

IDEOPOLITICAL PROJECTS IN DISPUTES AND THE REPERCUSSIONS ON SOCIAL POLICIES: THE ADVANCE OF THE NEW RIGHT AND THE SUBTRACTION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS



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ABSTRACT

The social democratic project of the labor parties resulted in reforms in social policies. From 1980 onwards, with the global capitalist crisis in the 1970s, the so-called New Right ascended, which subtracted labor and social rights and gave rise to a part of this so-called New Right to become extreme in conservatism and ultra-neoliberalism. The objective of this article is to analyze the repercussions on social policies of the different ideo-political government projects, pointing out the challenges of rowing against the neoliberal tide for governments of class conciliation in Brazil. It is an analytical and qualitative research, based on literature intentionally chosen to meet the proposed objectives. The method of exposition begins with the first session that conceptually addresses the denomination of the emerging New Right until its sharpening in extreme right-wing groups of a religious, military and neoconservative nature. In the second, it analyzes the New Right in Brazil and after 2016 its far-right expressions with the government of Jair Bolsonaro and the counter-reforms implemented. In the last session, we problematized the possibilities of the return of neo-developmentalism and a government of class conciliation, its challenges and possibilities.

Keywords: Neoliberalism. Extreme Right. Social Policies.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the nineteenth century, the new stage of imperialist monopoly capitalism has surpassed the previous model of free markets. The demands of monopoly capital and workers organized in unions and political parties gave rise to the so-called social state, initiating a cycle of reformist public policies, of inclusion based on citizenship and social rights that remained unchanged until the early 1970s. However, with the global crisis of capitalism in the second half of the 1970s and the exits from the crisis led by the bourgeoisie and the State, the so-called New Right was born, a kaleidoscope of proposals that has in common the defense of neoliberalism and neoconservatism (Pereira, 2016). Therefore, contrary to the labor parties and their coalitions, they assume the defense of individual and economic freedom, free markets, with less participation of the State in the provision of policies and services, reduction of social and labor rights that increased public spending and hypertrophied the State.

Thus, the collective search (bourgeoisie and its organic intellectuals, such as the IMF, World Bank, European Union, among others) for an answer to the economic, political and social crisis of the bourgeois order and the supposed crisis of the social state, provided the necessary subsidies for the construction of a variety of ideologies contrary to the social state anchored in the universality and equity of social policies. Despite their oppositions and theoretical variations, they united around a common ideal: criticism of the interventionist model of the State put into practice in European democratic regimes and which spread to all continents with greater or lesser strength and funding, uncontested defense of neoliberalism and neoconservatism in social values. The specificity that guarantees the differences of this right in relation to the previous ones is that the values and political positions are not anchored in the old aristocratic pre-capitalist social order and that they differed from the liberals, called modern and progressive.

The New Right has expanded neoliberalism in the West and after three decades of neoliberal policies in the US, the European Union, Latin America, among others, the discourses have become radicalized and emerge as part of this New Right, the extreme right, which has been spreading throughout the West, based on the neoconservatism of traditional customs and values and ultra-neoliberalism 'authoritarian, anti-democratic, neo-fascist. How is this trend expressed in Brazil? What are the repercussions on social policies and social and labor rights? These are some of the problematizations that guided the

bibliographic research and that led us to the qualitative approach of intentional choice of references to give answers to the problematizations raised.

The exposition of the theoretical foundation and the results are divided into three sections: the first, the subsumption of the neoliberal, the political direction that expanded it, the so-called New Right that, after four decades, opened possibilities for the extreme right to rise to power and spread its worldview. In the second, the advance of the extreme right in Brazil is discussed, via counter-reform in social rights, bringing to the debate how the extreme right in Brazil was personified in the government of Jair Bolsonaro and contributes to the counter-reform process that triggered the dismantling of social policies and the subtraction of social rights. In the last session, the challenges and possibilities of the resumption of neodevelopmentalism in Brazil with Lula's third government are discussed, in the face of a country in ruins left by Bolsonaro and the advance of neoliberalism as a superstructure.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW RIGHT, EXTREME RIGHT AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REGULATORY AND PROTECTIVE STATE OF THE MARKET

At the outset, it is important to highlight that the history of the capitalist mode of production can be told by a succession of crises inherent to this mode of production which, unlike other moments of humanity, do not constitute crises of scarcity, but crises of overaccumulation, when capital exists in excess and thus cannot realize your profit expectations. (Brandt; Cislighi 2020).

