

FROM THE JUNE 2013 DAYS TO THE ELECTION OF THE "BROAD FRONT"/2022: THE CRISIS OF BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE TACTICS AND STRATEGIES OF LEFT-WING POLITICAL PARTIES



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Paulo Roberto de Sena Júnior¹ and Jean François Yves Deluchey²

ABSTRACT

This research analyzes the tactics and strategies of the left and its political parties in the Brazilian democratic arena between the "June Days"/2013 and the General Elections in October/2022. It is challenging to write about the categories of Democracy and Left-Wing Political Parties in the Marxian and Marxist spheres, today, due to the process of erosion of democratic rights and freedoms underway in the world, specifically in Brazil. On several occasions and in very different countries, this process has called into question not only the existing democratic institutions and the idea of Democracy, but also affects the parties with left-wing programs and tradition, in their ability to address the problems of the contemporary world, and to propose new alternatives to the status quo. In this work we will outline the fundamental characteristics of Liberal Democracy and the elements that constitute its crisis of legitimacy in the contemporary world and in Brazil, in addition to explaining the tactics and strategies of the Left-Wing Political Parties in the country, taking as a time frame the period from the June 2013 Days to the 3rd victory of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and the "Broad Front" headed by the Workers' Party (PT). to the Brazilian executive in 2022. The theoretical and methodological framework that will be used in this research is based on the Marxian theory of understanding reality, having as a parameter the division of society into conflicting social classes and scrutinizing the categories Democracy and Left-Wing Political Parties, in addition to assisting in the historical contextualization of the political transformations that occurred in the period from June 2013 to December 2022.

Keywords: Democracy. Political Parties of the Left. Tactics. Strategies.

¹Graduated in Social Sciences (Bachelor's Degree), with a concentration in Political Science – (UFPA/IFCH), Master's Degree in Political Science, from the Graduate Program in Political Science-UFPA (PPGCP/UFPA) and PhD student in Social Work from the Graduate Program in Social Work-UFPA (PPGSS/UFPA)
E-mail: paulosena_1986@yahoo.com.br

²Dr. in Political Science / Public Policy from the Univ. of the Sorbonne Nouvelle (Paris 3). Associate Professor at the Federal University of Pará (UFPA), professor at the Faculty of Social Work (FASS/ICSA), the Graduate Program in Law (PPGD-ICJ), and the Graduate Program in Social Work (PPGSS-ICSA). Post-Doctorate in Philosophy and Sociology from the Université Paris-Nanterre (Sophiapol), and in Law from PUC-Rio. Co-leader of the CNPq research group CESIP-MARGEAR (Study Group on the Violent Normalizations of Lives in the Amazon). Researcher-member of GENA (International Study Group on Neoliberalism and Alternatives; Sophiapol, Univ. Paris Nanterre), and has research experience with IPEA (Brasília), the Gerda Henkel Stiftung foundation (Dusseldorf/Germany) and the LE STUDIUM Loire Valley Institute for Advanced Studies (Tours/France)
E-mail: jfdeluchey@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

It is challenging to write about the role of left-wing parties and the hope, which they bring (or brought), that the structural ills of capitalist society would "melt into thin air". The challenge already existed in other historical moments, given the breadth of the categories Democracy, Left-wing Political Parties, tactics and strategies in the Marxian and Marxist spheres. Such a challenge is, however, even more accentuated today, due to the process of erosion of democratic rights and freedoms underway in the world, specifically in Brazil. On several occasions and in very different countries, this process has called into question not only the existing democratic institutions and the idea of Democracy, but also affects the parties with left-wing programs and tradition, in their ability to address the problems of the contemporary world, and to propose new alternatives to the status quo.

The choice of research on this theme is necessary to glimpse the possibilities and political actions of the class that lives from work, because a revolutionary strategy cannot do without the knowledge of democratic engineering and its political and organizational form, considering that it is necessary to have an organization that creates the conditions for the development of a proposal, program or project alternative to capitalism. And for this arduous task, it is necessary time, research, knowledge of the totality and particularity, and to keep in mind that this research work will only have its academic and political meaning, if it is enriched with social practice, the opinions and suggestions of social actors, because an alternative society to capital must be built democratizing the debate and demands with the proletariat, and not be decreed from the top down.

In this sense, this article will have the insignia of analyzing the limits and possibilities of the left and its parties in the Brazilian democratic arena between June 2013 and December 2022, between being in the opposition and managing the federal executive. Checking the zig-zags of left-wing organizations and the changes in the course of their political programs and actions will help us understand the essence and appearance of phenomena, in the midst of the quantitative-qualitative political advance of the extreme right and conservatism; the rise of a careerist politician, without parliamentary expression, who becomes the authentic "representative of the popular classes" based on simplistic, reductionist and denialist solutions, exploiting growing nuances of anti-PT and anti-left sentiment; the deterioration of institutional relations between the 3 (three) powers of the Republic, among others. This feeling was strongly functionalized in the face of the economic crisis and its social effects.

THE "STORM" THAT SHAKES BRAZILIAN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND LEFT-WING PARTIES IN THE "EYE OF THE HURRICANE": FROM THE DAYS OF JUNE/2013 TO THE IMPEACHMENT OF DILMA ROUSSEF (PT)/2016

Reflecting on contemporary democracy as if it were inert the violations to which they have been subjected immediately denounces the insufficiency of the analysis.

It boasts a number of interruptions and impediments that carry a deep scar on the country's political rearrangement, mainly affecting left-wing organizations and social movements. The last almost 15 years have been effervescent, from the point of view of economic, political, social and institutional instability, as well as the responses of organizations on the left spectrum, based on their tactics, strategies and agendas in the context of class struggle.

Dilma Rousseff (PT), embarking on the high popularity of Lula da Silva's mandates (2003-2006/2007-2010), was elected for a third consecutive term of the Workers' Party, amid the consequences of the international crisis of 2007-2008, the so-called "North American real estate bubble". According to Santos (2019), the context of the sum of wealth expansion (period in which all social groups benefit, although some more than others) was in transition to a stagnant sum scenario (a tendency to freeze the social profile of wealth distribution) and a negative sum (some social groups would reduce the pace of appropriation of the income generated).

