


BRAZIL X PORTUGUESE AFRICA: RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, GEOPOLITICS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE PORTUGUESE-SPEAKING COMMUNITY

 <https://doi.org/10.56238/arev6n2-195>

Submitted on: 29/09/2024

Publication date: 29/10/2024

Pablo Henrique Cordeiro Lessa¹, Nélida Astezia Castro Cervantes², Zara Laís Radge Monteiro³, William Magalhães Lessa⁴ and Ana Rízzia Cunha Cordeiro Forte⁵

ABSTRACT

For many years, Brazil has played a strategic position in the international scenario, with recognition of its important role as a conflict mediator and political partner for the emergence of new actors with crucial weight in the International Community. With a focus on the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the BRICS, it was possible to raise the country to the level occupied during the last decade, being a direct actor in the geopolitical agenda and participating in decision-making regarding the directions that will be followed in the coming years by the planet. However, with the internal change in management, the country suffered losses in relation to the conduct of its international policy, weakening Brazilian participation in important international bodies, such as the United Nations. The position now occupied, including the President of the Republic not participating in important International Forums, requires new approaches to place Brazil, again, on the international geopolitical scene. One of these strategies is through the approximation of international relations with Portuguese Africa, and in order to strengthen the bond of the Portuguese-speaking community and make effective the right to self-determination of peoples. Each African country, along with its own history, demands different strategies of Brazilian approach so that, in fact, interactions are increased. The present article, therefore, proposes to highlight possible alternatives to increase these relations in contemporaneity according to what appears to be more advantageous and promising to Brazil in relation to Portuguese Africa.

Keywords: Geopolitics. Self-determination of Peoples. Constitutional law. Lusophony.

¹ Professor of Law at the State University of Amapá (UEAP)

E-mail: pablo.lessa@ueap.edu.br

² Professor of Law at the Federal University of Ceará (UFC)

E-mail: nelidacervantes@hotmail.com

³ Doctorate student in Law at the University of Lisbon/Portugal

E-mail: zara.radge@gmail.com

⁴ Master's degree in Law from the Federal University of Ceará (UFC)

E-mail: williamlessa33@gmail.com

⁵ Doctorate student in Pharmacology at the Federal University of Ceará (UFC)

E-mail: rizziacordeiro@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

To understand the process of integration of the Portuguese-speaking community, it is essential to understand the process of integration and interpretation of the geopolitical and geostrategic relations between Brazil and Portuguese Africa – composed of former Portuguese colonies.

Thus, it is proposed, through a bibliographic review composed of documents and relevant literature on the subject, to contextualize the relations between Brazil and the countries that are former Portuguese colonies and that today have achieved independence, with the recognition of State and Government, as in the case of Angola, given by Brazil, in an apparently paradoxical way, because the MPLA's enemy group was supported by the US and Brazil, theoretically a supporter of the US, did not fail to politically support the MPLA that installed itself in power and remains to this day. The measure proposes to increase the self-determination of African peoples, established as a constitutional principle, in association with cooperation between peoples for the progress of humanity.

It is intended, in this way, to understand the history and its influence on the relations between Brazil and the countries belonging to Portuguese Africa; understand the changes in foreign and economic policy in relation to these states during the different governments, analyzing a period from colonization to the government of former president Dilma Rousseff; and to highlight possible alternatives for increasing these relations in contemporary times according to what seems to be more advantageous and promising to Brazil in relation to Portuguese Africa.

Wrapped up in the idea, Stoessinger (1978)⁶ shows that the power of a country depends on what others think about it, or on how the State itself perceives how others see it. In this sense, Miyamoto (2014)⁷ argues that geopolitics refers to the dispute of power in the international sphere, which is not absolute and recognized only by that State in question, but is more related to the level of power accepted and recognized by the International Society as belonging to that country.

It is a kind of influence, which is visualized as power, that a certain State has over the others, being recognized by them as the holder of this influence. Throughout this chapter, graphs are presented that demonstrate the commercial and political relations

⁶ STOESSINGER, J. *The power of nations. The international politics of our time*. São Paulo (SP): Editora Cultrix, 1978, p. 32.

⁷ MIYAMOTO, S. *Geopolitics, Political Science and International Relations*. Boa Vista (RR): Edit. Esp. Geografia Política e Geopolítica, 2014, p. 13.

maintained between Brazil and these former Portuguese colonies and the impact of these relations on the economic development of these countries.

Only in this way is it possible to understand the integration process experienced by the Portuguese-speaking community and the different relations between Brazil and the former Portuguese colonies, which prove to be important strategic partners in reaching a zone of greater Brazilian influence in international geopolitics.

GEOPOLITICS IN PRACTICE

Miyamoto (2014)⁸ points out that the term geopolitics has been used indistinctly, far from its original concept, irresponsibly by some professionals, academics and even journalists and recognizes that the concept gained importance after the occurrence of the Cold War, which demonstrated the vulnerability of all countries in the world, even those previously considered "totally safe", since the rise of a power, which in the example used was the Soviet Union, put at risk the power achieved by the maximum power at the time, the United States, which was threatened by several military and space advances achieved by the USSR. For Miyamoto⁹, geopolitics would be a "theory of power".

Therefore, it is understood that geopolitics involves understanding the scope of state action, considering it as belonging to the International Society, as one of the various poles existing in the world and that, depending on the way it exercises its reactions with the others, it can succeed or be excluded from the main scenarios of international relations.

In addition, one cannot ignore strategic alliances and exchanges of interests, as well as the system of checks and balances at the international level, which leads States to coexist, in a certain way, in a harmonious way, which, once broken, leads to the occurrence of wars.

Raymond Aron (1979)¹⁰ conceptualizes *strategy* as "the behavior related to the set of military operations, and *diplomacy* the conduct of exchanges with other political units. Both strategy and diplomacy will be subordinated to politics, that is, to the conception that the collectivity, or those who assume responsibility for collective life, do "in the national interest".

⁸ MIYAMOTO, S. *Geopolítica...*, cit, p. 11.

⁹ MIYAMOTO, S. *Geopolítica...*, cit, p. 15.

¹⁰ ARON, R. *Peace and war among nations*. Brasília (DF): Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1979, p. 60.

In times of peace, politics uses diplomatic means, without excluding the use of arms, at least as a threat. During war, politics does not crowd out diplomacy, which continues to conduct the relationship with allies and neutrals (and, implicitly, continues to act towards the enemy, threatening him with destruction or opening up to him a prospect of peace)."

Among the elements that make up geopolitics, Miyamoto (2014)¹¹ highlights geography, which can favor a certain state with a favorable position and abundant natural resources; the ideological position of the country at a given time; its population, used in the construction of a modern industrial base; its territory; its military capacity to defend borders and institutions, ensuring national security.

Geopolitics, during the twentieth century, was linked to the expansionist and belligerent vision of States, especially the European ones, which, according to Miyamoto (2014), saw¹² the opportunity to expand their zones of influence and power. After the death of millions of people, such a position caused geopolitics to be viewed negatively, and encouraged disrespect for the norms of International Law.