The response of the ruling class to the crisis of capitalism is differentiated by the choices of the best strategies for new investments and expanded reproduction of capital. The crisis of 1930 gave rise to the Fordist/Keynesian model of the interventionist welfare state to guarantee the expansion of capitalism in the stage of the export of capital, goods and transnational corporations. This stage or model of monopolistic and imperialist accumulation gave rise to the social state, pressured by the struggles of the workers and the expansionist project of capital, therefore, the reformist era, progressive within the capitalist order to guarantee its legitimacy

The crisis of the 1970s, also a crisis of overaccumulation, when the demands for hypertrophied insertion of the State had already been exhausted, since new forms of accumulation were needed, both financially and in the area of services. In this context, a

hypertrophied State, now called bureaucratic, excessive spending, generator of paid leisure, lack of love for work and individual and family lack of responsibility for their life trajectory and coverage of social risks, was no longer of interest. Neoliberalism has a timid but powerful beginning in England, the USA and Chile. It is driven by the dictates of the Washington Consensus for Latin America and Eastern Europe. But, after the financial crisis of 2008, it became the "new reason for the world" (Dardot; Laval, 2016), called by Marxists the superstructure (legal, political, ideological and cultural) of the flexible, globalized and financialized accumulation model.

However, according to Lacerda (2019), the neoliberal turn to recover from the crisis of capital accumulation began to require a new hegemonic project that was the paradoxical alliance between neoliberalism and neoconservatism. The neoliberal rationality aimed at satisfying the expanded needs of the market, commodification, individualism, which collides with the rationality of collectivity, the decommodification and de-familiation of the previous stage, that is, social and labor rights.

The New Right and the conjunction between neoliberalism and neoconservatism, according to Pereira, (2016), although the union seems paradoxical. And this paradox is explained by Brown (2023) when he states that neoliberalism and conservatism are convergent political ideas in several ways, as both are anti-democratic, are based on the order generated by markets, defend a lean, smaller State without interference in the natural order of free markets; they act against political freedom and equality among citizens, because they consider natural inequalities necessary, and there should be individual freedoms and merely formal equality; Traditional values must prevail such as private property, traditional family and good customs. For the aforementioned author, neoliberalism transforms collective problems into individual problems with market solutions and defends the statism of the company model, in which democratic norms are replaced by criteria of efficiency and profit. Neoconservatism, on the other hand, prepares the ground for the authoritarian characteristics of neoliberal governance because the political-religious discourse allows for the mobilization of a submissive citizenry.

New Right also characterizes the parties that emerge in Eastern Europe, following the experiences of socialism and the defense of markets, traditional values, trade openness, and financial deregulation. Thus, it differs from the aristocratic and pro-Ancien Régime conservatives, the Bonapartists, fascists, Nazis, another right-wing tendency, but

anchored in nationalism, in racism. The current New Right is neoliberal and neoconservative.

According to Brown (2023), neoconservatism is partly a response to the erosion of morality in state-planned capitalism, the inclusion of minorities through policies of quotas, equity, and universality, which mean the expansion of collectivist values of socialism and communism. Neoconservatism is about filling the void left by the social state, now with rigid moral values, not of the previous order, but of the new bourgeois order, which emanates from free markets, natural hierarchies, opposed to communism, income distribution and social democracy.