Coggiola (2019) draws attention to the indices of the economic crisis in Brazil and the sharpening of the class struggle in the period before the June 2013 Journeys, coming from a junction between budget contingencies for strategic areas, falling economic indices and maintenance of the "booklet" on the validity of the payment of the Public Debt. The GDP (Gross Domestic Product) decreased from 4.5% in 2011 to 1% in 2012, mainly due to the drop in the services sector, in particular financial intermediation, as a result of the reduction in interest rates. The trade balance in the same period decreased from US\$31.3 billion in November 2011 to US\$23.9 billion in June 2012. "The federal government allocated two-thirds of the resources spent in 2013 to the payment of interest and debt amortization: R\$ 900 billion were planned for the public debt, 20% more than the R\$ 753 billion spent in the previous year." (IBIDEM: 149).

Osvaldo Coggiola also analyzed the consequences of the economic crisis for the world of work and its union and political organization. Between 2012 and 2013, the number of strikes in Brazil reached a new level, comparable to the late 1970s and early 1980s,

according to DIEESE. The strike of the Federal civil servants in 2012 (led by the ANDES, FASUBRA and SINASEFE unions), which paralyzed 58 of the 59 universities, promoted massive marches and days of struggle in Brasília. The tax auditors paralyzed for a salary increase of 30%. Strikes came to paralyze the industrial center of Manaus and the work of Federal Police employees. Also noteworthy is the private sector, where workers reacted with stoppages and strikes in metallurgical sectors (General Motors workers in ABC Paulista and São José dos Campos – SP), and in Eletrobrás (FURNAS, CHESF, ELETRONORTE, ELETROSUL and ten other companies), contesting the effects of the "sliced" Labor Reform, which already provided for "voluntary dismissal" and the insertion of the "bank of hours".³

Macro and microeconomic indicators were deteriorating, as well as the popularity of Dilma Rousseff, and showed signs of the entrails of the Brazilian democratic regime, in its social and political nuances. The social crisis was made explicit by the mobilizations against the increase in transport fares in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in 2013, and later added demands related to health and education services, as well as anti-corruption banners and the denunciation of the "spree" of spending public money for the preparation of the 2014 World Cup and the violent police action against the demonstrations. These demands of the basic Brazilian social agenda, together with the deepening of the mobilizations, led to the beginning of the greatest political crisis that the New Republic is going through, still unconcluded, and which directly affected the functioning of democratic institutions, sometimes with an emphasis on the representative spheres (Executive and Legislative), sometimes on the non-representative spheres (Judiciary and Armed Forces). (BIONDI, 2021).

In this sense, there were several organizations that tried to hegemonize the agendas of the demonstrations. Buzetto (2013) and Calil (2013) identified the organizations on the left-wing spectrum, which were present from the beginning: the Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), the Workers' Cause Party (PCO), the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) and the Unified Socialist Workers Party (PSTU). In addition to these, it was also possible to find members of tendencies that work within the Workers' Party (PT), the Luís Carlos Prestes Communist Pole and the Popular Consultation. However, with the nationalization of the marches, the emergence and advance of clearly right-wing banners, "against the PT", "against communism", summary

³ *IBIDEM*: 149-159.

defense of the return of the military dictatorship, the rejection of the "red flag" in the protests and the systematic criminalization of social movements by the mainstream media, cornered the left in its action, and when the protests cooled down at the end of June, These organizations have not been able to achieve a polarization with the ascendant right "born" from the days.

However, the attempt to demonstrate strength and organization was late. The following month, on July 11, there was a call called "National Day of Mobilization", and it was controversial, as it involved trade unions opposed to the Federal Government (CSP-Conlutas and Intersindical), and government centrals linked to the PT project (Central Única dos Trabalhadores – CUT; Central of Workers of Brazil - CTB, linked to the PCdoB; and by the trade union centrals traditionally associated with class conciliation unionism (Força Sindical, General Union of Workers, New Workers' Union Central, General Central of Workers of Brazil and Central of Brazilian Unions). For Calil (2013), the participation of pro-government trade unions was the upgrade for the mainstream media to exploit and influence public opinion, correlating the movement with the defense of the PT government, in addition to stigmas such as the association with corrupt union practices and clientelism, accentuating the depoliticization and confusion within the working class, in addition to denunciations about the presence of "militants" who were paid to participate in the demonstrations.

Still in 2014, the general elections were approaching, in which President Dilma Rousseff was seeking reelection, in a very unfavorable context in relation to the other three previous elections, won by Lula and herself. The right wing was advancing rapidly, with a rapid ideologization and politicization of the national agenda, usurping anti-institutional, anti-parliamentary, and even anti-systemic banners, beginning to attribute an ultraconservative value to it. (ANTUNES, 2022). The left was still "dizzy" under the effects of the June 2013 Days, and was articulated between the political parties that acted in the PT opposition, with little parliamentary insertion, but still with union roots (urban and rural), in the youth and in popular movements. When the time came for the 2014 electoral process, President Dilma Rousseff sought re-election for the Workers' Party (PT), polarizing the dispute for the 6th time with the candidacy of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), Aécio Neves, from Minas Gerais. The left was fragmented, not re-editing the "Left Front/PSOL-PSTU-PCB" that rose to 3rd place in 2006, when the time was headed by Heloísa Helena (PSOL), who garnered more than 6.5 million votes, equivalent to 6.85% of the valid votes. The Socialism

and Liberty Party (PSOL) launched the candidacy of former federal deputy Luciana Genro for the presidency, since the Unified Socialist Workers Party (PSTU) registered metallurgist José Maria de Almeida; while the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) competed in the election with Professor Mauro Iasi; and the Workers' Cause Party (PCO), which was represented by Rui Costa Pimenta, but had its candidacy rejected by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) throughout the campaign, being released sub judice until the end of the election.

The candidate of the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) campaigned on axes such as the economy, campaign financing, issues of customs (Legalization of Abortion and Decriminalization of Marijuana) and the Brazilian Public Debt. In an interview with Portal UOL, in conjunction with the program "Power and Politics", of Folha de São Paulo, on June 22, 2014⁴, the former congresswoman emphasized the importance of equal public financing of campaigns, defending the end of her private financing and the non-receipt of donations from multinational companies, banks and contractors. In addition, he defended the decriminalization of abortion and marijuana, where the State, from the Unified Health System (SUS) welcomes pregnant women, through a program of monitoring and safe and free treatment, and that stimulates an open and democratic dialogue with the population on contraceptive methods and family planning, in addition to the proposal of debt audit, as happened in Ecuador. For Genro, the audit is necessary so that resources can be allocated to the population, "(...) preserving the interests of small savers, of workers who have their money in pension funds, and seeking a renegotiation based on this audit." (IBIDEM, 2014).