Miyamoto (2014)¹³ says that geopolitics would be essentially linked to power policies that aimed at national protection linked to the continuous expansion of the territory of States up to its maximum limit.

In a favorable position to the one presented is Atencio (1975),¹⁴ who conceptualizes geopolitics as a science that analyzes the influence of geographical elements on the evolution of states with the objective of obtaining conclusions of a political nature. Miyamoto (2014)¹⁵ adds Ratzel and Kjellen as other important authors of what he called terrestrial geopolitics.

Ribeiro (2007)¹⁶ alludes that "it has become essential for States to respond to the new and complex global interdependence and to promote the reformulation of traditional positions in the face of themes and events that, even geographically distant, have come to directly affect national life".

In Brazil-Africa relations, it is possible to perceive throughout Brazilian military history the maintenance and development of Brazil-Africa relations has been highlighted, in view of

¹¹ MIYAMOTO, S. *Geopolítica...*, cit, p. 15-16.

¹² MIYAMOTO, S. *Geopolítica...*, cit, p. 18.

¹³ MIYAMOTO, S. *Geopolítica...*, cit, p. 19.

¹⁴ ATENCIO, J. *Qué es la geopolítica*. Buenos Aires (Argentina): Editorial Pleamar, 1975, p. 41.

¹⁵ MIYAMOTO, S. *Geopolítica...*, cit, p. 20.

¹⁶ RIBEIRO, C. *Brazil-Africa Political-Trade Relations (1985-2006)*. São Paulo (SP): University of São Paulo, 2007, p. 29.

the need and strategic and geopolitical importance of the South Atlantic due to Space and the strength of the MPLA government. This position is also supported by Brazilian diplomacy, which always highlights the importance of maintaining these Brazil-Africa relations.

BRAZIL-PORTUGUESE AFRICA RELATIONS-: IMPORTANCE OF GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC RELATIONS THROUGHOUT HISTORY

For Brazil, Ribeiro (2007)¹⁷ also highlighted the importance of promoting actions that would strengthen its interests and highlight its autonomy, with Africa being a plausible and promising alternative.

Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2017)¹⁸ on GDP growth rates by region reveal that, between 2000 and 2012, the continents with the highest rates were Asia and Africa.

In fact, China, the fastest growing economy in the last twenty-five years, has made efforts to penetrate the African continent, with the continent both serving as a supplier of strategic raw materials and being seen as a potential consumer market. With regard to Brazil, it is worth highlighting the relationship between Brazil and the so-called Portuguese-Africa – countries that were Portuguese colonies. This relationship did not follow a uniform trajectory, sometimes narrowing, sometimes distancing, whether politically or commercially.

Brazil's relations with African countries began with the slave trade in the sixteenth century to serve as labor for one of the most lucrative activities of that century – the cultivation of sugar cane. If, on the one hand, this trade favored the development and economic growth of the Portuguese colony in America, on the other hand, it implied disrespectful conduct from a human point of view: the inhabitants of the African continent were imprisoned and enslaved, sold and traded as products. None of its cultural aspects used to be respected and the African peoples brought to the country were treated like real animals – with punishments and humiliations.

Marquese (2006)¹⁹ points out that, from the seventeenth century onwards, the Brazilian slave system achieved a correlation between the transatlantic slave trade and the amount of manumission granted, making it possible to intensify the slave trade without

¹⁷ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁸ INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. *GDP Growth by Region*. IMF Portal [online], 2017.

¹⁹ MARQUESE, R. *The dynamics of slavery in Brazil. Resistance, slave trade and manumissions, seventeenth to nineteenth centuries*. São Paulo (S): Novos estud., 2006, p. 02.

endangering the social slave order, since, by granting manumissions, it became feasible in the imagination of slaves who, with the passing of the year and hard work, It was possible to become free, reducing social tension and dissatisfaction with the condition to which these people were imposed.

The African ideology remained linked to the development of Brazil itself as a nation. Over the years, the mixture of different African ethnicities with the Portuguese and indigenous people who inhabited the beginning of what has now become Brazil has rooted African traditions, customs and beliefs in the Brazilian popular imagination, making them part of the genuinely Brazilian culture.

Saraiva (2012)²⁰ states that, above the Brazilian discourse of rescuing the origins and respect for African influences, the historical debt that the country has and that was widely used to justify a closer relationship with the African continent recognizes the ills of slavery. In addition, Fingermann (2012)²¹ argues that the historical debt rekindles South-South cooperativism, giving Brazil greater room for action.

Lechini (2008)²² attributes to Portugal the impediment of the continuity of relations between Brazil and Africa soon after the colonial period, since the European country, after the Independence of Brazil, vetoed trade relations between the South American country and the former Portuguese colonies in Africa.

Involved in the theme, Rosso and Deliberali (2015)²³ show that there was even at the time of Brazil's Independence, a movement aimed at an attempt to annex Angola in order to break the trade blockade imposed by Portugal on the newly independent country with the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

Ribeiro (2007)²⁴ argues that foreign policy is a State policy, and is therefore less subject to sudden transformations and unexpected changes. And, Brazilian foreign policy, according to the author, was not only reactive to changes in the international system, but mainly explored the margins of maneuver and possibilities opened up in each of the conjunctures experienced.

²⁰ SARAIVA, J. *Africa: partner of Atlantic Brazil – international relations of Brazil and Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century*. Belo Horizonte (MG): Editora Fino Traço, 2012, p. 111.

²¹ FINGERMAN, N. *Comments on the work África parceria do Brasil Atlântico – international relations of Brazil and Africa at the beginning of the XXI century*. Porto Alegre (RS): Século XXI, 2012, p. 130.

²² LECHINI, G. *Brazil in Africa or Africa in Brazil? The construction of African politics by Itamaraty*. Revista Nueva Sociedad [online], 2008, p. 57.

²³ ROSSO, D.; DELIBERALI, D. *Brazil-PALOP Trade Relations (2010-2014): evolution or stagnation?* Porto Alegre (RS): State and Democracy in Change in the XXI Century, 2015, p. 03.

²⁴ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 30.

In the twentieth century, trade relations between Brazil and Africa could be resumed, according to what Lechini (2008) teaches²⁵. Despite this, Africa did not seem interesting from an economic point of view due to technological and political delays, as well as the irresponsible proliferation of the stereotype of the African at a lower social level than that of citizens from European countries, a "cursed heritage" of Brazil's slave-owning past.

Brazilian foreign policy activism should, according to Ribeiro (2007),²⁶ "be recognized as a component of an innovation process (...), foresees the constant need to combine new inputs with the permanent search for new products (...) essential conditions for the promotion of their domestic and foreign interests: development and autonomy".