Harvey (2005) calls this current stage of financial capitalism the model of accumulation by dispossession, which expropriates common lands or common goods, such as social policies that are precarious or privatized; state assets; of nature, indigenous lands, water, energy, communications, everything that was previously state-owned. The expectation is that all forms of collective solidarity will be dissolved in favor of individualism, the market, and private property. The resumption of personal and family responsibility is used to justify cuts in public spending, focusing on the extremely poor in state intervention, privatizations and the reduction of social and labor rights.

In the same sense, Lacerda (2019, p.52) understands that the "anti-statist ideology, founded on white supremacy, the defense of the patriarchal family, and Protestant fundamentalism" supports the dismantling of welfare policies that are of interest to a large part of the population. In the words of Lacerda (2019, p.58),

[...] neoconservatism is a political movement that has forged a privatist ideology (it defends the predominance of the private power of the family and corporations), anti-liberal (in favor of public interference in aspects of personal life), neoliberal (against state intervention to reduce inequalities), conservative (articulates itself in relation to the welfare state, the feminist and LGBT movement) and right-wing (opposes demand movements that seek greater equality of rights).

What can be understood from the author is that neoconservatism is a set of preferences, a way of thinking, a mentality linked to militarism, free market absolutism, Christian values, hatred of gender, class, race. In this key of thought, Brown (2023, p. 16) states that "neoliberal rationality prepared the ground to mobilize and legitimize fiercely anti-democratic forces in the second decade of the twenty-first century". And so the author describes,

[...] the composition of the [...] far-right (white authoritarian nationalist political formations) is due to the instrumentalized anger of economically abandoned and racially resentful individuals, but also delineated by more than three decades of neoliberal assaults on democracy, equality, and society (Brown, 2023, p.17).

Thus, after four decades of anti-democratic neoliberal policies, it created favorable ground for sectors of the New Right to become even more radicalized, with the emergence of the extreme right. The adherents of the extreme right, defenders of individual freedoms, are frontally opposed to social policies of a universalizing nature, because they generate laziness, lack of love for work, family and individual responsibility, that is, social democracy, but they are also authoritarian and anti-democratic, because, for them, democracy must be strictly liberal, vote and be voted for, giving a blank card to the rulers. The traditional values arising from the bourgeois order must emanate from this order and do not need the interference of the State, except for their guarantee.

However, the extreme right is not against the interference of the State, however, it must have the function of restoring moral and traditional authority, as well as safeguarding the market from its free action and helping it when it needs it. It is also in favor of public social protection, via minimum income cash transfer, with conditionalities for the strictly poor, leaving the others to satisfy their needs in the market.

According to Pereira (2020), in the face of social demands, the government on the extreme right acts on 3 fronts:

[...] The first co-opts and mischaracterizes social movements in their anti-capitalist struggles, transforming them into a representative identity struggle. The second refers to a double meaning, on the one hand it exalts the individual and his freedom and on the other hand, it weakens the real possibilities of mechanisms of popular and democratic participation; or any other form of social participation modality; and third is that, through a rational discourse and arguments, the opposition to social protection is committed to meeting social needs, as they confuse human needs with individual demands, since they believe that the State cannot offer solutions to individual demands. (Pereira, 2020, p131).

For the extreme right, the interventionist State is inefficient, unable to reduce poverty and the deviant behaviors that result from it, since not all social problems should be faced, since some are considered natural and spontaneous, at the same time everything that is not essential for the proper functioning of capitalism is considered individual failure and the entire responsibility of individuals, incompetent, maladjusted, to whom the State should not commit itself and whose solutions should be sought in their families, communities and markets.

In Brazil, the New Right emerged with the governments of Collor de Melo, Itamar Franco and FHC and aimed to insert the country in the era of globalization, flexible accumulation and expand the neoliberal ideology and its counter-reforms. It was interrupted for thirteen years by the PT governments, called neodevelopmentalism, a Brazilian version of social democracy of class conciliation. This conciliation, however, since 2013, was no longer of interest to part of the national bourgeoisie, which orchestrated the coup with the support of the PMDB, a center-right party, which took over executive power in 2016.

