

## THE FEDERATIVE SYSTEM AND THE COLLABORATION REGIME: BETWEEN THE PROPOSED AND THE POSSIBLE



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### ABSTRACT

The text analyzes, from the basic concept of federalism, how the collaboration regime between the federative entities is effective, considering the policies and plans developed by the Ministry of Education-MEC. This regime, which should be the strengthening between the members of the Brazilian federation in the sense of creating a collaborative relationship for the effectiveness of the commitment between the federative entities in the improvement of basic education, presents weaknesses and this relationship is shown, based on the actions of the central government, contrary to what is actually proposed in the legislation. We adopted a qualitative approach, and carried out a bibliographic and documentary survey, as well as collection, systematization and analysis of data from the documents available by the MEC. In general terms, we can infer that although the CF/1988 and LDB/1996 propose the implementation of the collaboration regime, this is not materialized in practice. Either due to the lack of compliance with the legislation or the proposal for a policy of a focal nature.

**Keywords:** Collaboration Regime, Educational Policy, Federalism, Federative Entities.

## **INTRODUCTION**

National education, based on the political and economic reforms disseminated in the last two decades, is going through a significant (re)structuring process in terms of its paradigms. The norms (Laws, Decrees, Ordinances and Resolutions) that define the country's public educational policies have been systematically proposed and implemented in this period, composing a plural set of conceptions that, through rules, meet the interests of capital, bringing social policies, especially educational ones, closer to the whims and demands of the market, in the name of equal access and permanence for all.

Thus, it is observed that the objective of the Brazilian central government follows as a model the education of developed countries, in which educational policies are based mainly on the rules of international capital, signed in agreements agreed with international organizations that, in the discourse, implements a management logic of educational policies, which has as its principle the sharing and decentralization.

The development of these policies alludes to the openness that advocates collaborative and participatory management among all federated entities. In Brazil, the defense of a more comprehensive social policy is demanded by social movements and constitutional legislation proposes a model of management of educational policies that, in a certain aspect, excels in the effectiveness of the regime of collaboration in the maintenance and development of education, aiming, above all, at greater symmetry in the financing of these policies and autonomy in the management of basic education by regional entities. with a view to ensuring the access and permanence of the whole society to a quality public education.

The recent policies disseminated in the country will follow this prism of the effectiveness of the collaboration regime between those that make up the national federation, considering what is corroborated by the Federal Constitution of 1988, the Law of Guidelines and Bases of National Education, the National Education Plan, the Education Development Plan (PDE) and the Plan of Goals Commitment All for Education (PMCTE) that will culminate in the elaboration of the Plan of Articulated Actions by the federative entities, This program is already in its fourth cycle (2021-2024).

## **THE BRAZILIAN FEDERATIVE SYSTEM: SOME APPROXIMATIONS**

Understanding the administrative organization of the Brazilian State in this macro structure, federalism, is necessary for us to understand how this relationship between the

Union, States, Federal District and Municipalities is processed with regard to the basic elements that constitute the implementation, through public policies, of the collaboration regime. Thus, the propositions that demand joint action by all members of the national federation to make this collaboration effective, especially in social public policies, especially educational ones, emerge from the organizational macrostructure of the Federative State.

When conceptually approaching federalism and its assumptions, we necessarily have to start from a specific type of State. In order to locate where we base our view and our analysis about the understanding of what this state structure is or is formatted, we cannot avoid presenting what we understand about the State and its sociopolitical concepts. We start from the assumption that this political entity and its contradictory and antagonistic nuances, configures and manifests itself as an organ of class domination, an organ of submission of one class by another, that is, the State is "the creation of an "order" that legalizes and consolidates this submission, cushioning the collision of classes" (Lenin, 2011, p.38).

Mészáros (2015) ratifies this characteristic of the dominant role of the State, as a structural order at the service of a given social class, when he states that the "State in its composition on the antagonistic material base of capital cannot do anything other than protect the established socio-metabolic order", or that "the State is much more than a historical construction to sustain and maintain the bases of political domination. The State is, in itself, the very space of this dispute" (Mészáros, 2015, p. 28).