Following the analysis of the electoral politics of the left-wing parties in the 2014 general elections, José Maria de Almeida represented the Unified Socialist Workers Party (PSTU) for the fourth time, with a political platform that envisions the nationalization of the financial system, the suspension of the payment of the public debt, the public financing of electoral campaigns and the program of the socialist revolution. When interviewed by the UOL portal, through journalist Guilherme Balza, on August 1, 2014⁵, "Zé Maria" stated that the moratorium on the Brazilian Public Debt and the nationalization of the financial system aims to invert priorities: that of financing and directing public policies for the construction of

⁴ "Read the transcript of Luciana Genro's interview with Uol and Folha." See more at <<<https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2014/06/24/leia-a-transcricao-da-entrevista-de-luciana-genro-ao-uol-e-a-folha.htm>>>. Accessed on 27 Jan. 2024.

⁵ See more in **Zé Maria (PSTU) defends minimum wage for politicians and nationalization of banks.** Available at <<<https://www.uol.com.br/eleicoes/2014/noticias/2014/08/01/ze-maria-pstu-defende-salario-minimo-a-politicos-e-estatizacao-de-bancos.htm>>>. Accessed on 27 Jan. 2024.

housing, schools, hospitals, food production, infrastructure works and offer cheap credit to the population. This entire framework needs to be linked to the end of what he calls the "privilege of large companies", ending tax subsidies for multinationals, such as vehicle manufacturers, with a progressive policy of "reducing working hours, would guarantee salary and retirement at the rates of the values calculated by the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE).

Also according to the PSTU candidate, public campaign financing has to be accompanied by the equality of debate spaces in electoral campaigns. According to him, it is unacceptable that a television company like Rede Globo, which has a public concession, offers more journalistic viewing spaces to 2 or 3 candidates better positioned in electoral polls. In addition, even knowing that it has little chance of winning the election, its political organization participates in the electoral contest in order to disseminate and debate the socialist political program.

The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) launched the candidacy for the presidency of the Republic, the professor of the Faculty of Social Work of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Mauro Iasi, who presented an agenda with economic and political axes, the issue of identity agendas and the debate of the socialist program. In an interview with the website "O Viés",⁶ on the eve of the 1st round of the election, the PCB candidate focuses his proposals on what he calls "popular power", which would be to use the necessary tools in the class struggle for political conviction and the permanent mobilization of the segments that make up the class that lives from work, and that fight for their rights: urban and rural workers, youth, women, blacks, homosexuals, Indians, among others, to confront capitalist domination and in defense of an alternative society, the socialist society.

At the end of the electoral campaign, the candidate of the Workers' Party, in a very close 2nd round against Aécio Neves (PSDB), was re-elected for a second term, with a difference of a little more than 3.5 million votes (51.64% x 48.36%). The smaller left-wing candidacies, quantitatively, garnered almost 2 million votes, with emphasis on Luciana Genro (PSOL), who obtained 1.6 million votes (1.55% of valid votes/4th place). José Maria de Almeida (PSTU), was in 8th place, obtaining 91,209 votes (0.09% of valid votes); Mauro Iasi (PCB), who finished the election in 10th place, with 47,845 votes (0.05% of valid votes);

⁶ See more in **Interview with Mauro Iasi**. Available at <<<https://www.revistaovies.com/2014/10/02/eleicoes-2014-entrevista-com-mauro-iasi-pcb/>>>. Accessed on 27 Jan. 2024.

and Rui Costa Pimenta (PCO), who even with almost the entire electoral campaign in a bias of contesting the ticket, obtained 12,324 (0.01% of the valid votes).

Dilma Rousseff (PT) begins her government in 2015 under the prism of distrust in a polarized environment, both of the political class that guarantees parliamentary governability, and of the social movements, which still reverberate the agenda of the June 2013 Days. Brás (2017) analyzes the beginning of the 4th PT term as an "era already in crisis", effects that were consciously constructed by the ruling class, which ranged from problems in the coalition in the National Congress, and suffering the bleeding of the Federal Police investigations in the "Operation Car Wash", the setbacks in the Federal Supreme Court (STF) and the ideological crystallization of the bourgeois media.

With the economic crisis taking great strides, the governability of the coalition increasingly weakened, the advance of the investigations of Operation Car Wash reaching the "hard-core" of the Government, dissatisfaction was almost generalized to the outskirts of Brasília, that the possibility of aborting Dilma Rousseff's mandate was real. Until December 2, 2015, the former president of the Chamber of Deputies Eduardo Cunha (PMDB), accepted a request from jurists Hélio Bicudo, Miguel Reale Júnior and Janaína Paschoal, to open a criminal case of responsibility of the presidency of the Republic. It was the path to Impeachment. Its justification: a crime of responsibility for the practice of the so-called "fiscal pedaling" and for the issuance of decrees to open credit without the authorization of Congress⁷. There were 273 days of an institutional journey, which ended on August 31, 2016, resulting in the revocation of Dilma Rousseff's mandate, but without the loss of Dilma Rousseff's political rights.

The process of impeachment of the PT mandate that put an end to 13 consecutive years of administration of the federal machine, was the context of debates, political elaborations and different perspectives of analysis, conjunctures and actions in the field of

⁷ "The prosecution argued that the decrees authorized budget supplementation by more than R\$ 95 billion and contributed to the failure to meet the 2015 fiscal target. They said that the government knew about the irregularity because it had already asked for a review of the target when it issued the decrees and that the Legislature had not been consulted, as it should have been done before the new target was approved. Regarding the pedaladas, the prosecution said that they were not just operational delays because the Treasury's debt with public banks accumulated for a long time and reached very high values. According to the jurists, the accumulation of debts served to manufacture a fiscal surplus that did not exist and to create a positive situation in the public accounts that was not true. The objective of the "pedaladas", as they claimed, would have been, therefore, to hide the real fiscal situation of the country". See more in "Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff marks the year 2016 in Congress and in Brazil". Available at <<<https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2016/12/28/impeachment-de-dilma-rousseff-marca-ano-de-2016-no-congresso-e-no-brasil>>>. Accessed 25 Jan. 2024

the left. The thesis that there was a "coup" has become almost unanimous among parties, social movements, intellectuals and academia. Lowy (2016) analyzes the Impeachment process as a "Parliamentary and/or Institutional Coup", and even a "Coup d'état", which brought with it a movement of reorganization of the political class to ensure its self-salvation, through the repercussion of investigations, accusations and trials of acts of corruption, which had the PT and its allies as their main targets, and cite economic, political and legal overdeterminations for such a definition.