In the US, the extreme right ascends with the Trump administration, with an anti-immigration policy, which mobilized conservatives. In the European Union, right-wing, conservative parliaments and prime ministers predominate in some countries. Even in social democratic countries, there are supporters of far-right parties for their anti-immigration discourses, active labor policies, reduction of public spending, among others, even if they do not have ascension to the executive.

In the Brazilian context, the example of the extreme right that lit up the executive from 2019 to 2022 was the government of Jair Bolsonaro and even today it has the largest benches in the Senate or in the Chamber of Deputies, with defense of conservatism in values and exacerbated or classical neoliberalism.

THE ADVANCE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN BRAZIL AND THE NEOLIBERAL COUNTER-REFORMS OF SOCIAL POLICIES

The effects of the 2008 crisis began to be felt in Brazil in 2014 and the re-election of Dilma Rousseff, with a small margin of difference in the vote, ended in the parliamentary, legal and media coup articulated by representatives of the bourgeoisie former allies, including Michael Temer, her vice president, who took over the government and remained until the 2018 elections. despite the records of unpopularity.

The coup government of Temer, in a logic of return to neoliberalism, now under the sign of ultra-neoliberalism, which expresses the radicality of fiscal adjustment, manages to approve the Constitutional Amendment, n.95/2016 that established the ceiling of primary spending, which froze for 20 years any real increase in resources for public policies in the Union budget, representing a qualitative advance in the permanent fiscal adjustment that has marked the neoliberal economic model in Brazil since the end of the dictatorship (Behring, 2008). In addition, it approved the Labor Reform that subtracted rights conquered

by the working class, paving the way for the acceptance of an ultra-neoliberal discourse anchored in traditional values.

Thus, from 2016 to 2022, we were under a coup d'état of a new type (Demier, 2017), no longer military, by the armed forces imposing a new State, but in its modern version, in the name of the law and which has at its core the deepening of fiscal adjustment, called the New Fiscal Regime. This classic perspective of neoliberalism returns in an aggressive, anti-democratic and authoritarian way driven by hate speech against those who are different and opposed.

The rise of Bolsonaro, from the far-right liberal party, is due to two important political factors, according to Cogiolla (2020): the first was the impeachment and imprisonment of former President Lula, with the firing of *fake news* against the PT and PC do B slate; and the second was the failure of the Temer government and the right-wing parties to impose a governmental change in their favor, which expressed the advance of the armed forces or a military representative and the recovery of their political power. Jair Bolsonaro's victory for the presidency of Brazil had the effect of an international bombshell, put the country in political commotion, and the consequences of the extreme right in power began to be discussed all over the world.

In the first months of Bolsonaro's government, he dismantled the mechanisms of democratic participation of civil society in the deliberative bodies, through the extinction of several councils and other collegiate bodies, many of these councils and collegiate bodies have essential attributions for the execution of important public policies. This implies constitutional non-compliance, since the councils are deliberative collegiate bodies provided for in the Magna Carta, and are instances of democratic control, which ensure the citizen's participation in democracy. (Pereira, 2020). Showing the anti-democratic, or restrictive, face of democracy of that government.

The greatest achievements of this government in the ultra-neoliberal and neoconservative logic were the conduct of economic policy according to neoliberal principles; the counter-reform of Social Security, which subtracted social rights by extending the contribution time and retirement age. It represented the attempt to approve a model of capitalization and reduction of welfare benefits in this policy that fortunately were not approved.

Added to the context of counter-reforms such as the cuts in the Social Assistance Policy, came the Covid 19 pandemic, with serious health and economic effects, but the

option for the economic had consequences in the concentration and centralization of capital and thousands of lives reaped. The worsening of social inequalities becomes visible in the mortality, aggravation and illness in the pandemic, as social distancing and sanitary measures to reduce contagion could not be followed by the poorest, due to precarious conditions of water supply and sewage, housing conditions, precariousness of bonds and working conditions and expansion of unemployment, increase in the price of food. According to data from Oxfam (2020), the pandemic has meant an increase in inequalities between social classes and a deep concentration and centralization of capital, to the detriment of small businesses.