Hermann (1990)²⁷ describes levels of change and characteristics of Foreign Policy, which are divided and explained as follows:

- a) *Adjustment changes*: adjustments in the Developed Foreign Policy in which there are no changes in the adopted guidelines;
- b) *Program changes*: changes in the methods used to achieve objectives that lead to qualitative changes;
- c) *Problem/goal changes*: changes in foreign policy objectives that lead to the alteration of its target and the choice of new international goals or guidelines;
- d) *International orientation changes*: global changes in the actor's perception of the international system and its self-location.

Only after the second half of the twentieth century, as a result of the adoption of a new Brazilian foreign policy, did Africa emerge as a truly plausible alternative that was facilitated by proximity in some elements, such as language (in some African countries) and culture, with various aspects of African culture being incorporated into Brazilian culture during the periods in which slavery occurred and later.

Silva (2003),²⁸ through his classic book "Geopolitics and Power", became the main theoretician of geopolitics within the Brazilian army, on which he formulates several strategies of the Brazilian nation-state in the post-war world both in relation to the internal articulations of the Brazilian territory with the objective of keeping the Brazilian regions articulated according to national objectives.

²⁵ LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, cit., p. 57.

²⁶ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 31.

²⁷ HERMANN, C. *Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy*. International Studies Quarterly, 1990, p. 05.

²⁸ SILVA, G. *Geopolitics and Power*. Rio de Janeiro (RJ): Editora Univer Cidade, 2003, p. 480.

In the internal field, in summary, Silva (2003)²⁹ made a geopolitical analysis of Brazilian political history since the times of the Portuguese colonial period between the processes of decentralization and administrative political concentration, which he figuratively called "systoles" and "diastoles", starting with the hereditary captaincies (decentralization), with the governors general (centralization), creation of the Portuguese colonies of Maranhão and Grão Pará along with Brazil (decentralization), viceroyalty (centralization).

In independent Brazil, the process continues with the first reign (centralization), regency (decentralization), second reign (centralization), first republic (decentralization), revolution of 1930 and "Estado Novo" (centralization), period of validity of the 1946 constitution (decentralization), coup of 1964 (centralization), post-constitution of 1988 (decentralization).

These so-called systoles and diastoles by Silva (2003)³⁰ were one of the main responsible for the expansion, territorial consolidation and integration of Portuguese America in contrast to the disintegration of Spanish America into several nation-states, with the strong presence of civil wars and great political instability.

In the external field, Silva's geopolitical formulations place Brazil as the leader of the southern part of the "American Fortress" and the United States would act directly in the northern part from a global perspective due to its nature as the largest economic power on the planet. The area of influence of the "American Fortress" would take place in terms of "inner and outer hemicycles": the first would be a more direct influence that in the case of Brazilian action in geopolitical terms would be beyond its neighbors, the "South Atlantic" and the countries of West Africa.

The inner "hemicycle" would be an area of security and direct influence of the leading power in the region, so in the Brazilian case it would justify the interest in relation to the South Atlantic and Africa, even if at various times tensions occurred with the northern ally, the United States, as would occur in the Brazilian decisions to expand the jurisdiction of the Brazilian territorial sea to two hundred miles and the support of the Brazilian to African governments not necessarily aligned with the United States.

After the 1964 coup, Golbery do Couto e Silva was the main mentor of the creation of the National Information System (SNI), a military government structure from a

²⁹ SILVA, G. *Geopolítica ...*, op. cit., p. 480-481.

³⁰ SILVA, G. *Geopolítica ...*, op. cit., p. 479-481.

hierarchical level to that of a ministry, responsible both for gathering information for the purpose of repressing opponents of the regime, as well as for strategic formulations in the political and economic fields and with influence on the country's foreign relations.

At the helm of the SNI, Golbery do Couto e Silva would use his theoretical knowledge of geopolitics to carry out studies of the conjuncture as well as scenarios at a time of extreme polarization between the American and Soviet blocs.

In 1974, General Ernesto Geisel took over the government and appointed General Golbery do Couto e Silva as Chief of Staff, both former members of the "Sorbonne Group" and promoted a shift in Brazilian geopolitical strategies reflected in particular in the "independent foreign policy" of Itamaraty". In line with the geopolitical models indicated by Golbery and in the discussions of the "Sorbonne Group", ³¹Brazil turned to Africa. It recognizes the independence of the socialist government of Angola in relation to Portugal, contrary to American interests that supported the guerrilla group opposed to UNITA, the same policy is adopted in relation to the former Portuguese colonies in Africa (Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau).

The Geisel government supports the United Nations resolutions against the racist government of South Africa, as well as condemning the occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel. At the same time, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) adopts a strategy of deeper relations with countries not entirely aligned with the Americans.

Lechini (2008)³² highlights the dual character of the resumption of relations between Brazil and Africa: the promotion of solidarity among the countries of the South associated with the increase of Brazil's capacity in global affairs and a diversification of Brazilian foreign relations.

Ribeiro (2007)³³ highlights the impossibility of considering foreign policy without visualizing the national objectives pursued and defined, which is, therefore, conditioned to the circumstances that characterize the State, such as geographical and economic situation, political regime, culture and diplomatic tradition. Among the elements arranged by the author, it is possible to perceive a great approximation of Brazil with African countries in relation to geographical situation and culture.

³¹ Group of officers of the Brazilian Army who became known for their more sophisticated intellectual condition, hence the name "Sorbonne" in reference to the French University, in contrast to another group of military personnel known as "Ala Dura" or "Casca Grossa" with less capacity for strategic formulation.

³² LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, cit., p. 57.

³³ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 33.

Lechini (2008)³⁴ names this type of diplomacy based on cultural similarities as cultural diplomacy. Among the elements highlighted by Ribeiro (2007),³⁵ when implementing Brazilian foreign policy, are the search for markets, financing, investments and technology. Thus, the author attributes to it an eminently economic character, focused on development, but which does not have broad social participation, remaining restricted to the Executive Branch.

If, on the one hand, this character can be positive, as there are no major transformations and visions of what should be done, on the other hand, it is negative, as it generates a distancing from the other branches of the country's foreign policy, in addition to ignoring other variables as important as human development and international solidarity. He also points out that Brazilian foreign policy directed to African countries is almost always supported by state agencies and is disconnected from social movements.

On the other hand, for Lima (1982),³⁶ "Brazil-Africa relations can only be adequately apprehended when examined in the broader context of recent Brazilian foreign policy, more precisely in the context of the strategy of inserting the country into the world system". But Brazil-Africa relations have not always been stable. Ribeiro (2007)³⁷ highlights its character of variable intensity, with a decline between 1980 and 1990 and recovery after the beginning of the twenty-first century. While in the 1980s it focused on countries considered priorities, such as South Africa, Angola and Nigeria; Politics has undergone considerable changes in the new century.

Ribeiro (2007)³⁸ lists a sometimes opportunistic performance of Brazil in foreign policy, since, at the regional level, in which it has greater resources than its neighbors, it obtains relative gains and tries to preserve its autonomy, even when greater action is required within the scope of MERCOSUR, without allowing the continuity of institutions; whereas, at the global level, in which the division of power disfavors the country, Diplomacy tries to institutionalize regimes to obtain absolute gains, even giving up autonomy in some contexts.