Michael Lowy evaluates the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff as a movement of the ruling classes and financial capital in Latin America, as the same method was used in presidential depositions in Honduras and Paraguay. The author calls this process in Brazil a pseudo-legal, "constitutional", "institutional" and parliamentary coup d'état, articulated by an alliance of right-wing parties from the bench of parliamentarians called "BBB": the "Bullet" (deputies linked to the Military Police, death squads and private militias), the "Ox" (large landowners, cattle breeders) and the "Bible" (fundamentalist neo-Pentecostals, homophobes and misogynists). It was a movement, according to the author, of the physiological political class, led by deputies and senators who were involved in corruption cases, and as a way of "diverting" attention from the investigations they were suffering by the Federal Police and the Public Prosecutor's Office, they attributed the accounting irregularities ("fiscal pedaling") to cover deficits in public accounts to the president, who had already had her popularity in tatters since the pre-impeachment period. Dilma Rousseff lost her position, but kept her political rights, while the leadership of the "coup" stir, federal deputy Eduardo Cunha (MDB – RJ), was forced to resign, investigated and imprisoned for corruption, money laundering, tax evasion, etc.

In this sense, almost all political parties, left-wing organizations and social movements realigned political actions around, initially, defending the PT mandate, and later, in an attempt to wear down and overthrow the new "Temer Government (2016-2018)". PT, PC do B, PCB, PCO, the majority leadership of the PSOL, the Unified Workers' Central (CUT), the National Union of Students (UNE), Homeless Workers' Movements (MTST), Intersindical, Central do Trabalhador e Trabalhadora Brasileira (CTB), Union of Popular Education Centers for Blacks and the Working Class (UNEAFRO), intellectuals, artists, among others, founded the "People without Fear Front", guided by three axes: "(...)"

Confronting austerity policies, confronting conservatism and ways out of the crisis with popular reforms and taxation of the rich"⁸

On the other hand, intellectuals, artists, some social movements and political parties, such as the PSTU and the Socialist Workers' Current (CST – UIT),⁹ advocate that the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff is part of the functioning of the class democracy of the bourgeoisie and its political agents, and expresses the class struggle in a distorted way, and does not represent and does not reflect the agenda of the class that lives from work.

Biondi (2021) recognizes the strong link between the consummation of the impeachment of the PT president and the impact of Operation Car Wash. In the lavajatista wording, the end of the PT governments was an event of "national liberation", the "end of the yoke of the party that would be the most corrupt in Brazilian political life". However, he disputes Michael Lowy's conclusions that there was a "Coup", whatever type it appears ("Institutional", "Parliamentary", "State", etc.), which has vilified liberal democracy and the Democratic Rule of Law. The interruption of the PT mandate in 2016 should be treated as a final determinant of the dynamics and contradictions of the class struggle, and not the starting point for the defense of dogmas such as "there were institutional ruptures", or "a coup against the democratically elected president".

The coup, continues Pablo Biondi, is a term open to adjectives, but the Marxist method of analysis of the State and bourgeois democracy dispenses with an analysis of the real, of the economic, political and social scenarios, and not centrally the legal imputation of the rulers. Lowy's thesis, that impeachment was a "legal aberration", simply because it was a ritual of corrupt people judging corruption cases, and because it has no precedent because "fiscal pedaling" has always been an act of past governments, is nothing more

⁸ See more in "**People Without Fear Front thickens the fight against retrocession**". Available at <<<https://www.cut.org.br/noticias/frente-povo-sem-medo-engrossa-luta-contra-o-retrocesso-8b8f>>>. Accessed Jan. 27, 2024.

⁹ The **Socialist Workers' Tendency – International Workers' Unity (CST – ITU)** was one of the founding tendencies of the *Socialism and Liberty Party* (PSOL) in 2004, and after controversies and disagreements with the majority leadership of this party, they broke with the organization, due to the organic participation as a parliamentary base in the Lula 3 Government (2022 – 2025), with the composition in ministries and positions of 1st and 2nd levels, and the consequent loss of their political and class independence. "*In this structural scenario – integration into the central government, the organ of the class domination of the bourgeoisie – there is no longer a real internal struggle. The PSOL irreversibly sealed its fate by joining and supporting the capitalist government of Lula/Alckmin. It crystallizes in institutionalization, with no axis in the class struggle, as a party of cabinets and advisors. The PSOL is tied to parliamentary logic, to the weight of the monumental and millionaire party fund and to paid electoral cables. We know that the current PSOL will continue to elect mandates, but it will never again fulfill the role it played in its foundation as a tool of the independent left.*" (**Why does the CST break with the PSOL?** In <<<https://www.cstuit.com/home/2023/06/05/por-que-a-cst-rompe-com-o-psol/>>>). Accessed 28 Jan. 2024.

than ethical proselytism, as if there were a trial of an "honest" bourgeois government, by a "bunch of dishonest people". The understanding of the conjuncture of the class struggle does not encompass the totality or its particularities only through the bias of legal opinions, nor does it expect political agents to behave as citizens moved by obedience to the strict legality of liberal democracy. This interpretation was even taken as a primer by the vast majority of left-wing parties, which took the side of "a progressive camp" in the class struggle, with the garb that the PT pole of the bourgeoisie and capital was the sensible position of the proletariat. The same fervor they had in "defending democracy" cooled when it came to denouncing the famine caused by the "PT way of governing", of alliance with the bourgeois fraction of national capital, and the reactionary character of the electoral system and the judiciary.

The Unified Socialist Workers Party (PSTU) and the Socialist Workers' Tendency – International Workers' Unity (CST-ITU)¹⁰ were outside the "radius of influence" of most left-wing parties, which attributed the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (PT) to a "coup action". They consider that, like Pablo Biondi, the economic, political and social determinants are the tools of the Marxist method for analyzing the conjuncture, the correlation of forces between social classes and politics for the concreteness of the moment. Facts such as the increase in the number of strikes since 2013, against the economic austerity imposed on various sectors of the economy, the political crisis triggered by the investigations and arrests of Operation Car Wash, the end of the minimal concessions maintained by the Lula and Dilma governments at the beginning of their first term, in a context of economic growth, the fall in agribusiness profit rates with the commodity crisis, the galloping inflation, the fall in job creation, the advance of layoffs and unemployment rates, undermined the social base of the government, not to mention the "abandonment" of a fraction of the class that supported the PT government, should express an alternative independent of the proletariat, both the government and the bourgeois opposition.