It should be noted that, even with the inflection of the Covid-19 pandemic, with greater incidence in the first two years (2020 and 2021), there was no retreat in the ultra-neoliberal agenda, which combined with the health crisis, with catastrophic results, assuming the profile of mass genocide and which affected, above all, the working class in its most impoverished sectors, based on a discourse that submitted the defense of life to the economy.

Despite this, some protection measures were adopted, albeit belatedly, after a movement of struggles and demands, such as the purchase of vaccination and the creation of an assistance benefit for the poorest, called Emergency Aid (AE), with the purpose of guaranteeing a minimum income to the most affected Brazilians during the pandemic of the new coronavirus, the AE was aimed at informal workers over 18 years of age, whether or not they contributed to the INSS, who did not receive any other benefit from the Federal Government (with the exception of the PBF).

According to Junior, Miguel and Filgueira (2023), the balance of the four tragic years of the Bolsonaro government, which can be summarized by the following facts: attacks on the institutions and foundations of the Democratic Rule of Law; rising unemployment, falling income and increasing poverty and hunger; deterioration of international relations and the transformation of the country into a pariah; denialism in the management of the pandemic, which led to almost 700 thousand deaths from Covid-19; fires and record deforestation of the Amazon rainforest and attacks on indigenous peoples; successive cuts in the budget of universities, threats to teacher autonomy and intervention in various institutions; dissemination of a culture of hatred and violence in schools; criminalization, censorship and lack of investment in culture, social sciences, among others. (Rocha, 2021).

The extreme right represents in the Brazilian context, according to Pereira (2020), as an alternative to the crisis of capital that peaked in 2008 and is perpetuated, its basis of action is the fight against systemic corruption, the implementation of a new policy that is not based on agreements, among others. However, led by "good men" and "family" accompanied by beautiful demure and housewife women, with a fallacious but charming discourse that associates the military, businessmen, and the market with honesty, a firm hand, discipline, and correctness" (Pereira, 2020, p.119), they devastated the country and its economy by setting prices at the world market price, dominated by big financialized capital.

In this way, the far right takes hold of a strong material base and sustained "by fire and sword by socially predatory and politically demobilizing political practices, guided by the competitive logic of the market that submits everything, including the power of the State" (Pereira, 2020, p 121) as a result of such practices, the growth of unemployment, the prevalence of precarious and unprotected work and the high growth of social inequality.

It is for this reason that the rule of law, which this party claims to respect and strengthen, but in a minimal State dimension, "has never been minimalist", on the contrary, it is "intrusive, it intends to curb nonconformity and collective action, resulting in the criminalization of social movements or any collective action that threatens the status quo of the neoliberal State. (Pereira, 2020)

The balance sheet of these center-right and far-right governments, however, demonstrates that their real effects fell far short of the expectations of their social bases. On the contrary, the maintenance of economic policies to sustain ultra-neoliberalism only guaranteed small economic advances, which further concentrated income and increased social inequalities. The new policy was actually fake news, as it always used the agreements with the center under the aegis of corruption.

III LULA'S GOVERNMENT: IS IT POSSIBLE TO RETURN TO NEO-DEVELOPMENTALISM AND CLASS CONCILIATION?

According to Santos (2024) in relation to the Lula government, the expectation is that this third term of Lula will be oriented towards the reconstruction of many of the management capacities of the public machine, which were weakened in the previous term. So, the evaluation of this first year of Lula's third term must consider some obstacles and challenges generated by:

1) the legacy of the previous period (economic austerity policies, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the outbreak of the Ukraine War); 2) the electoral expansion of the extreme right around the world in recent years; 3) the limits of building coalition governments, which had their greatest crisis in 2016 (Santos, 2024, p.38)

By coalition governments we understand, the Brazilian system of government, which emerged from the 1988 Constitution, came to be called Coalition Presidentialism – an expression of the political scientist Sérgio Henrique Abranches (1988) – precisely because of the way the president needs to behave before the National Congress, that is, it affects several choices of the president, such as the appointment of his team of ministers, for instance. It is a political-institutional arrangement that is due to the act of closing agreements and making alliances between political parties and political forces in pursuit of a specific objective.

