



The Master in Rousseau: Authority and Seduction



<https://doi.org/10.56238/levv15n39-042>

Thelma Maria de Moura¹

ABSTRACT

This article is the result of a bibliographic research in the works of the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau with the objective of analyzing the categories authority and seduction as constituents of the figure of the master. From the hypothesis that man, in the state of nature, was endowed with an essentially good soul and the belief that the abandonment of this original state to live in society is responsible for the state of moral degradation in which humanity finds itself, he attributes to education the function of protecting man from the evils to which he is susceptible when living in society. In this process, the formative importance of the relationship between master and disciple assumes centrality, since it requires a pedagogical pact in which the strength of the figure of the master consists precisely in his firm subtlety, whose capacity to lead his disciples is so masterfully ordered, that it makes itself felt as an enchanting freedom of thought and choice.

Keywords: Authority, Education, Philosophy, Mastery, Seduction.

¹ Doctor in Education
Professor of Philosophy of Education
Degree in Pedagogy
Federal Institute of Goiás – Morrinhos Campus



INTRODUCTION

Always present, perfectly penetrating gaze, he lurks. Respectful of a nature that he understands, he makes himself a servant of it. (...) He knows the ends of education. How to designate him A wise man? A guardian angel? A mediator?²

When faced with the question about the origin of inequality among men proposed by the Academy of Dijon³, Rousseau, in order to elaborate his theory, hypothetically goes back to the beginnings of humanity. On this return, one wonders how to return to the primitive without carrying what is civilized that it has in itself.

After admitting the difficulty of the reflection he is about to make, he resorts to a Platonic metaphor that will allow him to introduce more clearly the question he has set out to answer. Using the myth of the statue of Glaucus, he began the discussion about the moral degeneration of man, resulting from the abandonment of natural life and the consequent origin of life in society, to which he attributed the origin of inequality.

Like the statue of Glaucus, which time, sea, and weather had disfigured to such an extent that it resembled more a ferocious animal than a god, the human soul, altered in the bosom of society by a thousand causes ever renewed, by the acquisition of a multitude of knowledge and errors, by the changes that take place in the constitution of bodies, and by the continual clash of passions, so to speak, it has changed its appearance to the point of becoming almost unrecognizable, and instead of a being always acting on certain and invariable principles, instead of that celestial and majestic simplicity with which its author had marked it, there is only the shapeless contrast between the passion that believes it reasons and the delusional understanding (ROUSSEAU, 1978, p.227)

Celebrated in verse by Ovid⁴, the myth of Glaucus refers to a fisherman that the aquatic deities decided to transform into a creature of the sea. Falling in love with the nymph Scylla, and being rejected by her, he undertakes a desperate pursuit of his beloved, until she too is transformed into a monster and rejected by her pursuer.

Plato⁵ refers to the myth of Glaucus as an analogy for the condition in which the human soul finds itself: deformed by its union with the body and with the miseries of man.

What we speak of essence refers to its present conditions; we contemplate it in a state which closely resembles that of Glaucus, the sea-devil in which it is not easy to recognize its primitive nature, for not only has all the parts of the body broken, or worn out and disfigured by the waves, but new parts have been added to it: shells, shells, shells, shells, shells, shells seaweed and pebbles, so that it looks more like a monster than even what it is by nature: this is how the soul presents itself to us, disfigured by countless evils (Plato, *Rep.*X, 611d)

²BURGELIN, P. *Émile ou d'éducation – introductions*. In: *Complete works – Émile*. Paris: Pléiade, 1969.

³ The Academy of Dijon is one of the oldest French academies gathered under the aegis of the prestigious *Institut de France*. Created in 1725 by Pouffier Hector Bernard, it received authorization from the king in 1740 to work in three areas: medicine, physics and morals. A little later it merged with the Literary Society founded by Richard Ruffey and became the Academy of Sciences, Letters and Arts of Dijon. Since its foundation, it has sought to bring the results of significant scientific research in all fields of knowledge to the public. He went down in history by awarding his annual prize to Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1750 for the "Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts". Rousseau competed again, but without obtaining the prize, with another no less important work entitled "Discourse on the origin and foundations of inequality among men", published in 1755. (Source: <http://www.acascia-dijon.fr/accueil/lacademie/histoire-3/> accessed on 15 Feb 2013).