THE IMPRISONMENT OF LULA (PT) AND THE RISE OF BOLSONARISM: IN THE GAME OF CHESS, THE FAR-RIGHT "CHECKMATED"

In 2018, in the last year of the government of Michel Temer (MDB), there were drastic changes in the democratic game board, in view of the elections that would take place in October of this year. In a scenario in which the Emedebist administration, having

¹⁰ Still as an internal tendency of the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL).

already repositioned the interests of financial capital and the hegemony of the ultra-neoliberal bourgeoisie in the country, applying fiscal and social austerity plans, to recompose profit rates and maintain the primary surplus to increase the payment of external and internal debts, was impacted by a fact that would guide the upcoming electoral election: the arrest of former president and virtual presidential candidate Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (PT).

On April 7, 2018, Lula surrendered to the Federal Police, after a great political act that launched, from now on, the "Free Lula" campaign, in the surroundings of his political birthplace, the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo – SP. The conviction was defined by the Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region (TRF-4), of 12 years and 1 month in prison, starting in a closed regime, for passive corruption and money laundering. (...) Lula is accused of receiving the triplex on the coast of São Paulo as a disguised bribe from the construction company OAS to favor the company in contracts with Petrobras."¹¹

Without going into the merits of the legal content of the decision, the intention will be to analyze the impact of this political fact for the left-wing parties in the 2018 electoral election, and what tactics they used after the removal of the former president from the chessboard of politics in Brazil.

In a unified public note signed by PT, PDT, PC do B and PSOL, the parties claim that the former PT president was the victim of political persecution, and "(...) represents an aggression against Brazilian democracy and international human rights treaties, which enshrine, as the foundations of democratic regimes, the principles of popular sovereignty, the presumption of innocence and due process of law."¹² Also according to the statement, even though the judiciary has failed to comply with the procedural rite of the Democratic Rule of Law, there is a demonstration of clear confidence in the institutions of bourgeois democracy in reversing the case, because the answer to the unjust impeachment (according to the note), of the hitherto "leader in the polls of voting intentions", It is to stick to and respect democracy.

¹¹ See more in **"Lula surrenders to the Federal Police and is arrested to serve time for corruption and money laundering"**, available at <<<https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/lula-se-entrega-a-pf-para-cumprir-pena-por-corrupcao-e-lavagem-de-dinheiro.ghtml>>>. Accessed 30 Jan. 2024.

¹² See more in **"Left-wing parties release note repudiating Lula's imprisonment"**. Available in <<<https://pt.org.br/partidos-de-esquerda-divulgam-nota-de-repudio-a-prisao-de-lula/>>>. Accessed on 30 Jan. 2024.

The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) released a note on its website¹³ and was in the same rhetorical line as the PT, PC do B, PSOL and PDT. He begins by repudiating the imprisonment of former President Lula, and accused the judiciary of making a judgment full of vices, with manipulations and selectivity throughout the process, which had the ideological and prominent endorsement of the major media, especially Rede Globo, with the aim of removing him from the electoral dispute.

Also according to the note, this selectivity is demonstrated "(...) by the fact that the main corrupt people, both in the Executive and Legislative branches, even with vast evidence, are still free and enjoying freedom¹⁴." The text ends with the PCB calling for a unity of all democratic, progressive and revolutionary forces, and to resist against the emptying of democratic freedoms, "(...) actively participate in the confrontation, together with popular organizations and movements, of the fascistic escalation, the advance of conservatism and attacks against the working class".¹⁵

The Unified Socialist Workers Party (PSTU) released a note on its website¹⁶, and highlighted the character of Lula's imprisonment, its political significance and the consequences of the action of the judiciary in relation to the class that lives from work. Initially, the report states that the conviction of the former president in only one (1) of his nine (9) indictments in progress is part of his choice and that of the PT in its strategy of running the Brazilian bourgeois state, and by making coalitions with politicians (Sarney, Barbalho, Calheiros, Temer, Maluf, Collor, among others), which has nothing to do with the workers and popular classes of the country. and sank into his own traps of corruption.

Unlike the note released by the PT, PSOL, PC do B, PDT and PCB itself, it is not a deepening of the so-called "coup", or "an attack on democracy", or an "affront to the rule of law" or "justice that is being selective", and which culminated in the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (PT) and now the arrest of the PT leader. Justice and its rule of law are selective when they incarcerate "(...) 290,000 people imprisoned – the vast majority of whom are black and poor – without ever having had the right to any trial, neither in the second nor in the first instance."¹⁷ But as the judiciary is an instrument of hegemony of the ruling class, it

¹³ See more in "PCB Repudiates the prison of the Former president LULA". Available at <<<https://pcb.org.br/portal2/19284>>>. Accessed 01 Feb. 2024.

¹⁴ Idem 11.

¹⁵ Ibid. 12.

¹⁶ See more in **"PSTU NOTE: STF denies habeas corpus and Lula's arrest is decreed"**. Available at <<<https://www.pstu.org.br/stf-nega-habeas-corpus-e-prisao-de-lula-e-decretada/>>>. Accessed on 30 Jan. 2024.

¹⁷ Idem 14.

does not only go deep into the imprisonment of corrupt people. It is also necessary to arrest the corruptors, the companies and politicians who finance, in addition to the expropriation of the assets accumulated from corruption, of all those involved and indicted. "Justice is selective, yes, but the way out is to demand the arrest of other corrupt people, and not general impunity."¹⁸

The note concludes with a question and points to different strategies of the left-wing parties that are in the "orbit of the PT": "Are democracy and the presumption of innocence only for politicians and businessmen?"¹⁹. And he makes observations and questions about the judiciary, which should not have the confidence of the proletariat, because as an instituted power of the bourgeois ruling classes, in a country of miserable wages and with judges earning 40, 50 times more than an ordinary worker, and which leaves figures like Jair Bolsonaro free and with impunity, who explicitly praises the 21 years of Civil-Military Dictatorship (1964-1985) and is in favor of the withdrawal of democratic freedoms, it must "cover up" all forms of exploitation and oppression always with a justification of the Law and/or norms. And, who can build another judiciary, "(...) to end all impunity and injustice, to defeat all authoritarianism against the working people, and even to defend democratic freedoms that may be threatened, is the mobilization of the workers,"²⁰ and the erection of a socialist society.