It is the way in which the Executive Branch in Brazil conducts public administration, distributing administrative posts in search of political support and the formation of a parliamentary majority. In this sense, we can understand that, for a government to be able to put its government agenda into practice, it is necessary to create a base of support, of support, in the Legislative Branch. Through Coalition Presidentialism, it is possible to see the union of several parties in favor of a government agenda that can benefit the population as a whole.

However, Branches (1988) refers to the negative points of Coalition Presidentialism, which is that this system has a much more strategic role for parties and representatives than for the population itself. The formation of a coalition occurs so that a certain candidate or party wins the presidential elections and that others win positions in this government. The population, in this case, is not in the foreground, there is still the constant imminence of crises: if the Executive has a President who is not very skilled in the art of negotiating, it may have its governability reduced. Although the Executive has the power to set the agenda and has the constitutional competence to legislate, the Legislative has in its hands the power to vote on projects of interest to the government, and may hinder the execution of public policies by not voting on their projects. Therefore, Coalition Presidentialism can generate instability in the country's political order.

That is why, when the Lula government began, we once again witnessed: the left elected the president of the Republic, but it is unable to put into practice the fundamental aspects of its political program, in particular its economic agenda, clearly explained by Lula

throughout the electoral process. This finding is nothing new in relation to previous governments, including those of Lula himself, who operated through a singular "coalition presidentialism", in which the Executive guarantees support and approval for its projects by distributing funds, ministries, and positions of influence in federal state agencies to parliamentarians (Miguel, 2022). Thus, at the beginning, the conjuncture then presented contradictory circumstances that were quite different from those existing in previous PT governments.

Also according to Miguel's (2022) analysis, the author identifies elements that hinder the constitution of a "progressive" government (more to the left) – the deconstruction-rigging of fundamental state bodies by the Bolsonaro government, the disorganization of public finances, the ever-present pressure from the "market" to carry out a permanent fiscal adjustment, the aggressive action of Bolsonarism to permanently block any government initiative, and the government itself underrepresentation of the left, already mentioned, in the National Congress.

The extreme right, in its (neo)fascist and ultra-neoliberal strands, was already showing signs that it would bring challenges to the government. This is one of the characteristics of the "crisis of democracy", as identified even by the most conservative Political Science: the absence of moderation of an opposition that is willing to overthrow the government at any price, the contempt for the tacit rules of political dispute, the effort to keep tension always at a very high level, in order to produce failure in state management (Miguel, 2022).

It is a singular situation, a different game from the one played in Lula's two previous terms: to contain the government, to empty its transformative impetus, to force it to compromise with the status quo, the attempt to destroy it, to prevent it from actually exercising the task for which it was elected, that is, to govern in progressive ways, to return to neo-developmentalism, that is, economic growth with a social policy of social inclusion.

Even before the new government took office, dissatisfied with the transition PEC, which proposed the permanent withdrawal (or during the four years of the Lula government) of the resources of the new Bolsa Família from the "spending cap", they actively acted to dehydrate it, managing to reduce its scope to only one year. The objective of this PEC, indispensable for the exercise of minimum governability, was to make room in the budget for other priority social expenditures and public investments.

At the beginning of the government, the discursive tactic was that the Lula government should be a government of the broad front that elected him. But, in fact, they accepted an eventual broad front government, but subordinated it to the neoliberal playbook. Thus, they rhetorically recognize the inequality, poverty and hunger that exist in the country, but they are not willing to confront them, because for them (national bourgeoisies associated with foreign financial capital and their organic intellectuals) the budget has to continue to be subordinated to financial capital, prioritizing the payment of interest on the public debt. In short, permanent fiscal adjustment should be the priority of the "broad front government" (Santos, 2024).