³⁴ LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, op. cit., p. 58.

³⁵ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 36.

³⁶ LIMA, M. *Notes on Brazil-Africa relations in the context of Brazilian foreign policy*. Afro-Asian Studies, 1982, p. 241.

³⁷ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 43.

³⁸ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 48.

Vaz (1999)³⁹ highlights the search for the diversification of contracts and partnerships in Brazilian foreign policy, especially bilateral relations, enabling greater capillarity at the international level, even if this phenomenon has not been enough to place the country on the list of those who make the most important decisions in the international scenario.

Such a universalist character led Ribeiro (2007)⁴⁰ to name Brazil as a *global trader*, or a country in which a high degree of diversification in financial flows of imports and exports can be seen. This behavior is reflected in the participation of different continents in national exports in 2016, which, according to the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services – MDIC (2017), 20% of these are directed to China, Hong Kong and Macau; 18% to the European Union; 15.9% to NAFTA; 9.9% to MERCOSUR. This is an acquired benefit that confers economic flexibility at the international level that must be preserved by the country.

In addition, Ribeiro (2007)⁴¹ states that the country positions itself, on the global stage, in favor of peace and democracy, and that, after a paradigm shift visualized after the 1990s, universalism and autonomy were once and for all configured as the rule for the execution of Brazilian foreign policy.

Ribeiro (2007)⁴² argues that Africa emerged in the Brazilian foreign policy scenario during the Jânio Quadros government, in the midst of the Independent Foreign Policy, but that it had already been listed as important in the diplomatic scenario in the Juscelino Kubitschek government (1955-1960) due to the desire to build a Luso-tropical community.

Fingermann (2012)⁴³ states that, for Juscelino Kubitschek, the independence of African countries was a barrier to the growth of Brazilian trade with European powers, as they would be competing directly with each other to supply the old Metropolises. Finally, during the short government of Jânio Quadros (1961-1961), the support for the self-determination of African peoples became evident.

Africa also emerged in a conjuncture of strengthening third-worldism, breaking the East-West polarization imposed in the Cold War and in the search for other alternative partnerships to the American one, in which, according to Ribeiro (2007),⁴⁴ Brazil aimed at

³⁹ VAZ, A. *Strategic Partnerships in the Context of Brazilian Foreign Policy: implications for MERCOSUR*. Brazilian Journal of International Politics, 1999, p. 53.

⁴⁰ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 50.

⁴¹ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 54.

⁴² RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 57.

⁴³ FINGERMANN, N. *Comments ...*, op. cit., p. 130.

⁴⁴ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 58.

protagonism. However, politics hindered the relationship of friendship with Portugal, the country's former metropolis, of which Brazil was a strong partner, which made it impossible to act more effectively in the areas of conflict and in the process of independence of the former Portuguese colonies.

It was only after the independence of the Portuguese colonies between 1974 and 1975 that Ribeiro (2007)⁴⁵ considers that Brazilian action began to have more consistency, consolidating itself in the Médici, Geisel and Figueiredo governments, in which the policy of responsible pragmatism was exercised, approaching the countries of Portuguese Africa and Nigeria.

It is even in the Geisel government, they see a change in the military government's stance towards Africa. The authors highlight the Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism of the Geisel government as a consolidator of Brazilian policy towards the African continent, finally overcoming the dichotomy imposed on Brazil during the process of independence of the former Portuguese African colonies, with the country sometimes in favor of Portugal, sometimes in favor of the new independent nations.

With regard to the recognition of states, Brazil has always positioned itself in favor of recognizing the newly independent countries. In 1975, after having already recognized the independence of Mozambique, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, according to Rosso and Deliberali (2015),⁴⁶ Brazil was the first country to officially recognize the Independence of Angola, which was, at that time, under the Leninist-Marxist government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

During this period, Lechini (2008)⁴⁷ argues that Brazil's energy vulnerability was a stimulus for rapprochement with African oil-producing countries. This approach was problematic, since oil production was concentrated in a few countries.

Lechini (2008)⁴⁸ points out that Africa had become a market for the provision of services that boosted the sale of goods and allowed the real transfer of technology, since Brazilian manufactured products could be exported to that continent.

Ribeiro (2007)⁴⁹ points out that, between 1973 and 1974, exports to the African continent grew 129.1%, from US\$190,001,000 to US\$435,323,000, mainly due to the sale

⁴⁵ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 59.

⁴⁶ ROSSO, D.; DELIBERALI, D. *Relações...*, cit., p. 04.

⁴⁷ LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, op. cit., p. 60.

⁴⁸ LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, cit., p. 62.

⁴⁹ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 60.

of industrialized products such as tractors, trucks and buses; while imports grew 300.2%, from US\$169,903,000 to US\$679,998,000.

Currently, in 2016, Brazilian exports to Africa total US\$ 7.8 billion and represent 4.2% of total national exports. It should be noted that, in 1997, these exports were only US\$1.5 billion and 2.8% of Brazil's total exports, which demonstrates the growth and potential in Brazil-Africa trade relations.

With the end of the military regime, the Brazilian redemocratization caused negative consequences in Brazilian foreign policy, which became a counter for business and party exchanges, despite the maintenance of the old paradigms applied during the military governments.

To make matters worse, the economic crisis, the end of the polarization imposed by the Cold War, the economic turbulence caused by financial globalization and the Brazilian foreign debt caused phenomena of weakening of what had been built in previous governments.

Lechini (2008)⁵⁰ lists what he called the "Africa Cost" as a factor that strengthened the weakening of Africa as the main objective in Brazilian foreign policy, among which were the lack of qualified labor, infrastructure and economic, financial and political stability, as well as internal security. The author highlights political and economic instability as the main drivers of this concept.

Ribeiro (2007)⁵¹ shows that, during the Sarney government (1985-1989), the precepts of coexistence and cooperation with the other members of international society were maintained, but that Africa lost considerable space, as old priorities were reestablished, such as the relationship with the United States and the strengthening of South America.

Lechini (2008)⁵² names the Sarney government's policy as diplomacy of results, from which Africa was gradually drawn from the analysis and consideration as unsatisfactory of economic and commercial relations with the continent. Relations with Africa in this period were based primarily on cultural approximation and recognition of a historical past, especially those countries that have Portuguese as their official language, constituting the PALOP, which would serve as the beginning of the Community of Portuguese Speaking

⁵⁰ LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, op. cit., p. 56.

⁵¹ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 64-65.

⁵² LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, cit., p. 62.

Countries (CPLP) – and whose meetings were attended by Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe.

A trade facilitation program called *countertrade was also developed*, which, according to Ribeiro (2007),⁵³ allowed the payment of goods for goods, with oil being the main product of exchange, gaining prominence, mainly, with Nigeria and Angola.