The understanding of the federalist model of management implies, initially, the apprehension of what federalism is conceptually. The literature presents in a diverse and heterogeneous way, numerous inferences about the term. Cury (2006) emits an etymological concept about federation, a core word from which the term federalism will be derived. For him "Federation comes from the Latin *foedus-eris* which means contract, alliance, union, the act of uniting by alliance and also trusting, trusting, believing". The federation, in this sense, necessarily constitutes the union of several member states and/or provinces of a unified bloc forming a single sovereign political-administrative body, which constitutes a "National State".

It understands that a State organized with these federalist nuances is subject to what is commonly called a "federal regime", that is, the existence of a "sovereign State", where the other member states or federated subnational units can enjoy a certain autonomy. This autonomy is established by a specific limit, predetermined by a jurisdictional structure, in

this case, a Federal Constitution that defines the role or competence of each entity in this relationship or governance regime (Cury, 2006, p. 114).

Thus, the relations present in the federative form necessarily deal with a sharing of powers between the different spheres and levels of government whose definition of the competencies of each entity falls within the scope of what is pre-established in the constitutional legislation. The definition of competencies evoked in the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 deliberates to guarantee interdependence and autonomy among all the instances that make up the federation.

Abrucio and Soares (2001), in promoting a study on the term federalism and its applicability, affirm that this is "a federal arrangement" that necessarily constitutes a "partnership established and regulated by a pact, whose internal connections reflect a special type of division of power between partners". However, this partnership must be consolidated in a concentration of efforts, in which mutual recognition favors, in a concrete way, the integrity and governability of all subnational members, thus aiming at maintaining the "special unity among them". This definition of federalism encompasses the understanding that a relationship of reciprocity and respect between state entities is necessary and indispensable, that is, although this relationship is between different spheres, integration and interests, even if heterogeneous, must prevail in maintaining unity, guaranteeing autonomy, respecting asymmetries and the sharing of decision-making power.

For the aforementioned authors, "[...] the conformation of a federalist situation occurs when there is both heterogeneity (territorial, linguistic, ethnic, socioeconomic, cultural and political) and a project in favor of unity in diversity" (Abrucio & Soares, 2001, p.34).

To this end, the constitutional principles that establish the administrative guidelines of the Federative Republic of Brazil characterize it as a system of government of a federative nature that is distinguished, according to Coser (2008), "as a middle ground between a unitary government, with powers exclusively concentrated in the Union [...]". This administrative characteristic requires that the "central government possess power over the citizens of the states or provinces that make up the Union without this action having to be agreed upon by the states" (Coser, 2008, p. 2).

We verify, however, considering the above, that the other federative entities do not have the necessary and/or sufficient resources to satisfy these demands, so they are under the aegis of the central power. Almeida (1995, p. 1) states, considering this centralization of

power in the hands of the central power, that such a relationship exhibits "the marks of authoritarian conceptions, which consecrated the predominance of the federal Executive, of closed decision-making processes and of centralized management in large bureaucracies". In this case, the federative pact is necessary to establish the autonomy of the States and Municipalities, including the guarantee of a better redistribution of resources necessary for each entity to satisfy, in an equitable way, its demands.

In summary, federalism alludes to the organizational set of the political system and federation consists of the understanding of the theory of federalism, where in a more practical way it allows a relationship of integration and autonomy between the federative entities, in the Brazilian case: the Union, the Federal District, the States and Municipalities. In this federative organization, the Union becomes, not the center, but the "nucleus of the Federal State". We agree, then, with Camini (2010), when he states that the regime and the relations between federated entities cease to be centralized and unilateral to constitute "an institutional structure with a plurality of centers of power", allowing the exercise of equal and equitable construction and participation among federative entities in the elaboration of public policies for the national territory (Camini, 2010, p. 2).

We cannot fail to analyze the inherent relations between the members of the Brazilian federation without understanding the principle of autonomy and its implications for the strengthening and maintenance of the cooperative character of these relations, since autonomy is the founding basis for sustaining this federalist relationship. We start from the indication that, etymologically, autonomy means: self-government, self-government, self-organization, and self-administration. It derives from the Greek term, *autonomia* (the right to be governed by one's own laws), also meaning, according to Quintiliano (2012, 103) "the power of the member state in the federative state".