It should be considered that Lula owes his victory, mainly, to the poorest population in the country (who earn up to two minimum wages), and that he expressed himself in other social segments (women, blacks and LGBT) and regionally (Northeast) massacred, disqualified and stigmatized by the previous government. Its campaign was directed, fundamentally, to respond to the needs and demands of these segments: the fight against hunger (with emphasis on a new, much more robust Bolsa Família); the real increase in the minimum wage; the recovery of funding for school meals and popular pharmacy; the resumption of housing policy aimed at low-income families; the return of public investments and the defense of policies to protect the rights of "minorities".

Even in the face of the challenges faced at this juncture, we can consider and point out some significant advances in the economic aspect we have: increase and appreciation of the minimum wage above inflation, classified by Lula as "untouchable", the policy of valuing the minimum wage has positive effects not only on the lives of workers and retirees but also on all categories; inflation under control; record increase in the average income of workers; lowest unemployment rate in 10 years; record number of employees; stability in fuel and food prices, among others.

In relation to social policies, it has already promoted the rescue of 24 million Brazilians from food insecurity through the increase of social programs, including the Acquisition of Food from Family Agriculture (PAA); the record number of beneficiary families in the Bolsa Família which, after the previous government's attempts to dismantle it, has returned to being a fundamental pillar of the federal government's social protection network. With the inclusion of more than 200 thousand families, the program had a record reach in June 2024, of 21 million families, with a budget of R\$ 14.23 billion and an average value of R\$ 683.75 per family from the 12% increase. In health, it expanded the More Doctors

Program, which in 2023, reached more than 25,400 professionals, an increase of 105% compared to 2022. The goal for 2024 is 28 thousand active doctors. 86 million people are benefited by the program and 744 new municipalities are now served.

In education policy, the current government implements full-time school and readjustment of school meals - one of the greatest cruelties of the Temer and Bolsonaro governments was the freezing of the value of school meals, which was promptly revised by Lula at the beginning of 2023, with a 39% increase in the amount transferred by the federal government, which went from 36 to 50 cents per day for each student enrolled in basic education in the public network, in addition to indigenous and quilombolas, children in preschool and daycare centers and students in full-time schools. The program aims to increase full-time vacancies, offering working hours equal to or greater than seven hours a day or 35 hours a week, with investments that should reach R\$ 4 billion by the end of 2024, and R\$ 12 billion by 2026, with the forecast of 3.2 million new vacancies. According to the MEC, 100% of the states and 84.3% of the Brazilian municipalities have already joined

Regarding the tax burden, we are looking for new sources that do not burden the poorest, such as taxes on exported products. Exemption from income tax for those who earn up to R\$ 2,824.00. The government guaranteed the exemption from Income Tax for those who receive up to two minimum wages per month from 2025, benefiting 15 million Brazilians. Until the end of his term, Lula guaranteed that he will exempt from the tax those who earn up to R\$ 5 thousand per month.

In terms of economic development, it did not re-edit the acceleration of growth, the driving force of the previous neo-development, but it has already ensured the country's return to the ranking of the 10 largest economies in the world. Brazil was the seventh largest economy in the world between 2010 and 2014, during the PT governments. After the 2016 coup, it lost positions until it plummeted to 11th in 2022. With less than two years in office, Lula has put Brazil back in 8th position in the ranking of the largest economies in the world, by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 0.8% GDP growth in the first quarter of 2024 resulted in a cumulative increase of 2.5% in the four quarters ended in March, which led Brazil to rise in position, overtaking Italy. This economic growth is the basis of the policy of class conciliation, which enables the acceptance of social policies by the dominants, but imposes the direction of the focus apart from universal policies, no longer desired by the bourgeoisie.

