive has a direct implication on the concept of freedom.

It is through the ability that consciousness has to swim its reality, placing for itself a project of non-existents, that it is able to find motives that give meaning to its act. In other words, as already said, only a free conscience is capable of acting.

Sartre (1997, p. 541) states that "it is the act that decides its ends and motives, and

the act is an expression of freedom". To the same extent, freedom is an indispensable and fundamental condition of all action.

Understanding the concept of act implies understanding the issue of human freedom. But Sartre poses a problem to his reader: he points out the difficulty of describing freedom since it has no essence, it is not subject to logical needs. It is itself the foundation of all essences, it is beyond essence.

Imagination is presented by Sartre (1982) as the free consciousness par excellence. To imagine is to make explicit the implicit meaning of reality, it is to apprehend it in its totality, to affirm nothingness in its fullness, pure spontaneity, because "the image is only possible under a background of the world and, at the same time, moving away from the world and away from us" (Coêlho, 1999, p. 75).

To imagine is to swim reality, to introduce nothingness into reality itself. It is from the denial of the totality of the real that the imaginary can be posed. In order for consciousness to imagine, it must transcend the world, deny it. In other words, the imaginative consciousness has freedom as its ontological condition.

To be is to be aware (of) freedom (Sartre, 1997). To be is to swim the world and oneself, and this swimming is identified with freedom. To say that man is means to say that in him, existence precedes and conditions essence. To be aware of motives and motives, which are transcendent objects for consciousness, is to exist beyond essence, beyond these motives and motives, is to be free.

In this way, it is by swimming the world and the very being of consciousness that this same consciousness is constituted. "I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the motives and motives of my act: I am condemned to be free" (Sartre, 1997, p. 543).

To the extent that consciousness is constituted as consciousness (of) freedom, man becomes free precisely by swimming in the world in which he lives. "Man is free because he is not himself, but presence to himself" (Sartre, 1997, p. 545). In other words, "to be is to choose oneself". Everything that man does, his choices, actions, complexes, are part of a life project that he himself builds for himself.

"The act of placing the world as a synthetic totality and the act of 'taking a distance' from the world are the same act" (Sartre, 1996, p. 240). In a single act, consciousness is constituted as freedom and is situated in the world set by freedom. From this process results the fact that every constitution of an object is always concretely motivated by the

"situation-in-the-world".

In other words, freedom is only possible in a situation. According to Sartre (1997, p. 593), "the coefficient of adversity of things, in particular, cannot constitute an argument against our freedom, because it is through us, that is, from the previous positioning of an end, that the coefficient of adversity arises". It is freedom that constitutes the limits that he will later find.

By establishing that the For-itself is free, Sartre does not mean that it is its own foundation. Freedom itself is endowed with a facticity characterized by the fact that "there is a fact of escaping the fact." In this way, freedom cannot decide on its existence; it exists for the purpose it poses, but it cannot dispose of its own existence. "Freedom is the lack of being in relation to a given being, and not the emergence of a full being" (Sartre, 1997, p. 598). The emergence of freedom implies the swimming of the being that it is and the being in the midst of which it is.

Freedom arises on a double swim based on its facticity and contingency: "there is a being that has-to-be in the form of non-being". To have to be a being in the middle of the world means that freedom is originally related to the given. This datum, characterized by Sartre (1997) as the In-itself nadified by the for-itself that has to be it, its contingency and facticity, only appear to freedom as such in the light of the ends chosen by it.

It is possible to affirm, then, that the situation is the contingency of freedom to the extent that it reveals itself as such, if illuminated by an end chosen by it. There is an identification between situation and motivation. The For-Self discovers the situation it is faced with and perceives it as the reason. But this only happens in the face of a freely positioned end. Thus, the situation is an ambiguous phenomenon in which it is impossible to discern the just measure of participation of freedom and the raw existent.

Sartre advances in the discussion about the importance of the situation in relation to freedom to the point of stating that obstacles only exist for man in the field of his freedom. Man is free only because he is a being in a situation and, to the same extent, the situation only acquires this character in the face of the ends freely projected by freedom. There is no freedom except in a situation, and there is no situation except in full freedom" (Sartre, 1997, p. 602).

These resistances and obstacles, the situations, are found everywhere in human reality. Sartre presents as some manifestations of the facticity of our freedom: the place that man occupies in the world, the body he possesses, the past he has built, his surroundings

and the fundamental relationship that man develops with the Other.

In discussions about the facticity of freedom, the human being emerges as a being who is committed to a significant world and who reflects meanings not determined by himself. It is possible to perceive this phenomenon when one reflects on the role of the existence of the Other (and his freedom) on the individual existence of each man and of the human collectivity in general.