The left-wing parties that were on the "route of influence" of the Workers' Party (PT) and its main public figure, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, now in prison, would face a context in which their main candidate would be "out of combat", a situation ratified in the decision of September 1, 2018, by the Plenary of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). which rejected, by a majority of votes (6 to 1), the registration of the former president's candidacy to run for the Presidency of the Republic in October, who declared his ineligibility based on the Clean Record Law²¹.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 15.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 16.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 17.

²¹ On September 1, 2018, following the vote of the rapporteur of the Minister of the Federal Superior Court (STF), Luís Roberto Barroso, the registration of Lula's candidacy was declared ineligible, as a result of questions in the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) for challenges, news of ineligibility and actions to challenge the mandate, in a total of 17 processes. The demands were presented by the Electoral Public Prosecutor's Office (MPE), by candidates and opposing parties, entities and even voters. All these challenges contained, essentially, the same grounds: Lula is ineligible due to the incidence of article 1, item I, paragraph 'e', items 1 and 6, of Complementary Law No. 64/90 (as amended by Complementary Law No. 135/2010, the Clean Record Law), which provides that those who are convicted, in a final decision or rendered by a collegiate judicial body, are ineligible, from the conviction until the expiration of the period of eight years after the completion of the sentence, for crimes against the popular economy, public faith, public administration and

Nicolau (2020) found that, in the wake of the electoral campaign, the candidacy of a careerist federal deputy was strengthened, who had his parliamentary activity for two decades (1990-2010) discreet, having approved only one bill, without chairing a commission or being the leader of a party or bench: Jair Bolsonaro. If it weren't for his various flashy speeches, he would be another deputy to be unnoticed on the national scene. Even though he was not the champion of votes in all electoral processes (with an average of 100 thousand votes per electoral election), he prioritized the agenda of defending the interests of the military corporations. But from the 2011 legislature, Bolsonaro diversified his bravado to address behavioral issues in the Chamber of Deputies and in the media. Now he starts to focus on what he calls the "defense of the traditional family", which in his view, was constantly "(...) threatened by gay marriage, by the school supplies of the PT government 'which encourages children to be homosexuals' and even by the 'boy Bernardo law', which punishes physical punishment and mistreatment against children, which for Bolsonaro, would take away the autonomy of parents". (IDEM: 76). It was a conscious exposure, in view of an electorate that was multiplying with each election, responsible for the vote that made up a bench in parliament: evangelicals and conservatives. In the historical and political sphere, 2 (two) events had repercussions on the course of the dispute. Chronologically, the first is what the author calls "out of the curve", but it happened. Candidate Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) suffered an attack in Juiz de Fora – MG, known as "the stabbing", on September 6. The candidate spent almost the entire 1st shift convalescing in a hospital room, and then continued at his home. Never before had a candidate for president suffered such an act of such magnitude. And the second was the change in the composition of a slate in the middle of the campaign, for judicial reasons. As previously mentioned, the Workers' Party (PT) registered the Coalition "The Happy People Again", composed of PT, PC do B and PROS, headed by Lula and the former mayor of São Paulo Fernando Haddad (PT). With the rejection of the former president by the Clean Record Law, on September 11, 10 days after the "impediment" decision outlined by the TSE, Haddad becomes the "head of the ticket", with Manuela D'Ávila (PC do B) as his vice-president.

public property (item 1) and laundering or concealment of assets, rights and values. See more in "**TSE rejects request for registration of Lula's candidacy for the Presidency of the Republic**". Available at <<<https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2018/Setembro/tse-indefere-pedido-de-registro-de-candidatura-de-lula-a-presidencia-da-republica#:~:text=O%20relator%2C%20however%2C%20considered%20necessary%C3%A1rio,todos%20os%20recursos%20se%20exerata>>>. Accessed 30 Jan. 2024.

Resuming the work of Nicolau (2020), the PT candidate, when Lula's replacement was made official, obtained a meteoric rise in the opinion polls. He went from 5% to the 20% range of preferences, according to the DATAFOLHA and IBOPE polls, becoming one of the strongest competitors to go to the second round. This transfer of votes from Lula excited the PT leadership, which created expectations of a turnaround in the 1st stage of the elections. It was "almost a turnaround", because with Lula in the race, the former president was always ahead of the polls with a margin of 30 to 35% of the voters' preference. With Haddad's entry into the race, Jair Bolsonaro takes the lead during the campaign. It starts with a margin of 20% of intentions, starts to have more than 30% in the second half of September, breaking the 40% barrier at the end of the month. There was a possibility, among the coordinators of the PSL campaign, of the possibility of victory in the 1st round, which did not occur. In the "first round" of the elections, Jair Bolsonaro won, having 42% of the total votes (equivalent to 46% of the valid votes), while Haddad had 27% of the total votes (29% of the valid votes).

In the first round of the electoral process, the left-wing parties analyzed so far, which were outside the space of the state machine (PSOL, PCB and PSTU) and with insertion in social, union, popular, youth and rural movements, registered candidacies with different perspectives, even if they were supporting actors, in a polarized scenario between the return of PT, in the figure of Fernando Haddad (PT), and the anti-PT conservative alternative, which presented itself as "anti-system, God-fearing and patriotic", in the figure of Jair Bolsonaro (PSL).

The PSOL and the PCB sealed an electoral alliance on July 21, in which Guilherme Boulos (National Coordinator of the Homeless Workers' Movement/MTST) was chosen as the candidate for the Brazilian executive, with Sônia Guajajara (Coordinator of the Articulation of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil/APIB) as vice-president. The slate "Let's go without fear of changing Brazil" also received the support of social movements, such as the MTST itself, APIB, as well as the group "Mídia Ninja" and Intersindical.