It should be noted that Lula won the election with the vote of the poorest, the Northeasterners, assuming the commitment to make a government that again focused on inclusive social policies for those who suffer the most from social inequalities. If the government fails in this basic commitment, it is not only Lula's political career that will come to a melancholic end or the PT that will suffer. A possible failure of the Lula government, as observed in the years following the legal-parliamentary-media coup of 2016 (Jinkings, 2016; Pinheiro-Machado; Freixo, 2019), will be the necessary fuel for the growth of the extreme right, which may have a great chance of returning to power, with or without Bolsonaro. It will reaffirm, for vast layers of the population, that democracy does not work, it makes the State and government impractical, leaving only to cede powers to the rulers who, in the name of effectiveness and efficiency, govern without relation to the people who elect them.

CONCLUSION

Although the capitalist state is always an "executive committee of the bourgeoisie", a "political structure of capital" of dominant interests, it is permeated by the class struggle, by the correlations of forces, by antagonistic interests. Thus, depending on the ideo-political project defended by the political parties of the rulers, it will imply in a different way public policies, especially those of a social nature, either opening a time of reforms or on the contrary a time of counter-reforms, because, instead of inclusion, they restrict access, make social policies precarious and privatize.

The reformist era is an exception in the current capitalist context, it depends on the conjunctures and political forces in each country. Since the crisis of financial capitalism in 2008, neoliberalism has been the only alternative to be followed, opening up possibilities for the resumption of ultra-neoliberalism, even more fierce in the logic of fiscal adjustment, of reduction of public spending, based on neoconservative discourses that spread hatred of those who are different and opposed.

In the context of the predominance of counter-reforms put into practice by the advance of the extreme right, the restrictive logic and the subtraction of rights is the norm to be followed and accepted, legitimized. In the government of exception to this logic, it suffers from the deconstruction of previous governments and the national and international pressures to maintain fiscal adjustment, grow and develop the country at the margin of what is expected. The criticism of the government spending on ministerial structures and social programs. Thus, the challenges for the resumption of neo-developmentalism are enhanced.

What is in dispute today is the public fund, in which financial capitalism seeks a greater share, imposing restrictions on other expenditures, such as social spending. The restrictive logic of fiscal adjustment wants to equalize all governments regardless of their ideo-political affiliations, leaving with no way out those who are against interpreting social rights as spending and not investment. Therefore, with the fiscal adjustment, it is the social rights that the extreme right makes a point of neglecting and precarious through the offer of scarce resources that can barely cover selective social policies focused on the most impoverished. Achieving its ends of undermining state and universalizing public social protection.

The New Right, made up of neoliberal and neoconservative strands, put into practice neoliberal policies that undermined democracy and social democracy. Labor parties are at a dead end, but still making a difference by adopting more inclusive social programs, reducing the effect of the dismantling of the public structure of social rights, in Brazil, in the Federal Constitution of 1988. How long will they be able to resist? To have popular support and that of part of the national bourgeoisie?

In the model of accumulation by dispossession, monetization, financialization, privatization, targeting, familism³, rephilanthropization⁴, speak louder than public social protection. Everything that was solid melted into thin air, to give way to financial and neoliberal capitalism. We will always resist and fight!

³ It is the process of making families responsible for social policies, in which families are called upon as one of the main instances for the provision of social welfare. Mito (2018).

⁴ It aims to replace the logic of citizenship, based on the non-recognition of historically conquered social rights, as it is based on a humanitarian discourse of solidarity and philanthropy, leveraged by a morality of helping the needy. (Yazbek, 2001)

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ⁱ This is considered the 3rd phase of neoliberalism, and is called ultraneoliberalism, which is based on the trinomial: 1. Violent deepening of the exploitation of labor, that is, of precariousness and "capture" of the worker's subjectivity; 2. Expansion of the appropriation of public funds by financial capital; 3. Privatization and expropriation of common and state assets that still exist (LIMA SOBRINHO, 2022, p. 122).