The meaning of the world is alienated from the For-itself, since it arises and is in the presence of meanings that do not come into the world through it. The process of signification of the world occurs through a simultaneity between the various Parasis. At the same time that the For-itself chooses to capture the Other as Other-subject or Other-Object, this same For-itself experiences itself as an object through the Other's gaze. In other words, from the moment in which Another freedom arises in front of the For-itself, it sees itself attributed and attributing meaning to the world and to the Other and becomes aware of its being-in-situation.

The For-Itself histories the world and makes it dated by its techniques in choosing and historicizing itself. This process of history is of free choice of the For-itself. Only in a world chosen and set by the consciousness (of) freedom can this same freedom be at stake without at the same time ever being able to dispose of its own freedom. It is in relation to existence in the world that the For-itself is called into question. "To be free is to choose oneself in the world" (Sartre, 1997, p. 640).

From what has been said about the situation, it can be inferred that it is a relation of being between a For-Itself and an In-Itself that it swims through. He is the whole subject, who is nothing more than his own situation. Thus, the being-in-situation defines the human-reality. In other words, the situation is the organized totality of the being-there interpreted and lived by the being-beyond.

If human reality is defined as being-in-situation, in which situation and freedom are originally inseparable phenomena, there are no accidents in a life. Man is condemned to be fully responsible for himself, since he freely chooses the construction and meaning of his situation through the ultimate ends he sets for his life. That is, through their projects. Each person is a choice of themselves. It is characteristic of human reality to be without excuse.

EDUCATE: A FREE PROJECT

After this brief review of some essential questions about phenomenology, and

especially about the phenomenological perspective of Husserl and Sartre, it is necessary to resume the discussion about the implications of a phenomenological conception of education.

It has already been said that, currently, pedagogical discourses are contaminated by a conception according to which knowledge is a possession, a property to be acquired, shared, taught or transmitted, most of the time this occurs in a unidirectional way from a teacher who knows, to his students who do not know.

These students are expected to appropriate knowledge, to be able to swallow it, digest it, store it in their minds for later rescue at times when the teacher requires it.

According to Bicudo (1999), this conception results in a natural attitude towards education, according to which it has become a natural object that can be decomposed into parts, be detailed in its phases and programmed, so that it can be known and so that it is possible to develop "efficient strategies" of teaching and learning.

Students and teachers are also seen as part of the physical world. Their minds are understood as receptacles for the storage of knowledge and knowledge meticulously selected and detailed by curricula and pedagogical guidelines.

The I-Other relationship is reduced to the performance of previously established social roles. They are psycho-physical objects, which have an inside and an outside, a subjectivity and an exteriority expressed by the physical body. There is a separation between objective and subjective, in which the former corresponds to the real world and the latter to an inner dimension of the human personality and feelings.

This posture results in a pedagogical practice in which the emphasis is on cognitive aspects and interpersonal relationships. The contents are also naturalized, they start to have an existence in themselves and outside the subjective sphere of the student.

Only in this conception is it possible to think of education as a process with rigidly established goals, based on quantitative indices of use and profitability of institutions; operationalized in activities with programs defined through strategies that fit perfectly to a capitalist market, but which have very little or nothing in common with the world of knowledge and culture.

A phenomenological conception of education must initially reflect on the essence of education itself, its meaning. It is necessary to tirelessly seek to rethink the meaning of educational action, to rescue the concept of education as a project that must be built towards a specific end and, for this very reason, constitutes a free and responsible action.

This is a movement that needs to be done tirelessly by those who propose to think about education.

The phenomenological understanding of education implies knowing human reality as a project freely set by historically and culturally situated individuals. In this way, each student is a pole of intentionality, a consciousness from which the world is placed.

For phenomenology, school needs to be thought of as a historically and culturally constructed institution. In the school-life-world, what is established is the relationship with knowledge and with the world of culture, which cannot, from any perspective, be aligned with market needs or strategies of merely economic development. Its essence is different. It is precisely this essential nature of the school and the educational act that phenomenology seeks to rescue.

Phenomenological didactics objectifies the world through perception, exploring the way it is placed by its agents, that is, experienced by students, teachers and other people involved in the process of producing knowledge and knowledge, a question that is constantly posed in the school.

For Bicudo (1999), this way of understanding the relationship with knowledge brings an implicit conception that the thing is experienced in multiple ways and unified in a synthesis of historical and cultural identification. In this way, the world starts to make sense to each man.

This meaning is constructed through the transcendence of the given in perception, through the synthesis of the multiple, through the search for essential intuition. This search makes it possible for man to perceive himself as being, but also to perceive the Other as a condition of his free existence.

Through the phenomenological epoché, all personal statements, all empirical knowledge, all common sense ideas, all reality is "put out of the loop", submitted to rigorous investigation, privileging the development of thought and reflection as ways of reaching apodictic judgments (Husserl, 2006).

A phenomenological education establishes a constant dissatisfaction with established concepts, promotes a tireless search for truth, through the rigor of thought. It apprehends man as a totality, understood in all dimensions of his existence.