In the political platform launched on the website of the Superior Electoral Court, the PSOL – PCB ticket presents itself as an alternative "(...) of a sovereign, democratic, egalitarian nation, reversing the current chaos of deepening social inequalities, fear and hopelessness".²² There was an anti-systemic perspective, of confronting the status quo of

²² See more at **"Coalition Program 'LET'S GO WITHOUT FEAR OF CHANGING BRAZIL' – Guilherme Boulos and Sonia Guajajara.** See more in

the country's ruling class, which historically built its economic, social and political privileges to the detriment of chronic social inequality and the impoverishment of the Brazilian working class. He also adds that the political program of the socialist left must have as its central perspectives the rapture of financial capital, agribusiness, monopolies (including the large media), commercial, economic and technological dependence, and that it combats conservatism and all forms of aggression by the capitalist state. According to the proposal, the foundation of the slate's platform should be transversal, and have the environment as its axes, taking stock of the predatory models of natural resources, forests and traditional communities, as well as the demands of the world of work, social security, the policy of generating jobs for youth and "(...) the centrality in the fight against inequality and for rights, in the demands of women, black men and women, LGBTI, people with disabilities, indigenous people and in another model of development consistent and coherent with this programmatic nature".²³

The Unified Socialist Workers Party (PSTU) made official the worker Vera Lúcia as the "head of the ticket" for the presidency of the Republic, with the activist of the Black Movement "Race and Class" Hertz Dias, both affiliated with the party. In an interview with journalists Lucas Arraz and Ailma Teixeira, from the website "Bahianoticias", the candidate intends to make her campaign during the general elections as "a call to rebellion", and that she extends her candidacy to the class that lives from work, having as central axes "(...) the expropriation of companies and large estates, as well as the handing over of the guardianship of these properties to the workers, as part of the measures she will adopt to combat the concentration of income in Brazil, if elected".²⁴

Trying to consolidate herself as an alternative on the left spectrum, the PSTU candidate says that, in the midst of the context of yet another economic and political crisis, the deepening of social inequality, unemployment and high prices, her candidacy aims to bring together the struggle of the working class, debate the need for a socialist revolution and a socialist country, and to present a revolutionary program that represents the proletariat.

<<https://divulgacandcontas.tse.jus.br/candidaturas/oficial/2018/BR/BR/2022802018/280000601016/proposta_1533565462424.pdf>>. Accessed 01 Feb. 2024.

²³ Idem 20.

²⁴ Interview "Against 'empowerment theory', PSTU candidate for the presidency defends socialist revolution in the country". See more at <<<https://www.bahianoticias.com.br/entrevista/584-contra-teoria-do-empowerment-candidate-of-the-pstu-a-presidency-defends-revolucao-socialista-no-pais-30072018>>>. Accessed 30 Jan. 2024.

In the second round of the 2018 general elections, there was a consensus among PT marketers that Fernando Haddad should adopt a new strategy in this second round, more focused on the center and distant from former President Lula. The PT candidate, in order to attract undecided voters and the more centrist candidates, removed the term Constituent Assembly, one of the controversies of the first round, and eliminated mentions of the decriminalization of drugs and the reform or demilitarization of the police. He immediately tried to make nods to the market, such as maintaining the autonomy of the Central Bank and agribusiness, and even jettisoned the idea of a fixed term for higher courts. This is another piece in the search for votes to try to defeat opponent Jair Bolsonaro (PSL).²⁵

For Jairo Nicolau, the PT candidate's campaign did not succeed, and this was due to the delay or denial of support in the democratic sectors. He received critical support from the PDT, and the party's candidate Ciro Gomes preferred not to declare his vote, even traveling to Paris in the 2nd round campaign. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and other national leaders of the PSDB did not manifest themselves, or openly declared their vote for Jair Bolsonaro, such as governors-elect João Dória and Eduardo Leite, for São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, respectively. Marina Silva gave her support only 15 days after the 1st round of voting. The PSOL expressed its vote for Haddad and even joined the campaign with candidate Guilherme Boulos, the same path taken by the PCB. The PSTU, on the other hand, declared a critical vote for the PT, defending the preservation of democratic freedoms, which were at risk of being dissipated in a possible Bolsonaro government. It should also be noted that it circulated behind the scenes of Haddad's campaign that not even the PT leadership believed in the turnaround, and hoped that the defeat, at least not (NICOLAU, 2020).

The author also points out that there was an attempt to give a "last breath" to a "turn vote" campaign, cultivated on social networks, and "Ele Não", by movements linked to gender and LGBTQIA+ causes, with various street activities in different cities in the country. At the end of the campaign, even though Fernando Haddad had grown more than Bolsonaro, the PSL candidate triumphed. The PT candidate went from 27% to 41% of the total votes, while Jair Bolsonaro went from 42% to 50%. In valid votes, the former deputy's victory was 55% to 45%. (IDEM, 2020).

²⁵ *Idem* 22.

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: IN THE FACE OF THE ADVANCE OF BOLSONARISM, IT IS URGENT TO RESCUE THE NEED FOR CLASS INDEPENDENCE

The 2018 general elections were a milestone, from an institutional perspective. It was characterized by being disruptive (ABRANCHES, 2019; CORBELLINI and MOURA, 2019), as it ended a political cycle that organized the Brazilian coalition presidentialism of the last twenty-five years, driven by a polarized dispute between the Workers' Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), realigning the strength of the political parties in an abrupt exchange in governmental power – in this case, from the traditional and parliamentary left to the ultraconservative right.

The current instability in the Brazilian class struggle, deepened by the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, and materialized in a "caricature" way in the 2018 elections, resulted in the application of an ultra-neoliberal agenda, which guarantees the sovereignty of agribusiness and mineral exploration, "(...) at the expense of deregulation and the dismantling of mechanisms for the protection and demarcation of indigenous and quilombola lands", of "(...) recently assumed centrality of the Social Security counter-reform, (...) putting the project of "Brazil, paradise of fictitious capital and the super-exploitation of labor without rights" (SANTOS, 2019) to work.

Demier (2018) evaluates the new period opened with the election of Bolsonaro, as a product of the advance of authoritarianism and conservatism, and as a kind of reactionary semi-Bonapartism, in which a relative autonomy of the government apparatus is glimpsed in relation to the ruling classes themselves, filling strategic positions of high echelon by military and robed actors (as in the case of former judge Sérgio Moro), as well as by an ultra-neoliberal economic agenda, located between democratic guidelines and the emergence of a neo-fascist political regime, but acting within the framework of liberal-armored democracy.

When we return to Antunes (2022), making a historical rescue of these almost four years of ultra-right government, the author points out that Jair Bolsonaro was not the best option of the ruling classes of this country and international capital, but his candidacy proved to be viable by combining militarized autocracy with an ultra-neoliberal policy in the economy. The perfect combination of "Defense of the Financial System".

Also according to Ricardo Antunes, darker times still loom over Brazil, as a reflection of the structural crisis of capital. Stating that the Bolsonaro Government was "(...) the greatest economic, social and political tragedy of the country in the entire republican

period". (ANTUNES, 2022: 76). It is the context in which the Brazilian ruling classes have lost any trace of attachment to democratic engineering; it openly assumed its colonialist, slave-owning, surrenderist and authoritarian face; deepened the dismantling of social legislation protecting labor; it ruined the social security policy, with the reform of Public Pension in 2019, by which the poorest wage earners were excluded from an effective public pension, leaving them, at most, with crumbs of assistance; added to this package is the attempt to destroy the class organizations, the Labor Court and the predominance of the "agreed" over the "Legislated"; the systematic destruction of nature, with the record release of pesticides and pesticides, in addition to the devastation of the Amazon by the irregular and harmful work of mining, mineral extraction, timber, agribusiness, fires, etc.; Added to this, the economic and social decomposition, with the deepening of misery (33 million below the poverty line) and almost 15 million unemployed. (IBIDEM, 76-77).