⁴ ALBERTO, Paulo F. *Ovid: Metamorphoses*. Lisbon: Cotovia, 2007.

⁵PLATO. *The Republic*. 3. ed. Belém: EDUFPA, 2000.



For Starobinski (1991), the resumption of the Platonic myth brings with it a dichotomy present in several moments of Rousseau's thought in which the interpretation of Glaucus' deformation bifurcates into two versions: in the first, the human soul had been definitively degenerated and a return to its original purity would be practically impossible. In the second version, just like the mythological statue, the human soul would be hidden, hidden by the vices acquired by life in society.

Rousseau's thought sustains both versions, sometimes simultaneously, affirming that life in society has irremediably destroyed natural identity, but at the same time proclaiming that "the original soul, being indestructible, remains forever identical to itself under the external manifestations that mask it" (STAROBINSKI, 1991, p. 27).

The deformation of the corroded and mutilated face of the statue, covered by algae, shells and pebbles, represents Rousseau's bet on an original and indestructible goodness that is extremely dear to him. He also sustains his belief in the externality of evil, corruption and vices that distort the human soul, which does not degenerate its essence, remaining preserved, although hidden, under the deformed appearance.

Rousseau's conclusion that the original man, living in nature, is good, is the fundamental premise of his pedagogical thought. The challenge posed by this thought would then be to develop a model of education that would form a morally strong man to avoid the perversion introduced by social customs and thus be able to preserve its essential goodness. (so far is the introduction)

ROUSSEAU'S PEDAGOGICAL THOUGHT

From the hypothesis that man, in the state of nature, was endowed with an essentially good soul and the belief that the abandonment of this original state to live in society is responsible for the state of moral degradation in which humanity finds itself, he attributes to education the function of protecting man from the evils to which he is susceptible when living in society.

Rousseau (2004, p.08) expresses his educational ideal in the maxim: "Plants are molded by culture, and men by education". It is in *Emile* that his great project of formation with a view to correcting degradation and giving a character to the human spirit is presented. To form a natural man within society is his goal. The proposed educational project is not limited to school education, which could even compromise the formation of this natural man, but refers to a global action for the development of man and all his needs. It is the project of forming an autonomous man.

Life itself is an educational work that takes place in the intense and constant interaction of man with his environment, for which three types of masters converge: nature, men and things.



The internal development of our faculties and our organs is the education of nature; the use we are taught to make of this development is the education of men; and the acquisition of our own experience about the objects that affect us is the education of things (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 9).

Of the three forms of education, man is master only of the education of men, even if this is limited by external factors that surround the life of the student. Rousseau asserts that the goal of the education of men should not be different from that attributed to the education of nature, considered as the most perfect. The model of education to be followed must, therefore, be in accordance with the natural order.

The scope of this educational work must prioritize the formation of a man, rather than a citizen, in accordance with his primitive dispositions and with the laws of nature that inhabit him. "Forced to fight nature or social institutions, one has to choose between making a man or a citizen, because one cannot do both at the same time" (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 11).

It should not, however, be thought that Rousseau despises the political formation of man. The presence of a synthesis of the *Social Contract* in Book V of *Emile* consists of an intentional choice at a moment in the work in which, having formed a man, the disciple now needs to be formed for social, and therefore political, life.

What needs to be observed is the specificity of education at each stage of life. When he is young, man must be formed in the full sense of natural education so that, only in the fullness of his physical and intellectual strength, when he is ready to understand the moral concepts required for political experience, these concepts can be presented to him without running the risk of degenerating into mistaken concepts or into the very vices that are intended to be avoided.

To educate the natural man, the ideal model could be none other than a domestic or nature education to the detriment of public education which, having public institutions as *its locus par excellence*, is only capable of producing as a result men of two faces, incapable of discerning between their real needs and the illusions produced by social life. Natural education, in turn, takes the form of a negative education.

To form this rare man, what must we do? A lot, no doubt: to prevent something from being done. When it comes to just going against the wind, we bow down; but if the sea is rough and we want to stand still, we must drop anchor. Be careful, young pilot, that your cable does not untie or the anchor does not come loose, and the boat sets adrift before you realize it (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 14).