Brazil also began to exert influence on the African continent, taking a vehement stand against the *existing apartheid* in South Africa, including trade sanctions, such as the veto on the export of oil, arms and ammunition, licenses and patents, and cultural, artistic and sports exchange activities.

The insecurity regarding the success of South-South relations put Brazil's project in Africa in check, since the countries of the then considered Third World were not able to meet the demands caused by the debt crisis of the third world countries. When Africa is highlighted, Ribeiro (2007)⁵⁴ shows that the situation was even worse, since the external debt practically doubled, with an increase in the commitment of the Gross Domestic Products of Sub-Saharan Africa from 31% to 67% and an increase in international interest rates.

Ribeiro (2007)⁵⁵ points out that African countries were held hostage by their external debts, the scarcity of resources for development and adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in addition to exporting primarily agricultural products and mineral raw materials, while importing capital goods, machinery, manufactured goods and energy.

Saraiva (2012)⁵⁶ points out that China's entry into Africa, in contrast to the requirements of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, came to modernize the continent's economy. Fingermann⁵⁷ highlights a new type of financing created by the Asian giant, in which payment could be made with natural resources, abundant on the continent, to the detriment of capital, which was scarce.

Economic relations between Brazil and Africa followed the decline in Africa's participation in international trade, which, according to Ribeiro (2007),⁵⁸ went from 3.3% in 1950 to 2.3% in 1975, 1.0% in 1993 and 0.8% in 1995. In addition, Africa was not able to

⁵³ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 67.

⁵⁴ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 77.

⁵⁵ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 81.

⁵⁶ SARAIVA, J. *Africa...*, op. cit., p. 85.

⁵⁷ FINGERMANN, N. *Comments ...*, op. cit., p. 131.

⁵⁸ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 82.

raise Brazil to a level of visibility on the international scene, remaining on the international sidelines, which caused disinterest in these relations.

At that time, the list of investments and objectives in relation to Africa was reduced by the Brazilian Executive, concentrating its focus on Portuguese-speaking African countries, having, according to Ribeiro (2007),⁵⁹ a Brazilian representation in all Portuguese-speaking African countries, with the exception of São Tomé and Príncipe. The author points out that this geopolitical context made it possible for Brazil to act as a protagonist and mediator of interests between South American and African countries.

The crisis scenario in Africa has been intensified by the proliferation of diseases and malnutrition. Of the poorest countries in the world, Ribeiro (2007)⁶⁰ points out that 66.6% were African, even going so far as to classify these countries as "The Fifth World".

The Collor government was marked by the attempt to detach from the image of Brazil as a Third World country and the entry, finally, into modernity, and the African continent continued to be absent from the main foreign policy goals. Brazil achieved this objective, according to Ribeiro (2007),⁶¹ mainly because it hosted important international conferences on climate, culminating in Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration and in the paradigm shift, in which environmental protection would be linked to developmentalism, in a model called Sustainable Development.

During the Itamar Franco government (1992-1994), Brazilian activities were redirected to MERCOSUR and the developing countries, later called BRICS (Russia, India, China and South Africa). Within the framework of the United Nations, Brazil saw in Peacekeeping Operations an opportunity to strengthen its candidacy for a permanent seat on the Security Council, used actions in Africa, especially in Angola, to generate more visibility for the country.

Ribeiro (2007)⁶² highlights the decline in the number of diplomats in African territory, which decreased from 34 in 1983 to 24 in 1993, and the strong criticism that this phenomenon received, among which we can mention that diplomats were not negotiators, so they should not act only under the guidance of the Economy. But, through the diplomat Celso Amorim, Africa regained importance, especially with the project of the Communities of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) and the South Atlantic Cooperation, an action that

⁵⁹ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 89.

⁶⁰ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 91.

⁶¹ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 100-101.

⁶² RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 113.

aimed to garner support from African countries in votes in which Brazil was part in multinational forums.

In the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government, there was autonomy through integration to justify the Brazilian action of regional strengthening of South America. Lechini (2008)⁶³ reinforces the fact that, given the economic limitations between Brazil and Africa, the actions of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government (1994-2002) on the continent involved the proposal of a treaty of denuclearization and protection of the Atlantic environment, demonstrating the Executive's concern with national security and with the maintenance of good relations with nearby countries. Brazil's macroeconomic and budgetary problems at the time justified the withdrawal of diplomatic posts in Africa, although several African countries grew economically, renewing interest in Brazil-Africa relations (Table 01).

Table 01 – Economic Phases of Africa

Períodos	TMAC*	Situação Econômica
1960-1974	5,2%	Crescimento
1974-1981	2,7%	Declínio
1981-1993	1,0%	Estagnação
1993-2002	3,2%	Recuperação

*Average Annual Growth Rate
Source: RIBEIRO (2007).

Ribeiro (2007)⁶⁴ also highlights the concentration and selectivity that guided the Brazilian actions in relation to the African continent, which focused on three countries: Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. Lechini (2008)⁶⁵ calls the phenomenon selectivism.

The constitution of the CPLP (1996) did not mean a significant economic and commercial increase between Brazil and the other members, as shown in the graphs below, since the main trading partners in this list continued to be Portugal and Angola.

In addition, Ribeiro (2007)⁶⁶ states that Brazil obtained economic gains from the CPLP, but that this was not perceived by the majority of Portuguese-speaking African countries, which saw a lack of political action in the Community, which was based mainly on cultural and historical aspects.

⁶³ LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, cit., p. 65.


⁶⁴ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 139.

⁶⁵ LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, cit., p. 62.

⁶⁶ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 145.

As can be seen, Brazil-Africa economic relations remained low and stable between 1985 and 2000, demonstrating the continent's inexpressiveness in relation to the priorities established by the Brazilian Government (graph 02).

Graph 01 – Evolution of Brazil-Africa relations from 1985 to 2006



Source: RIBEIRO (2007).

During the Lula government (2003-2010), there was a considerable change in Brazilian foreign policy, with the inclusion of Africa among one of the priorities of the Government, which focused on the capillarization of Brazil in all continents as a way to strengthen the country's image on the international stage. South-South relations were considerably increased, and African countries were not left out.

This phenomenon can be seen with the reopening of embassies and consulates in Africa closed during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government, totaling, according to Ribeiro (2007),⁶⁷ 13 new posts, and bringing to 30 embassies and 2 consulates-general the number of official representations of Brazil on the African continent. In addition, an internal reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave it its own wing focused on Africa.

Ribeiro (2007)⁶⁸ points out that the adoption of democratic and stable regimes, the adoption of economic policies of macroeconomic stabilization and the overcoming of the import substitution model by one of alignment with international trade and investment flows, gave a new look to the economy of African countries, which facilitated this approximation of Brazil.

⁶⁷ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 172.

⁶⁸ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 178.

Trade relations between Brazil and Africa grew considerably between 1996 and 2006. Exports to the African continent grew 487% in the period, with a growth of 315% between 2002 and 2006 alone. Imports, in the same period, grew 478%. The trade flow went from US\$6 billion in 2003 to US\$15 billion in 2006.