Mascaro (2020: 4) contextualizes the Brazilian political moment in force with the Covid-19 pandemic, in 2020, which devastated the world and transposed the multiple contradictions of Capitalism, deepening an eminently social and historical crisis. For the author, the systematic deterioration of the human relationship with nature, which has spuriously conditioned him to choose between "saving for health, and vice versa", corresponds to a small portion of the problems present in the face of the human burden that the coronavirus has caused. "The scourge of unemployment, precarious housing to withstand quarantines, contamination in crowded public transport and the fragility of the health system are, exactly and necessarily, historical conditions of a specific mode of production, capitalism".

Also according to Alysson Mascaro, Brazil expressed an ambiguous and even self-destructive position in the face of the health and social catastrophe. Jair Bolsonaro, even if his denialism clashes with the functionality of social reproduction, presenting himself as "anti-system", he and his far-right government are responsible for maintaining bourgeois hegemony, capital and state agents, always pressuring the institutionality to give in to its authoritarian pressures, and having as a political tactic the production and replication of fake news "(...) in opposition to the very reality over which they govern, reducing political costs and responsibilities that are their own, making use of their captive far-right audiences and anti-scientific discourses and thoughts". (IBIDEM, 8).

For all this scenario, is there still a programmatic and independent alternative, arising from the demands of the working class? What is the programme to be presented by the

socialist Left to the class that lives by work? Would the alliances that the then candidate, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (PT), articulated in 2022 (the so-called "Broad Front"), be the most consequential to defeat the far right in the streets and at the ballot box? Would the re-edition of the so-called "social pact", of class conciliation, taken up in the electoral dispute 20 years ago, including agglutinating historical opponents and labeled as "coup plotters", such as Geraldo Alckmin, Renan Calheiros, Gilberto Kassab, Rodrigo Maia, Tasso Jereissati, Jádér Barbalho, among other bastions of the fallacious "parliamentary coup" of 2016, be able to present an agenda that attributed rights and the advancement of the consciousness of the class that lives from work?

Engels, in the Preface to *The Class Struggle in France from 1848 to 1850*, already pointed out the pitfalls of bourgeois democracy to the workers' movement and its organizations. The struggle for the conquest of transitory democratic rights (such as universal suffrage and free organization) is extremely important, but stipulating the synthesis of the "political plenitude of the working class" should not be strategic, because bourgeois institutional engineering is the "enemy's field" of class, and its survival is inversely proportional to the proletariat's ability to mobilize.

Continuing with Engels, the proletarian movement can, and must, have its organizations participate in legal political processes, relying on the workers, as in Spain, Germany and France. However, the experiences of the class struggle teach us 3 (three) lessons: 1 – it is necessary to transform the electoral process and access to the parliamentary tribune as a tool for denouncing the class fraud (spurious agreements, usurpation and destruction of the few instituted rights, etc.) that is bourgeois democracy; 2 – The need to use it as a powerful propaganda instrument, to reach and win the consciousness of the working class for the revolutionary and socialist program; 3 – To ensure that the parliamentary game is only tactical, and not strategic, because the bourgeoisie tries to ensure, through the repression of their armed forces, any disproportion of the conquests of the workers in the class struggle²⁶.

Mézsáros (2010: 157-165) reinforces the contemporary character of Engels' analyses, and states that, between crises and contradictions, the State of the capital system is a material constituent that regulates and contingencies sociometabolic reproduction, thus admitting moments of "more democracy" and "less democracy".

²⁶ ENGELS, Friedrich. Preface In Marx, Karl. *The Class Struggles in France – From 1848 to 1850*. Translation: Nélío Scheneider. 1. Ed. São Paulo – SP: Boitempo, 2012. (Marx-Engels Collection).

Constitutional democracy is a class engineering and represents the multiplicity of interests of the capitalists, under a global political command, going through periods of concessions to labor, through social and protective measures, even in periods that put the very existence of humanity in check to remain in charge of social reproduction, undermining institutions with active involvement in authoritarian and legislative measures, as well as provoking insane and bloodthirsty wars, of invasion of territories, to maintain a sustainable level of capital accumulation.

In this sense, the author reinforces the importance of rescuing the category of State and the Marxian analysis of its historical constitution, based on the assumption that it is a mistake to think of the duality of Civil Society x Political State, since the parliamentary structure is a mere formal/legal matter, of political legitimation, "(...) Since capital does indeed have control of all vital aspects of the social metabolism (...) and of the socio-economic reproduction of capital, "(...) even if it is assumed (...) the 'democratic equality' of all the political forces that participate in the legislative process". (MEZSAROS, 2010: 36).

Committing some Marxian orthodoxies is extremely urgent, so that we can gain the consciousness of the class that lives from work, and unify its immediate needs, the viability of Socialism and defeat the ultra-right. Mézsaros (2011) and Antunes (2022) rescue a fundamental principle for the solidification of the socialist left, which has been forgotten in political practice: class independence. The rejection of any kind of conciliation, agreements with the ruling classes, is not a question of sectarianism and "ethical, ideological and noetic purism", but of ontological, historical and dialectical principle. The economic forces of capital and the social forces of labor are irreconcilable. See the Stalinist disaster with the policy of "Popular Front" that permeates the Communist Parties until the present moment, and which ruined the alternative project of sociometabolism that the Russian Revolution of October 1917 inaugurated.

Therefore, to the extent that it is necessary to share quantitative and qualitative factors, to counteract in an extra-parliamentary way, the elaboration of flexible actions that can mediate the different demands of the working class, anchored in their struggles and resistance from their unions, class parties and popular movements, in an agenda that includes full employment; education; health; the fight: against machismo, misogyny, racism, LGBTQIA+phobia; the recognition of native cultures and the protection of the environment, not as a "product of exchange" for agreements, but as radical programmatic points, to advance the consciousness of the working class and its task as a social and political

subject, debating the need to overcome the social division of labor and in the construction of an emancipatory anti-capitalist and socio-metabolic alternative.

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