The trade to be taught to the disciple of natural education is not associated with future social positions. It consists in teaching how to live, to form a man in all that a human being should be, knowing how to face with courage and wisdom both luck and fortune as well as need and deprivation.



Domestic education must begin with the birth of the child, preventing the formation of social prejudices in the mind of the future man. In the first years of life, contrary to the conception in force at the time, Rousseau argues that domestic education should consist less in avoiding death than in care to make the child live actively, allowing the full development of physical strength.

During childhood, dependence on things should play a preponderant role in the child's formation. Only physical obstacles and the consequences of one's own actions should offer formative lessons. "Only experience and impotence should be a law for the child" (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 83). At this age, education should not be effected by reason, because the way of thinking in childhood differs from that of the adult, and only the latter is responsible for the use of reason.

Childhood has ways of seeing, thinking and feeling that are its own; Nothing is less sensible than to wish to substitute our own for these manners, and to me it would be the same thing to require a child to be five feet tall and to have sense at the age of ten. For what good would reason be to him at that age? It is the brake of force, and the child does not need this brake (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p.92).

Only the domination of nature, in the form of necessity, should be felt by the child as a limit to his desires. Otherwise, with verbal lessons and theoretical explanations, the result obtained would be the formation of little flatterers capable of dissimulating their feelings and elaborating various tricks to please whomever they deemed convenient. By proceeding in this way, the disciple would be introduced to the practice of the very vices that he intends to avoid.

Negative education is less concerned with teaching virtue or truth than with protecting the heart against vice and the spirit against error. "By starting by doing nothing, you would have done a prodigy of education" (idem, p. 97). If, on the one hand, it consists of an education founded on the exercise of the body and the senses, it is equally concerned with keeping the soul at rest, postponing for as long as possible the presentation of lessons other than those offered by nature.

As adolescence approaches, the child's strengths develop much more rapidly than his needs. It is time to use this surplus of strength in learning jobs that may be profitable to you in the future. It is time to replace the criterion of necessity with that of utility.

There is, therefore, a choice of the things we are to teach, as well as the proper time to teach them. Of the knowledge that is within our reach, some are false, others are useless and others serve to feed the pride of those who have it. The few who really contribute to our well-being are the only ones worthy of the researches of a wise man, and therefore of a child whom we wish to make wise. It is not a matter of knowing what exists, but only what is useful (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 213).

It is not yet a matter of teaching him what is just and good or the truths that need an already formed understanding. It is about provoking their curiosity so that, instigated by questions for which they perceive a real importance, they find the answer to the problem. Good education, at this time,



"is not about teaching him the sciences, but about giving him the taste to love them and methods to learn them when this taste is more developed" (idem, p. 222).

Teaching the child everything that is useful for his age is the educational maxim when adolescence approaches. It is up to the master to bring about the birth of the desire for knowledge and to provide the disciple with the means to satisfy it. Involved with activities appropriate to his age and seduced by the usefulness of knowledge acquired by his own effort, the child will at the same time be occupied with work that he may need in the future and far from any form of knowledge that is useless and pernicious for his age.

As we enter adolescence, formative problems will become more severe. The questions that the young person will face will no longer be limited to the immediate needs for survival, nor to what will be useful to him. The awakening of sexuality and coexistence in society will require new care and the learning of concepts that until then the master had managed to skillfully keep at a distance.

To be born into social life requires the disciple to put at the service of morality the skills he acquired in the earlier stages of his education. To observe life in society, and to learn from the experience of others the lessons which he should use for himself, will require of the young disciple the development and use of reason in order to avoid the vices which until recently were avoided by ignorance.

Consider that in order to guide an adult, you must take the opposite foot of all that you have done to guide a child. Do not hesitate to inform him of the dangerous mysteries that you have so carefully concealed from him for so long. Since it is finally necessary for you to know them, it is important that you do not get to know them either from someone else, or from yourself, but only through you; since he will henceforth be forced to fight, it is necessary, in order to avoid surprises, that he knows the enemy (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 456).

Educated in this way, in adolescence the disciple will have acquired the conditions for intellectual growth articulated with moral formation. Curiosity will become the engine par excellence for learning to take all its instruments from itself, never to turn to anyone until after it has recognized its insufficiency, "it pays more attention to what is most useful to it and, never departing from this way of appreciating, concedes nothing to opinion" (idem, p. 282).