Since the imagination occupies a privileged place within Sartre's thought, a phenomenological conception of education must promote the stimulation of the imagination as a condition of human freedom. Without imagination, man would be unable to break away

from what is given. It is because he sees the real transfigured, because he is able to imagine that man is free. Only an imaginative consciousness is capable of swimming the world in order to put a world project for itself.

To educate and educate oneself is to teach and learn in a process of relationship with the world, in which, by apprehending oneself as a being in a situation, which is an ontological condition of freedom, man understands himself as free to project his life with a view to a freely projected end, through which the world and the Other appear as a situation. Educating to understand the role of the other "as well as teaching and learning the limits of education, knowledge, science and technology" should be the role of a phenomenological conception of education (Coêlho, 1999, p. 89).

Education must teach to question any form of reductionism: consciousness is not reduced to knowledge, education is not reduced to the transfer of information or pedagogical technique, just as the whole is not reduced to the part.

By defining consciousness as "pure act, pure intentionality", by promoting the construction of another form of relationship with knowledge, the need for a specific method for education, different from those used in the natural sciences, becomes evident. In the construction of this new method, it is necessary to be careful to understand that despite the primacy of the pre-reflective over reflection, in the domains of concrete existence, only the reflective attitude is capable of leading man into the domains of certainty.

A phenomenological education is one that seeks the essence, the fundamental aspects, without being deceived by fads, the absence of reflection or by rites and routines guided by common sense. It educates man to recognize that the time of knowledge operates in another rhythm, in another logic, it educates to overcome the accidental, to search for the essence in educational practice.

A rigorous and critical teaching is one that makes man understand knowledge and reality as historical processes of production and overcoming of himself. It is the one in which teaching is placed as mediation and learning, as a relationship with knowledge.

The role of a phenomenological education is to form people who think, question, contest reality, but also who are capable of imagining, creating, humanizing, in other words, forming fully free men.

Education is much more than conditioning, training. Since consciousness is pure intentionality, education is pure intentional act.

They are intentional and happen with a view to an end, and are never an unbridled

and arbitrary agitation (...) in fact, education, as a phenomenon and human activity, is an expression of the freedom and humanity of each and every one and, at the same time, a process of construction of this same freedom and humanity. It expresses freedom and humanity and builds them, being by nature liberating and humanizing man himself (Coêlho, 1999, p.95).

Educational action must have freedom as its fundamental theme and commitment, as it is inherent to human reality itself.

In this way, the educational act must be an exercise in hope. Since imagination has a privileged position in Sartrean thought, since it is only through the capacity of consciousness to perform a swim of the world and put forward a thesis of unreality, that it is capable of imagining it must be stimulated by the teaching work as the free act par excellence.

In the same way, in order to educate, it is necessary to make a denial of the world, of reality, of the school as ready-made realities, so that other possibilities can be posed. This search for overcoming the real through the dream, through the ideal is what justifies human action.

In this sense, the important thing is not to understand how education occurs, but to seek the broader, essential meaning of this act. In the words of Sartre himself (1997), man is not, he makes himself. Man is this constant becoming, which removes from his situation the foundation of his freedom. Since this act is ontologically an expression of freedom, which only exists in a situation, education implies the formation of men aware of their responsibility in the face of their existence.

The act of educating must be understood as an act of full responsible freedom, committed to an end given by its project. Thinking about education must be a constant reflection on the educational project, its end, its purpose.

Thinking about education must cease to be a mere questioning of didactic resources and pedagogical techniques for the transmission of naturalized knowledge. When we talk about education, a thesis is put forward, a project for the formation of a human ideal that must be constantly reflected.

It is in this sense that education constitutes itself in action, an intentionality: to educate is to transcend, to make a denial of reality, to swim it, to put forward another thesis about human existence, which must have as its purpose the formation of a man for the recognition of the ethical responsibility that the ontological condition of his freedom implies.

Education should prepare men to assume the full and oppressive responsibility that

their existence imposes on themselves and their future, as Sartre (1997, p. 678) states that "man, being condemned to be free, carries on his shoulders the weight of the whole world: he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being".

It is evident that educators, from this perspective on education, understand that educational action is also a situated action and no less free or responsible.

It is concluded that there is a need for an educational project to be put in place that rescues the work of building a more humanized, fraternal, ethical man, making possible "coexistence", the conscious construction of a new project of humanity based on the responsible awareness that man is what he makes of himself. In other words, an educational project capable of building a new man who

... is not yet established. We are not complete men. We are beings who struggle to arrive at human relations and a definition of man. (...) We seek to live together, as men, and to be men. Thus, it is through the search for this definition and this action that would be properly human, (...) that we can consider our effort and our end. In other words, our goal is to arrive at a truly constituted body, in which each person would be a man and in which collectivities would be equally human. (Sartre, 1992, p. 31).

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