By transposing these meanings to the issue of federative entities, we can affirm, then, that an entity enjoys the right and independence to self-manage, politically and/or administratively, to self-govern and to manage its own laws. Therefore, we can affirm that these actions (self-governing, self-administering and self-organizing) demand their own competences. However, this can also mean independence and financial self-sufficiency. For Barroso (2001), these relations of autonomy stand out for the understanding that "autonomy is a concept constructed socially and politically, by the interaction of different organizational actors". Autonomy implies allowing freedom and capacity for subjects or organizations to make decisions.

However, autonomy is also "a field of forces" that results in "confluences of various logics and interests", in this sense, it needs to be cultivated in order to be kept balanced, considering the confrontations and the many existing influences, whether from government policies, administrative actions or actions of social and multinational organisms (Barroso, 2001, p. 16).

Understanding the bases of the autonomous relationship between the federated entities is of significant importance, since it has implications for the understanding and repercussions on social and educational public policies in the country, as it presupposes the sharing of administrative, tax, legislative and socio-political competences without the tutelage or control of the central entity, safeguarding, in this relationship, the basic aspects and characteristics of the federation's sovereignty.

The 1988 Federal Constitution deliberates on the autonomy that permeates the relations between the federated entities when it demarcates in Articles 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 the competences attributed to the Union; in Articles 25, 26, 27 and 28 that deliberate on the attributions and competences of the States and in Articles 29 and 30 that deal specifically with the role of the Municipalities. However, it is a relative autonomy, as there are powers that are exclusive to the Union, for example, the legislation on the guidelines and bases of national education, as provided for in item XXIV of article 22.

Such autonomy, however, is evaluated by many authors as being fragmented and subject to different interpretations and incoherence with the concept of autonomous, since other intrinsic issues and concepts derive from autonomy, such as: competence, decentralization or interdependence. Barroso (2001), however, points out that there is no "decreed autonomy", what can be decreed are the formal norms and rules that regulate the sharing of powers between the different levels of administration" (Barroso, 2001, p. 21, emphasis added).

Among federative entities, the one that collects the most taxes and has the greatest financial backing is the Union, so the other federated entities (States and Municipalities) end up maintaining financial dependence, which impairs their autonomous character to make their own public policies viable. This makes the issue of autonomy contradictory, as the other federative entities become submissive to guarantee the financial sums for their development, evidencing the hierarchy between the entities, which should not exist in a federalist regime.

Thus, although there is a legal framework that determines, among other things, the relationship between the federative entities that guarantees autonomy as the primary principle of the federation, the political system ignores, in practice, such deliberation. Autonomy is presented in the Brazilian administrative system as necessary and essential, since it is from this conquest of self-management that one can effectively think of a primacy that appears with political "decentralization".

All these factors, in analyses, related to the constitutive principles that articulate the administrative organization of the national state, in a *de facto* federative regime, excel, above all, in the understanding of the governed governmental structure that permeates the nuances of the collaboration between those entities that make up the federation. One cannot talk about the functionality of the federation, in the collaborative aspect, without first understanding how the process of the legal framework was built and the historical clashes that forged the Brazilian federation.

## THE COLLABORATION REGIME AND EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGES

The discussion about the basic principles that involve the concept of collaboration regime in the national system and its political-administrative apparatus implies the need to define a distinct meaning of this term, considering its organizational intentionality and its importance for the achievement of the management of the state apparatus. In this sense, based on the contributions of the literature consulted, we expose, in general terms, the meaning of the two words that make up this administrative model, which are: Regime and collaboration.

Werle (2006), when discussing this theme, explains that the term *regime* comes from the Latin *regimen*, which means "action of guiding, of government, of direction". And that this term refers to the "mode of administration, rule or system, regulation". In short, these definitions of the term regime refer, in particular, to a concentrated effort among all members of a federation or government in the action of collaborative management, in which the principles of decentralization of power and decisions, of political and administrative autonomy should be the driving force of institutional relations (Werle, 2006, p. 23).

The responsibilities and co-responsibilities in the direction of the implementation of a collaborative regime, in meeting the specificities of basic education, so that these relations of interests do not overwhelm the individualities and consider, above all, the financial capacities of each entity, must be well defined, so as not to hurt the autonomy of the



regional entities and not make them hostages to the determinations of the central government, because beyond "simple administrative and bureaucratic transfer of responsibility, co-responsibility means a joint political will to solve the problems of basic education, within the possibilities of each administrative sphere" (Haguete, 1989, 27).