Of this total, Angola, South Africa and Nigeria represent 48% of Brazilian exports and 53% of African imports to Brazil, according to Ribeiro (2007),⁶⁹ showing that Brazil still has an enormous potential for exploring trade relations with other countries belonging to Portuguese Africa.

Former President Lula also performed what was called presidential diplomacy, while personally visiting several countries on the African continent and, through official trips, made it possible to strengthen economic and political ties between the countries, also encouraging Brazilian entrepreneurs to invest in the African continent.

Lechini (2008)⁷⁰ highlights as an important achievement in relation to a greater recognition of the influence of Africa on Brazilian culture the obligation, through Federal Law No. 10,639, approved on January 10, 2003, of the teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture at all levels of education.

Brazilian action was also not limited to the member countries of the CPLP, denoting an increase in interest in the continent as a whole as a possible Brazilian partner. Ribeiro (2007)⁷¹ highlighted that such a change in posture represented an overcoming of the strictly economic and short-term paradigm for the long-term political and strategic paradigm.

Lechini (2008)⁷² argues that former President Lula, through his official trips, propagated the use of biofuels and the promotion of Brazilian technology in the production of this type of fuel. The performance of former President Lula and the policy of valuing Africa made trade between Brazil and the African continent jump from US\$5 billion in 2002 to approximately US\$20 billion in 2007, making economic and trade relations with Africa represent 7% of Brazilian Foreign Trade.

Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁷³ argue that the Dilma government continued the advances in rapprochement with Africa initiated by the government of her predecessor. Among the programs created is ProSavana, signed in 2011, which involves trilateral

⁶⁹ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 188.

⁷⁰ LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, cit., p. 67.

⁷¹ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 176.

⁷² LECHINI, G. *O Brasil...*, op. cit., p. 68.

⁷³ ROSSO, D.; DELIBERATI, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 12.

cooperation between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique that involves improving research capacity and technology transfer for the development of agriculture in the Nacala regions. This project is involved by EMBRAPA in conjunction with the Institute of Agrarian Research of Mozambique (IIAM).

The Dilma government also prioritized projects in the area of security, with military training programs being carried out with all Portuguese-speaking African countries. Debts of Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe were also forgiven.

RELATIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND PORTUGUESE-SPEAKING AFRICAN COUNTRIES (PALOP) LARGE AND SMALL

To facilitate the explanation, Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁷⁴ divide the Portuguese-speaking African countries into Large PALOP and Small PALOP in relation to economic and trade relations with Brazil. Among the Great PALOP countries are Angola and Mozambique, which have true trade with Brazil. Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe make up the Small PALOP, which only carry out commercial exchanges.

BRAZIL-ANGOLA RELATIONSHIP

Rosso and Deliberati (2015),⁷⁵ in relation to Angola, highlight the importance assumed in the commercialization of technology, capital goods and investments in infrastructure, including basic sanitation works and the construction of hydroelectric plants, as the main points of economic and commercial relations between Brazil and the African country.

The economic relationship between Brazil and Angola has been intense since 1975 according to Ribeiro (2007),⁷⁶ mainly based on oil, despite the country not being Brazil's main trading partner in Africa. Brazilian companies such as Petrobras, Furnas and Odebrecht have found an open and promising market in the country. Angola had obtained loans from credit lines made available by Brazil in order to strengthen trade relations between the countries, and one form of debt repayment was the shipment of barrels of oil.

However, as a reflection of the decline in economic relations between the two nations, in 1994, the African country suspended the shipment of barrels stopped, creating

⁷⁴ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 13.


⁷⁵ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 05.

⁷⁶ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 149.

even more problems between the two states. According to Ribeiro (2007),⁷⁷ internal conflicts in Angola also served to discourage Brazilian companies from continuing to invest in the country. The expansion of credit lines directed to the country to a value of US\$580 million in the 2005-2007 triennium, the exports of automobiles and police vehicles, the completion of the Capanda Hydroelectric Plant and the contracting of projects in infrastructure, sanitation and agriculture further favor Angolan-Brazilian relations.

Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁷⁸ point out that Brazilian exports to the country reached US\$1.2 billion in 2014, a value close to the US\$1.1 billion of imports from Angola to Brazil. They also pointed to manufactured products and basic goods, such as sugar, frozen beef and chicken as the main products of trade between Brazil and Angola. For all these reasons and the history of relations between the two countries, Angola has the highest degree of geopolitical importance for Brazil.

Graph 02 – Brazil/Angola Economic Relations



Source: RIBEIRO (2007).

Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁷⁹ also highlight the end of the Civil War in Angola as an important factor that facilitated the increase in exchange with Brazil, especially during the Lula government. The destruction and low competition attracted Brazilian construction companies in the post-war reconstruction process, especially the construction companies Queiroz Galvão, Odebrecht and Andrade Gutierrez, and several financing was made possible through the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) – a Brazilian public bank, which was very important in generating employment for Angolans.

⁷⁷ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 109.

⁷⁸ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 12.

⁷⁹ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, cit., p. 06.

For these reasons, Angola, in view of the political stability and economic situation that should improve with the recent increase in the price of oil; due to its significant potential in natural and energy resources, in addition to a population of more than 25,000,000 (twenty-five million) inhabitants, with the highest GDP per capita among the countries analyzed; Purchases of products that exceed 7% of Brazilian exports to the African continent (except the Middle East) is the country with the highest degree of geopolitical importance of Brazil in Portuguese Africa.

BRAZIL-MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONSHIP

In relation to Mozambique, Brazil's relationship with the country has already had very complicated moments, since the support given by Brazil to Portuguese colonialism brought distrust among the citizens of this African country regarding Brazilian intentions in its territory, according to Rosso and Deliberati (2015), in ⁸⁰addition to the African country's preference to maintain relations with countries of the former socialist bloc, of which Brazil was not a part.

Even today, the country faces problems of internal instability, but which are being stabilized by the current government. Ribeiro (2007)⁸¹ lists the country's level of indebtedness, one of the highest in the world, as the main obstacle to a better level of growth and Brazilian investment in the country. The Brazilian company Vale do Rio Doce managed to win the bid for the exploration of the Moatize coal complex, in the north of the country, which strengthened its relations with Brazil.

Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁸² highlight the progress of Brazil's relations with Mozambique during the Lula government, in which several national companies began to act in cooperation with the Mozambican government, as in the case of the Moatize mine, built by the Brazilian company Vale do Rio Doce, with operations on Mozambican soil since 2004; in the reactivation of the Sena Line (railway); in the construction of the port of Nacala; in Nampula; and government cooperation aimed at promoting the use of clean energy, especially biofuels, among which ethanol stands out.

Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁸³ also highlight the role of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) in offering courses and support aimed at the technical

⁸⁰ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 05.

⁸¹ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 150.

⁸² ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, cit., p. 08.