There are, in all of *Émile's* books, educational principles which, developed in accordance with the care to preserve the heart from vice and the spirit from error, will culminate in the formation of a man and citizen in accordance with a human nature. To develop the virtues necessary for social coexistence, Rousseau points out several situations and precepts that should guide the student throughout his public life. If it is from adolescence that young people awaken to morality, the appeal to nascent reason constitutes at this stage a powerful aid to think about oneself in relation to others and to be aware of life in collectivity.



Even if the disciple acquires good attitudes by imitating the conduct of adults, since he cannot yet reason for himself about the nature of good, it is better for him to do it by imitation than not to do it at all. But this work does not dispense with the freedom that should be the guiding principle of education. By desiring only what he can and doing only what he pleases, his entire formation will be assured so that he becomes an autonomous subject.

The only one who does his will is the one who does not need to put someone else's arm at the end of his own. It follows from this that the first of all goods is not authority, but freedom. The truly free man only wants what he can and does what he pleases. This is my fundamental maxim. It is only a matter of applying it to childhood, and all the rules of education will derive from it (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 81).

When, however, recourse to reason is necessary to guide the young disciple in the uncertain terrain of social life, Rousseau establishes two fundamental steps for dealing with the passions: "This, then, is the summary of all human wisdom regarding the use of the passions: 1. to feel the true relations of man, both in the species and in the individual; 2. to order all the affections of the soul according to these relations" (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 299).

The proper use of reason, associated with self-knowledge, contempt for artificial passions and illusions fed by social life, are the skills that will allow young people to control their passions effectively and become fully master of themselves.

Rousseau's thought, not only in *Emile* but in other works, attributes to education the function of forming this virtuous, free and autonomous man, capable of living in a society of degenerate men without himself suffering the degrading effects of this relationship. But a formative process of this magnitude cannot be conceived as something that can be achieved in a short period of time. The formation of a man is a long project, to be developed over a lifetime.

The requirements for an educational project of this kind to be successful fall especially rigorously on the figure of the one who will be the great architect of the project of man to be built. As a project of human formation in a broad sense, just as the figure of the disciple is essential, the presence and constant care of the master is indispensable. It is on him that the responsibility of being a *gouverneur*, a director of the soul, who does not offer ready-made precepts, but awakens in the disciple the will to seek them.

THE QUALITIES OF THE MASTER: AUTHORITY AND SEDUCTION

The innovative nature of Rousseau's conception of childhood and education finds its synthesis in a pedagogical contract in which the master holds the pedagogical authority necessary for the formation of the disciple. For Dozol (2003), Rousseau builds a hybrid relationship between the master and the disciple, which operates in three directions:



Sometimes it confers on the teacher an absolute power over the student, seeming to adopt, at times, even if supported by a deep knowledge of the childlike nature of man, a refined and innovative pedagogical authoritarianism (...). Sometimes it reveals the child in what particularizes him, defending his free expression and inaugurating a new way of understanding and loving childhood (...). Or, in another guise, it seeks a formula that is guided by a sensitive and rational interaction between two beings involved in a formative process and, at the same time, preserves the identity and role of both (DOZOL, 2003, p.65-66).

This relationship, although consistent with his principles, is nevertheless characterized by a tension that Rousseau will try to transform into an instrument for the conscious and intentional use of the master, on condition that this instrument remains hidden from the eyes of the disciple.

If the first pages of *Emile* already present the fundamental characteristics of his disciple, it is throughout the work that one can identify the essential qualities of the master. These are both physical characteristics – it is recommended that the master be young so that he can establish a close relationship with his disciple – and psychological characteristics such as not being a venal man, being humble and having self-control, becoming an example to be followed.

As a life project, in the model of education thought by Rousseau, the ideal is that the master is the father himself, the main responsible for the cultivation of virtue in the spirit of his child. The child would thus be "better educated by a judicious and limited father than by the most skilled teacher in the world, because zeal will supply talent better than talent with zeal" (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 27). Associated with the care for the conservation of life, the mission he attributes to the father transcends the biological sphere and requires the formation of a complete man, insofar as:

A father, when he begets and supports children, accomplishes only a third of his task. He owes men to his species, he owes sociable men to society, he owes citizens to the state. Every man who can pay this threefold debt and does not pay it is guilty, and perhaps even more guilty when he only pays it in half (*Ibid., Ibid.*).