The current model of the collaboration regime, if we consider the definitions of the term "regime", is contradictory. The relations exercised, especially by the central government, in the elaboration of educational policies, from the 1990s onwards, affect the basic precepts of the autonomy of the other federative entities, and the common effort that should be implemented by all the participating members of the federation, ends up being reduced to the simple execution of federal plans and programs, via transfers to regional members, in which the Municipalities, in the main policies, are the most penalized.

In this sense, as Werle (2006, p. 23) states, "the collaboration regime refers to a relationship framework in which autonomy and not subordination should be at the forefront, contradicting forms of imposition of decisions, including the simple transfer of burdens in dealing with common issues".

As for the second term (collaboration), it conceptually implies "working on the same work, cooperating, interacting with others [...] contribute, assume responsibilities, share in the results and in common commitments and expenses" (Werle, 2006, p.23). Collaboration implies that all propositions and decisions made on a given public policy that implies the involvement of federative entities must be joint and common, that is, collaborating, suggests equality of competences and decision-making.

When we consider this co-responsibility in the implementation of public policies and the complicity of the federative entities in the promotion of educational plans and programs common to each entity, we agree with Cassini (2011) when he asserts that collaboration is configured as "a mandatory institute, not vulnerable to a "possible adhesion" and, therefore, does not run the risk of being another instrument subject to the defensive and collaborative game of subnational units" (Cassini, 2011, p. 68, emphasis added).

Thus, a State in which a relationship of collaboration is proposed in its governmental actions, in which each member of the federation is a co-participant in the promotion of educational policies, must be a State that promotes greater interaction between the federative entities, providing, above all, the guarantee of greater autonomy, without the risk of weakening the principle that marks the management, in this case, the principle of the collaboration regime.



In this sense, the collaboration regime presupposes "sharing political, technical and financial competences for the execution of programs for the maintenance and development of education, in order to agree on the actions of the federated entities without harming their autonomy" (Parente *apud* Camini, 2010, p. 6). This understanding, of common sharing actions, differs from the delegation of responsibilities, as it emphasizes the democratic principles of autonomy, cooperation and participation of each entity of the federation.

We highlight that the Collaboration Regime has been a recurring subject among the analyses and some studies of public educational policies established in recent decades in our country. When discussing this agenda, we cannot disregard the challenges that educational policies have faced, especially for not having a truly regulated collaboration regime to enable and effect improvements in the quality of national education. Araujo (2014, p. 61) corroborates this premise when he points out that "almost three decades of the federative model, enacted in 1988, have not been sufficient for the rules for the distribution of resources and responsibilities to be properly regulated".

These ideas of collaboration will be an equitable proposition in the magna legislation and its derivations that will format and deliberate on basic education in the country, with emphasis on the attempt to make autonomy effective at the different levels and instances of the public administrative organization and the guarantee of the participation of education systems in the elaboration, execution and monitoring of the maintenance and development of public and free education.

Thus, the Collaboration Regime consists of a "culture of relationship to be increased at all levels of education and in all political instances" (Werle, 2006, p. 9), that is, it is embodied as a relational principle that shares political, technical and financial competences in the achievement of policies of a national nature, whose objective is to ensure the basic rights of society, without affecting the autonomy of the federated entities.

The relationship established between the federative entities, since the CF/1988, with a view to enabling greater regional integration and promoting improvements for basic education in the country, takes directions that are beyond the control of the central entity. Although the national legislation defines the guidelines of educational policies, based on a regime of collaboration, its practicality is made effective through focused plans and programs, going, in this sense, against the legal propositions.

It is worth noting that the legislation that deliberates on greater effectiveness of the collaboration regime is still fragile, with regard to the form of administrative conduct, among

the federative entities, of policies that effectively promote accountability and joint commitment and the improvement of the quality of education offered in basic education.

Fernandes (2013, p. 19) when he states that "as long as the collaboration regime for education is not regulated by means of a complementary law, the collaboration between the Union, States and Municipalities will have difficulties to be effective". Ganzeli (2012) corroborates this understanding when he asserts that, "paradoxically, despite its importance, the collaboration regime was not regulated, generating obstacles in the complex institutional political engineering of the federation, including States and Municipalities that depend on transfers, compromising their autonomy", or even, for this author, the "absence of regulation of the collaboration regime requires the construction of pacts between the federated entities, meeting conjunctural demands, increasing the complexity of the political-institutional process" (Ganzeli, 2012, p. 4).