⁸³ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 09.

training of agricultural producers and technology transfer to the field, based on efforts to improve the food security and health sectors. Added together, the International Cooperation Program for HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Actions for developing countries, created during the Lula government, and which had Mozambique as one of the main beneficiaries.

Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁸⁴ point to wheat and mixtures of wheat and rye, frozen chicken meat, iron and steel works and some aerial vehicles as the main products involved in trade between Brazil and Mozambique. In relation to the number of trade relations, the figure of Brazilian exports to the country in 2014 was US\$63.9 million, with trade between 2010 and 2014 increasing by 74.8% - an increase of 58.2% in exports and 409.7% in imports.

For these reasons, Mozambique, despite being an area of great military conflict and political instability, due to its significant potential in natural and energy resources, in addition to a significant population that can become a consumer market with the growth of the economy, is of a high degree of geopolitical importance for Brazil in Africa.

BRAZIL-CAPE VERDE RELATIONSHIP

Cape Verde has been the stage for Brazilian action with regard to technical cooperation agreements and staff training, enabling, according to Ribeiro (2007),⁸⁵ the growth of students from this country in Brazilian Higher Education Institutions. A direct air route between Fortaleza, Brazil, and Cape Verde was also created, being an opening channel for greater commercial interactions between the countries.

Rizzi (2012)⁸⁶ states that, during the Lula government, Brazil's exports to Cape Verde increased by 203%. In addition, Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁸⁷ show that Brazil, in 2014, was the 5th main importer of the country, negotiations that involved US\$25.4 million. Thus, Cape Verde has a reasonable highlight of Brazil's geopolitical importance in Africa.

⁸⁴ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 09-13.

⁸⁵ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 148.

⁸⁶ RIZZI, K. *The great Brazil and the small PALOP: the Brazilian foreign policy for Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe (1974/2010)*. Porto Alegre (RS): Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, 2012, p. 216.

⁸⁷ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 12.

BRAZIL-GUINEA-BISSAU RELATIONSHIP

With regard to relations between Brazil and Guinea-Bissau, the most prominent point given by Ribeiro (2007)⁸⁸ was the Brazilian action, together with the CPLP, in guaranteeing the territorial integrity of that country when the official government was deposed, due to the imminent threat of invasion by troops from Senegal.

Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁸⁹ highlight actions promoted by the National Service for Industrial Learning (SENAI), which has a teaching center in Guinea Bissau, as an important link between Brazil and the African country. Rizzi (2012)⁹⁰ states that, during the Lula government, Brazil's exports to Guinea-Bissau increased by 5,600%.

Recently, according to Rosso and Deliberati (2015),⁹¹ the Brazilian government, during the Dilma administration, provided technical support to the elections held in Guinea-Bissau, positioning itself as an important ally in the defense of democracy.

Despite the advances, the importance of Guinea-Bissau for Brazilian geopolitics in Africa is not very significant, as the country does not have great potential in relation to commercial interests, natural resources and logistics.

BRAZIL – SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE RELATIONSHIP

São Tomé and Príncipe jumped to the Brazilian eyes with the possibility of oil exploration, which Ribeiro (2007)⁹² considered possible through the creation of a *joint venture* managed by that country, Portugal, Brazil and Angola. However, the negotiations were unsuccessful and the project was eventually carried out between the nation and Nigeria.

Rizzi (2012)⁹³ points out that, during the Lula government, Brazil's exports to São Tomé and Príncipe increased by 265%. In addition, Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁹⁴ show that Brazil exported US\$672 thousand, also denoting the smallness of the trade relationship between the two countries.

Rosso and Deliberati (2015)⁹⁵ also state that actions promoted by the National Service for Industrial Learning (SENAI) are being taken in the country, which also has a

⁸⁸ RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 148.

⁸⁹ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 11.

⁹⁰ RIZZI, K. *O grande...*, cit, p. 216.

⁹¹ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 12.

⁹² RIBEIRO, C. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 148.

⁹³ RIZZI, K. *O grande...*, cit, p. 216.

⁹⁴ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 12.

⁹⁵ ROSSO, D.; Deliberati, D. *Relações...*, op. cit., p. 11.

teaching center, recently inaugurated in 2014. Due to the increase in relations between Brazil and São Tomé and Príncipe and, mainly, due to the capacity that the country has from the discovery of oil wells, São Tomé and Príncipe has risen in the degree of geopolitical importance of Brazil in Africa.

The junction of Portuguese-speaking African States with such diverse realities for the analysis of the conjuncture becomes very difficult. However, to fill in the table above, an average was used as a result of facts that occurred in the continent through the analysis of each of the states that make up "Portuguese Africa" included in the annex of this work.

It is evident that, in view of the average applied, countries such as Mozambique, whose government is of great political and military instability, add value to this average, while States such as Angola, which have grown considerably from the political and economic point of view, in the military aspect and opposition to the government, cause the average to be decreased.

Given such diversity, in the following graph, we put the factors considered individually and the countries with similar reality.

Table 02 – Political Instability, Energy Resources and Excessive Hunger in Portuguese Africa

Political instability	Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau.
Energy resources	Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe
Inflation	Angola, Mozambique.
Excessive hunger	Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe

Source: Authorship (2022).

It can be seen, in the figure above, that the diversity in the political and economic configuration of the African countries that make up the CPLP countries demonstrates what Brazil's geostrategic focuses should be in its international relations, thus avoiding international confrontations and economic wear and tear.

CONCLUSION

Among the common points that connect Brazil to Portuguese-speaking African countries are, in addition to the language, which acts as a facilitator of relations and communication, making the intentions and objectives of both parties clearer; Christianity, whether in its more traditional aspect of Catholicism, or in relation to Protestantism, which has grown in the number of followers, bringing these countries even closer; and the common origin, all colonized by Portugal and, thus, exploited by that country, subjected to a third-world ideology that tends to be overcome over the years.

Another point of intersection that can also be mentioned is the cultural element, since Brazil received intense African influence, especially literary, which can be seen in the creation of the Camões Prize, which rewards works by Portuguese-speaking authors, always highlighting Brazilian authors and authors from African countries that were former Portuguese colonies. The exchange of technologies takes place, above all, by universities that receive African students and that integrate these students with Brazilians, as is the case of the University of International Integration of Afro-Brazilian Lusophony – UNILAB, in addition to the agreements signed between Brazilian and African universities for the exchange of students and encouragement of research.

Africa has changed and Brazil is aware of this, hence the continued strengthening of relations between Brazil and countries on the African continent. The political stability of countries such as Angola and the discovery of mineral resources such as oil and natural gas, in Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe, make the African continent increasingly attractive to Brazil from an economic point of view. In addition, Brazil's position in relation to this community favors the principle of self-determination, considering that, in addition to political autonomy, the states in question have a higher percentage of economic autonomy.

The geographical positioning of the African continent and the proximity to Brazil also facilitates the maintenance of these relations. Whether due to the size of the population, political stability, or the presence of natural resources, Angola is strategic for the maintenance of Brazil-Portuguese African relations. Cape Verde, in turn, is geographically attractive to Brazil in view of its position in the Atlantic Ocean in relation to Africa and Europe.