In the impossibility of such an important mission being carried out by the father, it is recommended that one not hire a venal man, because money will never be able to buy the zeal and affection that are natural to the father figure or a close friend.

The master of Rousseau's education must first possess in the highest degree the qualities he intends to form in his disciple.

Remember that before daring to undertake the formation of a man, one must have become a man; It is necessary to have in itself the example that must be proposed. (...) Make yourselves respectable before all, begin by making yourselves loved, so that each one may seek to please you. You will not be master of the child if you are not master of everything that surrounds it, and this authority will never be sufficient if it is not based on esteem for virtue. (...) Zealous masters, simple, discreet, restrained (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 99-101).

Masters, let the pretenses be virtuous and good, and let your examples be engraved in the memory of your students, while we wait for them to enter their hearts. Instead of rushing to demand from my student some acts of charity, I prefer to do them in his presence... (idem, p. 113-114).



Associated with the moral qualities that will assure him the respect of all those around him and will end up introducing in the heart of the disciple admiration for the master, these qualities are formative conditions in themselves. By means of them, the master will be able to make himself admired. This conquest consists of the foundation of authority and seduction, fundamental means for the young person to let himself be directed by the adult. The master will conquer formative authority to the same extent that he manages to seduce the disciple, making himself heard and respected not by an external or conventional force, but by constituting himself in such a respectable figure that it will be irresistible to the disciple the desire to accompany him.

When, however, they consider each other as people who must spend their days together, it is important for them to make themselves loved by each other, and for this very reason they become dear. The student does not blush to follow in childhood the friend he should have as an adult; the preceptor is interested in works whose fruit he should reap, and all the merit he gives to his student is a capital that he applies in favor of his old age (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 33).

This is the pact that must be established between the two parties in order to ensure the success of the formative work. The relationship between master and disciple is not natural, but the result of this pedagogical contract, in which the latter grants authority over himself to the former. This pedagogical authority, as a form of consented power, finds its legitimacy in the fact that it is consensual.

Francisco (1999) recognizes in Rousseau's pedagogical contract two fundamental clauses for establishing a true relationship. As a fundamental condition, and first clause, in the pedagogical relationship one must lead and the other must be led, because the power relationship is immanent to the pedagogical relationship.

The command condition is essentially an attribute of the master. Just as nature is the first and greatest teacher, the model to be followed, in the same way, with regard to the education of men, the preceptor is the one who holds the function of command.

It should be noted, however, that guidance and command are a temporary condition and admitted only for the purpose of building in the disciple the qualities necessary for autonomy. "In fact, the ultimate purpose of the teaching authority is the construction of the autonomous student, as a free person, a subject capable of self-determination, of dispensing, in short, with any conduct of others" (FRANCISCO, 1999, p. 106).

The second clause conditions the master's command to the condition that it is only exercised with the purpose of benefiting the student with an adequate education from the point of view of his growth and the promotion of his autonomy. Teaching authority is conditioned to be exercised only for the benefit of those who submit to it.

This benefit does not mean that the master must yield to the immediate desires and whims of his disciple. The second clause should be understood as an intentional investment by the entire teaching authority in activities aimed at the formation of autonomy and natural virtues, even if this is not perceived at first by the student.

The challenge posed to the teacher is to elaborate and develop appropriate strategies to establish the pedagogical contract along the lines exposed above, ensuring its authority in a way that is not perceived by the student.

May he always believe himself to be the master, and may you always be one. There is no subjection more perfect than that which preserves the appearance of freedom; thus its own will is captivated (...) no doubt it must only do what it wants, but it must only want what you want it to do. It must not take a step without you having foreseen it; he should not open his mouth without knowing what he is going to say (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 140).

Establishing a formative relationship in which the master's direction is felt as freedom of choice by the student: this is one of the central points. To form a man in consonance with natural education, the teacher must never make explicit his authority as a power of command. Every movement of the student must be foreseen and arrangements must be made so that he walks in the desired direction without his noticing it.