These administrative uncertainties and the assumption of responsibilities in the promotion of programs in the hands of the Union, mischaracterize the basic principle of the collaboration regime, making concrete and effective educational actions unfeasible, creating conflicts between the other federative entities, making it difficult for these entities to act in meeting what was proposed as their responsibilities in improving the quality of basic education in the country.

Thus, considering this lack of clarity and the non-effectiveness of the collaborative regime, we have the implementation of focal policies proposed in the federal educational system that spread to the other entities, and these in turn develop their roles autonomously, in the name of a pseudo collaboration. Thus, "in the case of basic education, we have a *tower of Babel*, protected under the politically convenient concept of a regime of collaboration" (Araújo & Oliveira, 1998, p. 24, emphasis added).

## THE COLLABORATION REGIME IN THE ESSENCE OF EDUCATIONAL POLICY

We understand that this collaborative relationship and its administrative mechanism must function in an articulated way within an ordered totality, that is, it is concatenated as a concept closely linked to that of the federative principle, and does not include hierarchical relations between the spheres of political power and is based on the idea of the relationship between equals. Thus, between the Union, States, Federal District and Municipalities, there is no relationship of subordination, as they constitute equal federated entities, as provided for in the legislation on which it is based.

Thus, collective bargaining, power sharing, autonomy and horizontal decision-making can be seen as central pieces in the effectiveness of the relationships that materialize the collaboration regime. Collaboration, in this format, begins to incorporate aspects beyond mere execution, as we have often experienced, thus assuming the practices of participation in the creation, in the decision-making interposition in the destinies of policies and in their forms of materialization, in addition to taking a concrete position in their execution by all the governmental units that make up the federative system (Abrucio, 2010).

The proposal to implement the collaboration regime has its notoriety present in the national legislation, which deliberates on this principle of relations between the federated entities, in which each of them develops its policies based on the assumptions present in the legislative instruments of a democratic management, in which the autonomy and participation of the federative entities, give themselves effectively.

It can be seen that the central entity, through the MEC, assumes a regulatory and centralizing character of the rules in the conduct of these policies. The Union appropriates market, quantitative, and meritocratic mechanisms and guides, in which the relationship ceases to be constituted in collaboration (with the participation of all federated entities and with respect to financial limitations and social and administrative asymmetries), and becomes a relationship of subordination, in the name of achieving goals and results, via management contract, in which the emphasis on compliance with international standards and indexes is more important.

This management character also promotes a greater socioeconomic disparity between the participating entities, thus contradicting the constitutive assumptions of an effectively democratic federation.

Therefore, we show that educational policies are permeated by a standardized relationship, proposed by the Union, and this implies nuances in which the regime of collaboration in these policies does not actually apply. What we have, however, is the approximation of a centralized relationship, in which States, Federal District and Municipalities establish, with the central power, a weakened obedience, in which the absence of financial power and the inequality in the economic capacity of these subaltern entities, with a few exceptions, are the basic core for the unconditional fulfillment of the proposed plans and programs.

Highlighting that this relationship manifests itself in the name of a collaborative regime or practices of decentralization that is effected, in disguise, in the consented subordination of state and municipal governments in relation to the federal government and, consequently, in the same way, this subordination is repeated with municipal governments in their relationship with state governments.

The Collaboration Regime, however, although it deliberates to guarantee the maintenance of the participation and autonomy of the entities in obedience to the federative pact, including keeping clear the instances and their levels of the national federative organization (Union, States and Municipalities) and the defense of equality among them, violates these principles, because by proposing vertical and centralized rules, a "Union restricts the individual freedom that each political unit has, given that the philosophical foundation of any cooperative federal government is to guarantee the freedom of its citizens and political units that is maintained through the pact as consensus" (Sousa & Cavalcanti, 2015, p.9).

In this aspect, it envisions the collaborative regime through the objectives made official by the legal norms, the democratization of management, ensuring decentralization and, consequently, a greater "autonomy" of the institutions; however, what could be verified is that the inductions that MEC makes by proposing a ready-made instrument, built without the participation of other federative entities and civil society, indicate a managerialist conception of management, where the focus induces deconcentration and not decentralization as defended by the central government.