It is also worth mentioning the prospect of infrastructure growth to be implemented by large Brazilian companies, especially construction companies, in those countries, in

addition to the projection of an increase in consumer markets for products exported from Brazil, ratifies this interest.

The greatest challenge that has been presented and that hinders the maintenance of these relations is the constant political instability with constant change of rulers still present in these African states, in addition to the existence of armed military conflicts, as well as the economic instability that has severe repercussions on the development capacity of these countries.

Such relations are also hampered by the current political and financial instability experienced by Brazil, which has repercussions on its international policies, as well as its low capacity for international financing to African countries, which places it at a disadvantage in relation to other countries, such as China, much more economically stabilized and with a greater possibility of exploiting raw materials and making investments in infrastructure and trade with the United States. African countries.

REFERENCES

1. ARON, R. (1979). Paz e guerra entre as nações. Editora Universidade de Brasília.
2. MATENCIO, J. E. (1975). Qué es la geopolítica (2ª ed.). Editorial Pleamar.
3. BANCO MUNDIAL. (2017a). São Tomé e Príncipe: aspectos gerais. Portal do Banco Mundial. Disponível em: <http://www.worldbank.org/pt/country/saotome/overview> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
4. BANCO MUNDIAL. (2017b). Pobreza no mundo. Portal do Banco Mundial. Disponível em: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/site-content/wdi/maps/maps-wdi-2016-sec-1-poverty.png> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
5. BRASIL. (2017). Exportações - Ministério da Indústria, Comércio Exterior e Serviços – MDIC. Portal Aliceweb. Disponível em: <http://alicesweb.mdic.gov.br/> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
6. BRITO, L. B. (2011). A presença chinesa em Angola: ameaças e oportunidades para o Brasil. Portal Academia. Disponível em: https://www.academia.edu/3827557/A_PRESEN%C3%87A_CHINESA_EM_ANGOLA_AMEA%C3%87AS_E_OPORTUNIDADES_PARA_O_BRASIL (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
7. CARVALHO JUNIOR, M. C. (2011). A presença da China na África e as ameaças ao Brasil. Informativo de Comércio Exterior AEB, 108(22), 1-20.
8. FINGERMAN, N. N. (2012). Comentários à obra África parceira do Brasil Atlântico – relações internacionais do Brasil e da África no início do século XXI. Revista Século XXI, 3(1).
9. FUNDO MONETÁRIO INTERNACIONAL. (2017a). Crescimento do PIB por Região. Portal do FMI. Disponível em: <http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
10. FUNDO MONETÁRIO INTERNACIONAL. (2017b). Crescimento real de PIB. Portal do FMI. Disponível em: http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORD (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
11. HERMANN, C. (1990). Changing course: When governments choose to redirect foreign policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(1), 3-22.
12. INSTITUTO INTERNACIONAL DA LÍNGUA PORTUGUESA. (2014). Parlamento Europeu abre exposição sobre Língua Portuguesa. Portal Wordpress. Disponível em: <https://iilp.wordpress.com/2014/02/18/parlamento-europeu-abre-exposicao-sobre-lingua-portuguesa/> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).

13. LECHINI, G. (2008). O Brasil na África ou a África no Brasil? A construção da política africana pelo Itamaraty. Revista Nueva Sociedad. Disponível em: <http://www.cebri.com.br/midia/documentos/318.pdf> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
14. LIMA, M. R. S. (1982). Notas sobre as relações Brasil-África no contexto da política externa brasileira. Estudos Afro-Asiáticos, 6(7).
15. MARQUESE, R. de B. (2006). A dinâmica da escravidão no Brasil. Resistência, tráfico negreiro e alforrias, séculos XVII a XIX. Novos estudos (versão eletrônica). CEBRAP, São Paulo.
16. MIYAMOTO, S. (2014). Geopolítica, Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais. Acta Geográfica, Boa Vista (RR): Edit. Esp. Geografia Política e Geopolítica.
17. PIMENTEL, J. V. de S. (2000). Relações entre o Brasil e a África Subsaariana. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 43(1). Disponível em: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292000000100001 (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
18. PORTAL DW. (2017a). Cronologia do conflito entre a RENAMO e o Governo de Moçambique. Portal DW. Disponível em: <http://www.dw.com/pt-002/cronologia-do-conflito-entre-a-renamo-e-o-governo-de-moçambique/a-19105846> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
19. PORTAL DW. (2017b). Conflitos e violência aumentam o número de refugiados em África. Portal DW. Disponível em: <http://www.dw.com/pt-002/conflitos-e-viol%C3%Aancia-aumentam-o-n%C3%BAmero-de-refugiados-em-%C3%A1frica/a-18528015> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
20. PORTAL MOÇAMBIQUE PARA TODOS. (2016). Moçambique encerra 2016 com uma inflação de 25%. Portal Moçambique para Todos. Disponível em: http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/2017/01/mo%C3%A7ambique-encerra-2016-com-uma-infla%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-25-ine.html (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
21. PORTAL TRADING ECONOMICS. (2018). Inflação de Angola. Portal Trading Economics. Disponível em: <http://pt.tradingeconomics.com/angola/inflation-cpi> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
22. RIBEIRO, C. O. (2007). Relações Político-Comerciais Brasil-África (1985-2006) (Tese de doutorado, Universidade de São Paulo). Disponível em: <https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-31102007-145644/pt-br.php> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
23. RIZZI, K. R. (2012). O grande Brasil e os pequenos PALOP: a política externa brasileira para Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau e São Tomé e Príncipe (1974/2010) (Tese de doutorado, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul). Disponível em: <http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/handle/10183/54081> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).

24. ROSSO, D. D., & DELIBERALI, D. (2015). Relações comerciais Brasil-PALOP (2010-2014): evolução ou estagnação? 1º Seminário Internacional de Ciência Política. Estado e 25. Democracia em mudança no século XXI. Porto Alegre (RS). Disponível em: <https://www.ufrgs.br/sicp/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/3.-ROSSO-Diulia-Dorneles-e-DELIBERALI-Daniel.pdf> (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
26. SARAIVA, J. F. S. (2012). África parceira do Brasil Atlântico – relações internacionais do Brasil e da África no início do século XXI. Editora Fino Traço.
27. SILVA, G. do C. (2003). Geopolítica e poder. Editora Univer Cidade.
28. STOESSINGER, J. G. (1978). O poder das nações. A política internacional de nosso tempo. Editora Cultrix.
29. TRANSPARÊNCIA INTERNACIONAL. (2016). Índices de Percepção de Corrupção 2016. Portal Transparência Internacional. Disponível em: http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 (Acesso em: 5 mai. 2022).
30. VAZ, A. C. (1999). Parcerias estratégicas no contexto da política exterior brasileira: implicações para o MERCOSUL. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 42(2).