The fact that he is not recognized by the disciple as a despotic authority, but as a companion in activities, a friendly presence, an accomplice in the games as well as in the works, a discreet gaze that never reproaches, but always ready to welcome, constitutes the foundation of true authority, the origin of the seduction that the master exercises over the student.

The seduction of mastery cannot be understood as a degenerate form of power. Whether it is invested in a person, or refers to the strategies to involve the young person in educational activities, it is something that emanates from the moral authority of the adult, who makes himself admired, who becomes attractive by his posture before the disciple in a particular way and the world in general.

The young man is not coerced to obey the master, nor to develop activities to please him. He does so because he finds himself under the strong impression that the fascination of the preceptor exerts on his youthful spirit. He develops the activities because he feels truly impelled to do them, without perceiving the work of his protector. It starts from a pseudo-absence of authority, if evaluated from the student's angle, but not from the absence of authority in fact.

However, the use of authority cannot be the same in childhood, adolescence and adulthood. When the disciple is able to reason for himself, he will voluntarily grant the master the authority that is due to him, the result of the recognition for the care given to him during the previous phases of his life. But first, it is necessary to direct it first from the physical point of view, then from the intellectual point of view, so that it is capable of being sufficient for itself.



After developing character and cultivating reason as moderators of temperament, nascent sensibility, and impressions caused by sensible objects, authority will assume another form from the appearance of the passions. The conformation of the body, the formation of one's own judgment and the moral formation will have a more intense impact on the adolescent.

This phase poses another type of problem for the master, whose meaning will only be achieved through the understanding of Rousseau's program in its broadest dimension: moral and political formation of man with a view to his own happiness. To carry it out, a student must be formed who is capable of resisting his inclinations (passions) and of always choosing duty.

But man, in general, was not made to remain always in childhood. It comes out of it at the time indicated by nature, and this moment of crisis, although very short, has long influences. As the lowing of the sea precedes the storm from afar, this stormy revolution is announced by the murmur of the nascent passions; a mute fermentation announces the approach of danger. A change in mood, frequent outbursts, a continual agitation of spirit make the child almost indisciplinable. She becomes deaf to the voice that made her docile; it is a lion in its fever; it does not know its guide, it no longer wants to be governed (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 286).

Admiration and affection for the master will constitute the link that will ensure his ascendancy over the disciple. This ascendancy must be consciously accepted and desired.

When, by the signs of which I have spoken, you sense the critical moment, immediately cease to use the old tone towards it, forever. He is still your disciple, but he is no longer your pupil. He is your friend, he is a man, treat him from now on as such (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 453).

Authority had formerly been won by cunning, and had remained unknown to the young heart, for it was necessary to force or deceive it to obtain its obedience. From now on, ignorance will not be the best ally of authority, it will be necessary to have the help of intelligence to help the adolescent to discern the questions that provoke his spirit and sensitivity.

From adolescence onwards, the teacher should, when necessary, address the student with gravity, taking care that these attacks are not made without an attraction that arouses interest. At all times, he must listen to what nature says, without ever trying to hold its course, stifle the imagination or fight against the desires of the young man.

To preserve his condition of mastery, he must speak to the young person in such a way that he becomes his confidant, producing in his conversations a charm that pleases the one who listens. Skilled in the use of words, he will use only those that are convenient to the conjuncture to which the progress of the years has brought him.

In order for the master to continue with his formation program, it is essential that the disciple ratifies his authority, feeling and understanding that the exercise of it is aimed at his own good. The time will come when the young man, recognizing the faithful and protective company, the efforts and



the zeal given to him by his devoted preceptor, will voluntarily place himself under the master's government:

My friend, my protector, my master, take back the authority you want to abdicate at the moment when it is most important to me that you remain; until now you only had it because of my weakness, but now you will have it by my will, and so it will be more sacred to me (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p. 468).

In spite of the disciple's acknowledgment and his appeals to him to remain in authority, the need to use it must be skillfully removed by the master. The choices to be made should never be imposed. Trust, the exchange of confidences and the orientation of the use of pleasures should always be carried out from the knowledge of the nature of the disciple, respecting the inclinations of his age and never sacrificing the present with a view to the construction of a future happiness. With the development of autonomy, the recognition of authority and the feeling of admiration will only increase in the heart of the disciple.