Thus, we evidence a conception of management in which the hierarchy of federative entities is scored. The Union, through the PDE, PMCTE and PAR, subjugates the other entities, based on the establishment of closed rules and mandatory criteria that must be strictly obeyed, with States and Municipalities being responsible for the scheduled service and compliance with the evaluative indexes.

In this sense, when the autonomous entity exercises its decision-making power and deliberates on any issues, which are within its competence, according to the legal rites, it itself proposes actions, seeking to solve the problems that may arise in the geographical space of its competence. The difficulty of the federative units (FUs) to exercise their full competences has to do with the inadequacy and/or distortions of the principles of autonomy and interdependence between the federated entities, as it allows autonomy to be sometimes used as a form of decentralization without association with the responsibility of

each entity, and interdependence is used with the intention of the federal government having a centralizing and authoritarian imposition, a force/power that goes beyond the federative pact (Abrucio & Soares, 2001).

And it is in this aspect of a centralized collaborative regime that the relations between the federative entities and the Union are established. The financial capacity dependent on the transfer of federal resources, the limitations in their own programs and the scarcity of policies in the municipalities are instruments that strengthen the hegemony of the central entity over the other entities.

## CONCLUSION

The approximations resulting from this work give us an account of a macroeconomic scenario in which public policies are based on the relationship of federative entities that are members of a given political-administrative format or of a national State model. Neoliberal-based political and economic orientations gained space and strength in the countries on the periphery of capitalism at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, especially those on the African and Latin American continents.

The Brazilian agenda in this journey to promote strategies that enable a greater balance of power among the federative entities, on the discourse of decentralization, was conditioned to the demands and (re)arrangements of the national economy, required by the occurrences of capital restructuring in peripheral countries, as a result of agreements assumed with international organizations that guide their partners to implementation, above all, of social policies that combine with neoliberal ideas, that is, the minimization of the State.

And this transfer of responsibility will have a cascade effect in which the transfer of responsibilities will take place from the Union to the States, from the Union to the Municipalities and from the States to the Municipalities, configuring a kind of municipalization of policies, in which everything will be centralized in the municipal entity. Understanding these types of federalisms that take turns and sometimes merge in the conduct of the country's federative relations allows us to reflect on the weaknesses of management.

The Collaboration Regime is inherent to the federative State, when it respects and bases its management practice on the principle that values two pillars of this regime, which are: autonomy and participation. Autonomy, as a founding pillar of the Collaborative

Regime, is not built from sporadic or focused policies between entities, but is structured in the genesis of the constituted State. Autonomy, in this relationship, dispenses with government practices of induction through specific plans and programs. Autonomy, for the entities of a federation, is greater than a given government policy, it extrapolates, that is, it is not limited to State policies, because an autonomous entity is independent of these policies.

The CF (1988) deliberates on the basic axes of the Collaboration Regime. However, although they are present in the constitutional letter, these axes are still very loose, lacking a systematization of the macro profile that actually contemplates what it consists of and what is the role of each entity in the country's public policies. In the aspect of educational management, the LDB repeats the conditions provided for in the CF/1988, on the Collaboration Regime, however, it also makes little progress. Although it defines the field and levels of action of the federative members, this legal instrument cannot embody the principle of collaboration.

It is evident that educational policies, in the format of floating programs and plans, are marked by a centralized relationship in the Union, implying a management format that does not make the Collaboration Regime effective in these policies. It is notorious that States and Municipalities establish, with this center, a consented submission, a submission that is due, especially, to financial fragility and inequality in the capacity to generate new resources, with a few exceptions.

One of the weak factors for the guarantee of a more successful Collaborative Regime and that can be identified, considering the municipal entities, the so-called third degree entities, was the financing of education. This financial gap of the municipal entities is the central weakness for the unconditional acceptance of the propositions planned by the center. It is undeniable that the sharing of resources from taxes, transfers and complementation of the Union, as a result of constitutional bindings and sub-bindings, does not guarantee the effective maintenance of Basic Education under the responsibility of the municipal entity.

Although this central entity is responsible for conducting and formatting policies that order and establish the participation of each member in collaborative actions in social policies, what is observed is a centralization and hierarchization of relations in the name of strengthening and increasing control of the educational policy under its command. which weakens an efficient regime as desired by the other federative entities.



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