Even when his fictitious student, Emile, falls in love, the master retains his authority, becomes his confidant. According to Starobinsky (2011, p. 184), the "Rousseauian hero is at once a master of wisdom and a seducer. (...) He is less attached to possessing bodies than to fascinating souls and becoming the confidant of consciences."

Even in this very delicate phase of the student's life, the figure of the master is found as a moral example, to whom authority and seduction converge inseparably. The image of an exemplary master must be carefully constructed in the mind of the disciple, because the condition of mastery is not a hierarchical position externally imposed, but a condition conquered from actions performed, moral conduct, behavior towards the disciple and life (DOZOL, 2003).

Mastery is the result of merit. The virtue of the master was built from the intentional effort to conquer the government of oneself, by experiencing the joys and pains in becoming man. The capacity for self-government is a condition for exercising the government of others.

The superiority of the master is a condition for the disciple to place his trust in him and recognize him as someone who is beyond his own limitations. This confidence will be, however, different in childhood and adolescence. If in the first there is no awareness of it, in the second, there is a consciously felt confidence. Regarding this second modality of trust, Rousseau writes:

The confidence he must have in his preceptor is of another kind: it must concern the authority of reason, the superiority of the lights, the advantages which the boy is in a position to perceive and whose usefulness he feels. Long experience has convinced him that he is loved by his guide; that this guide is a wise, enlightened man, who, wanting his happiness, knows what he can provide for it (Idem, p. 343).



Confidence in the affection of his preceptor, coupled with recognition of his wisdom and moral virtues, makes such a deep impression on the young man that he feels compelled to listen to his teachings and to desire to imitate him.

Moral force, in order to result in a seductive authority, cannot be clothed in an arrogant pedantry founded on a false model of perfection. The master, to be admired, must adopt a humble posture, assuming his mistakes and recognizing his weaknesses, "show your weaknesses to your student if you want to heal his; let him see in you the same battles that he fights, learn to conquer himself by your example" (ROUSSEAU, 2004, p.482).

Finally, thinking about mastery in Rousseau's work implies recognizing that the seduction exercised by the master is not guided by the social parameters established by the time in which he lived. The forms of seduction existing in the eighteenth century resulted in the denial of individual singularities and the corruption of customs. Against this model, he establishes the image of a master of simple tastes, reserved when it comes to social life, a lover of natural things and life in the countryside.

The strength of the Rousseauian master's seduction consists precisely in not being immediately felt. "A silence full of meaning will permeate the coexistence between master and disciple" (DOZOL, 2003, p. 134). Present at all times of the young man's life, the direction he exerts on his actions is that of an organization so masterfully ordered that it makes itself felt as an enchanting freedom of thought and choice.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The formative importance of the relationship between master and disciple, teacher and student, cannot be supplanted without serious damage to human formation. The figure of the master, that great maestro of human formation - a simple and seductive figure, discreet, but always present, promoter of autonomy without ever abdicating authority - is in question today.

In the face of the pulverization of training objectives and strategies, the proliferation of distance education programs, many of them in "virtual" learning environments, associated with an indiscriminate and thoughtless use of increasingly sophisticated technological resources that dispense with immediate interaction between teacher and student, it is essential that pedagogical action be constantly thought of from a radical search for its nature.

In today's world, the instrumentalization of thought requires increasingly instantaneous results. Reflection on moral and philosophical issues has been supplanted by the empire of technology and innovation. The capacity of human thought to transcend what is immediately accessible is threatened by a pedagogy of results, in which the teacher must be an "entrepreneur" and the student, alienated from his human dimension, begins to play "social roles" that must place him in



conditions of employability. Against this reductionist understanding of education which, as in the myth of Glaucus, reduces reason "to the shapeless contrast between the passion that believes it reasons and the delusional understanding," Rousseau's pedagogical thought provokes those who think about education to seek a purpose whose objective is more than mere specialization. Its proposal is based on a formative relationship that can never be replaced by any technological resource.

Promoting the figure of the master to a central position in education, constituted from authority and seduction, Rousseau establishes a formative model in which the master/disciple relationship and the moral force of example are indispensable dimensions for the formation of the autonomous man, whose main job is the art of living.



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